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Abstract 
This thesis examines the application of Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes (STAMP) in healthcare and the analysis of patient safety incidents. 
Healthcare organisations have a responsibility for the safety of the patients 
they are treating. This includes the avoidance of unintended or unexpected 
harm to people during the provision of care. Patient safety incidents, that is 
adverse events where patients are harmed, are investigated and analysed as 
accidents are in other safety-critical industries, to gain an understanding of 
failure and to generate recommendations to prevent similar incidents occurring 
in the future. However, there is some dissatisfaction with the current quality of 
incident analysis in healthcare. 
There is dissatisfaction with the recommendations that are generated from 
healthcare incident analysis which are felt to produce weak and ineffective 
remedial actions, often including retraining of individuals and small policy 
change. Issues with current practice have been linked to the use of Root Cause 
Analysis (RCA), an analysis method that often results in the understanding of 
an accident as being the result of a linear chain of events. This type of simple 
linear approach has been the target of criticism in safety science research and 
is not felt to be effective in the analysis of incidents in complex systems, such 
as healthcare.  
Research in accident analysis methods has developed from a focus on 
technical failure and individual human actions to consideration of the 
interactions between people, technology and the organisation. Accident 
analysis methods have been developed that guide investigations to 
consideration of the whole system and interactions between system 
components. These system approaches are judged to be superior to simple 
linear approaches by the research community, however, they are not currently 
used in healthcare incident investigation practice. 
The systems approach of STAMP is felt to be a promising method for the 
improvement of healthcare incident analysis. STAMP strongly embodies the 
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concepts of systems theory and analyses human decision-making. The 
application of STAMP in healthcare was investigated through three case 
studies, which applied STAMP in: 
1. The analysis of the large-scale organisational failure at Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Trust between 2005-2009. 
2. The analysis of a common small-scale hospital-based medication 
prescription error. 
3. The analysis of patient suicide in the community-based services of a 
Mental Health Trust. 
The effectiveness of the STAMP applications was evaluated with feedback 
from healthcare stakeholders on the usability and utility of STAMP and 
discussion of the STAMP applications against criteria for accident analysis 
models and methods. 
Healthcare stakeholders were generally positive about the utility of STAMP, 
finding it to provide a system view and guide consideration of interactions 
between system components. They also felt it would help them generate 
recommendations and were positive about the future application of STAMP in 
healthcare. However, many felt it to be a complicated method that would need 
specialist expertise to apply. The STAMP applications demonstrated the ability 
of STAMP to consider the whole system and guide an analysis to the 
generation of recommendations for system measures to prevent future 
incidents. 
From the findings of the research, recommendations are made to improve 
STAMP and to assist future applications of STAMP in healthcare. The 
research also discusses the other factors that influence incident analysis 
beyond that of the analytical approach used and how these need to be 
considered to maximise the effectiveness of STAMP.   
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Chapter 1  - Introduction 
1.1 The research problem 
In the year 2000, reports from the UK’s Department of Health (Department of 
Health, 2000) and the USA’s Institute of Medicine (Institute of Medicine, 2000) 
attracted much attention to the issue of patient safety in healthcare. In the UK’s 
NHS hospitals it was estimated that adverse events causing harm to patients 
occur in around 10% of admissions, costing around £2 billion a year in 
additional hospital stays (Department of Health, 2000). Both reports discuss 
the importance of building up knowledge and learning through the effective 
investigation and analysis of adverse events, which can be used to develop 
remedial actions for safety improvement.  
In the present day (2018), concerns have been raised about the effectiveness 
of current practice regarding the investigation and analysis of healthcare 
adverse events in both the UK and USA. Issues around the quality of 
investigations and their resulting ineffective recommendations, which often 
focus on retraining frontline staff and small policy change, have been linked to 
both practical and theoretical limitations. Investigations are undertaken by 
clinical professionals who lack the time and safety expertise for comprehensive 
investigation (Peerally et al., 2016; Trbovich and Shojania, 2017). Theoretical 
concerns regard the prominent use of the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
technique which is limited by its reductionist nature (Wu, Lipshutz and 
Pronovost, 2008; Kellogg et al., 2016; Peerally et al., 2016; Trbovich and 
Shojania, 2017).  
Potential pitfalls in incident or accident investigation and analysis have been 
known to the safety research community for some time. Accident investigation 
is used in other safety critical industries, such as aviation, nuclear and rail, to 
learn from failure and create action plans to avoid future occurrence (Salmon 
et al. 2011). With these safety critical industries in mind, there have been 
continual research efforts to improve safety knowledge and investigation and 
analysis methods. This knowledge should be of benefit to healthcare in their 
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learning from adverse events and development of effective safety 
improvements. 
When studying past events, the objectivity of an investigation can be 
compromised by psychological bias. One bias, the hindsight bias, occurs due 
to the investigator having knowledge of the outcome of an event and working 
backwards to try to understand how this event occurred (Woods and Cook, 
1999). The knowledge of outcome gives rise to the tendency for those making 
judgements of past events to overestimate the how foreseeable an outcome 
would be to those involved at the time of the event (who would not have 
knowledge of outcome) (Fischhoff, 1975; Woods and Cook, 1999). Further to 
this, there is an outcome bias, where a negative outcome, as in an adverse 
event such as a patient suicide, can influence the judgement of the processes 
and decisions linked to that outcome. Research has shown that those with 
knowledge of a negative outcome, judge the process, decision or action linked 
to that outcome more severely (Woods and Cook, 1999).  
Accident analysis is shaped by explanations of cause, with an investigation 
normally stopped when an investigator is satisfied with the identification of 
causes and the explanation of an accident (Rasmussen, 1990).  This 
satisfaction is based on an investigator’s subjective stop-rules which are 
influenced by their background knowledge and practical considerations, 
reasons for stopping include: the inability to follow a causal path due to missing 
information; a familiar abnormal event is found to be a reasonable explanation; 
or, a cure is available (Rasmussen, 1990). Investigations can be open to the 
influence of organisational culture and an analyst’s own self-interest (Dien, 
Dechy and Guillaume, 2012). Investigation outcomes may be influenced by 
organisational hierarchy, with efforts made to protect the organisational image 
and the role of senior managers (Dien, Dechy and Guillaume, 2012).  
These pitfalls can lead investigations towards a narrow focus on human error 
and the actions of those closest to an incident, the frontline workers (Woods 
and Cook, 1999). However, research in safety argues that accidents in 
complex systems, such as healthcare, are rarely singularly caused by the 
actions of individual workers (Perrow, 1984; Rasmussen, 1990; Reason, 1995). 
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Rather than explaining accidents as simply resulting from errors of frontline 
workers, knowledge from safety research guides us to view them as a 
symptom of deeper system problems. Furthermore, frontline workers are 
viewed as the creators of safety with their adaptations and actions often 
diverting potential accidents before they happen (Woods and Cook, 2002; 
Hollnagel, 2014).     
Research on accident causality has fed into the development of models and 
methods to guide investigations and analyses to be more systematic and 
objective. Accident causation models underpin approaches to accident 
investigation and influence how data are collected, how causal factors are 
identified and how an accident is explained (Leveson, 2004; Lundberg, 
Rollenhagen and Hollnagel, 2009). Some accident models, such as the 
Domino Model (Heinrich, 1931), view accidents as the result of a simple linear 
chain of events. These models may work well for simple systems and failures 
of physical components, but are not thought to be sufficient for the investigation 
of accidents in complex systems (Leveson, 2004). A different type of accident 
causation model has been developed for large, complex systems, with their 
multiple interactions between people, technology, policy and different 
organisational levels (Leveson, 2004). These systemic accident analysis 
methods and causation models, based on systems-theory, attempt to expand 
investigations beyond proximate events and use hierarchical system modelling 
to assist in the identification of organisational and structural deficiencies 
(Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000; Leveson, 2004). However, there is a gap 
between the systemic methods most recently developed in safety research 
and their adoption in industry incident investigation practices (Underwood, 
2013).  
In healthcare, the flawed adverse event (accident) investigation practices rely 
heavily on RCA (Wu, Lipshutz and Pronovost, 2008; Kellogg et al., 2016; 
Peerally et al., 2016). RCA is based on a simple event chain accident 
causation model (Hollnagel, 2004) and may not be the most suitable technique 
for analysing accidents in healthcare systems. There is reason to believe that 
the adoption of a systems approach could be of benefit to healthcare. However, 
healthcare has had limited exposure to systems-theory based approaches to 
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accident analysis and there is little evidence of their application in the UK. 
Furthermore, there is limited understanding of how a systems approach could 
be integrated into healthcare accident analysis given the practical limitations 
of current practice. This is the area this research aims to address and provides 
the motivation for the studies that form this thesis. 
1.2 Systemic accident analysis and the focus on STAMP 
There are three main systemic accident analysis methods that have been 
identified, regularly used and cited in safety literature (Salmon et al., 2011; 
Underwood and Waterson, 2012; Underwood, 2013), those being: AcciMap 
(Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000); Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2004, 2012); and Systems-Theoretic Accident Modelling 
and Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004, 2012).  
Both AcciMap and STAMP model systems in node-link diagrams (Ware, 2013) 
as hierarchical structures that represent different levels of a sociotechnical 
system. In AcciMap the causal factors of an accident are identified at the 
different levels of the hierarchy and represented as the nodes, with the factors 
linked to their effects to illustrate how one factor influenced the other (Branford, 
Naikar and Hopkins, 2009), an illustrative example is provided in Figure 1. This 
causal linkage shows similarities with event chain methods, which are 
criticised for the subjectivity in identifying the causal links between events 
(Leveson, 2004). Hollnagel has previously noted a similarity between AcciMap, 
the Domino Model and RCA in their focus on causal factors (Hollnagel, 2012) 
and this is a potential limitation of AcciMap. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that while the levels of the hierarchy facilitate the analysis and 
graphical representation, the levels constrain the analysis by limiting it to these 
levels, which are perhaps not generally applicable to all work systems 
(Hollnagel, 2012). This thesis seeks to improve the analytical approach to 
patient safety incident investigation and analysis, which currently involves RCA, 
due to AcciMap’s focus on causal factors, it is felt that it may not be optimal for 
providing a different perspective to incident analysis than provided in current 
practice.   
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Figure 1 Generic AcciMap example, adapted from Rasmussen and Svedung 2000 
The developer of AcciMap, Jens Rasmussen, also developed the Risk 
Management Framework (RMF) and ActorMap (Rasmussen, 1997; 
Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000), with an example shown in Figure 2. The 
RMF views risk management as a control problem, with accidents and 
incidents seen as resulting from the loss of control of a hazardous physical 
process capable of injuring people or damaging property (Rasmussen, 1997).  
The RMF models the sociotechnical system involved in risk management and 
the multiple levels of decision-making including politicians, managers and work 
planners involved in the control of safety by the use of laws, rules and 
instructions (Rasmussen, 1997). Rather than focussing on an event chain, the 
model represents the actions decision-makers take to control safety (down 
arrows) and the information they receive from the lower system levels to inform 
them of the status of the work system (up arrows). AcciMap can be used in 
conjunction with the RMF (Waterson and Jenkins, 2010) but it is often used 
23 
 
alone and AcciMap method guidance describes AcciMap as a stand-alone 
method (Branford, Naikar and Hopkins, 2009).  
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Figure 2 The socio-technical system involved in risk management, adapted from Rasmussen 
1997 
STAMP, developed by Nancy Leveson, builds on the ideas behind the RMF.  
Noting some limitations of the RMF, the development of STAMP sought to 
emphasise system development processes alongside operations and 
components of control beyond information flow. Furthermore, the developer 
aimed to provide a classification of specific factors involved in accidents 
(Leveson, 2004).  
In analysing an accident, STAMP explains accidents as the result of 
inadequate enforcement of safety-related constraints. STAMP models the 
control structure (see Figure 3) in place to enforce safety constraints on system 
development and system operation. Work systems are viewed as interrelated 
components that are kept in dynamic equilibrium by control-feedback loops 
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(Leveson, 2004). The control structure model includes the controllers in the 
system, those being the individuals, groups and technology that can influence 
the behaviour and status of the system (Leveson, 2012). These controllers are 
represented as nodes, with the links between the nodes representing the 
control-feedback loops. The down arrows represent a reference channel and 
the control actions taken to enforce safety constraints on the system level 
below. The up arrows represent a measuring channel and the feedback of 
information on the status of the lower system level that is returned so the 
controller can adapt its behaviour and control actions if necessary (Leveson, 
2004, 2012, 2015). The operating process in the bottom right corner of Figure 
3 shows a model of decision-making, this accommodates the need to consider 
the role that human decisions and the interactions among decisions by multiple, 
interacting decision makers play in accidents (Leveson, 2004). 
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Figure 3 Generic STAMP control structure model, adapted from Leveson 2012 
STAMP benefits from considering and modelling the control-feedback 
connections between system components, rather than causal links between 
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events. STAMP also clearly embodies systems theory concepts (Underwood 
and Waterson, 2014), but it may have a limitation in its usability characteristics 
and practitioners have previously reported difficulties in using STAMP 
(Underwood, Waterson and Braithwaite, 2016). It should be mentioned that 
AcciMap may benefit from greater usability, but this author feels that STAMP 
has more potential to provide a different perspective to patient safety incidents, 
by shifting focus away from causal links. STAMP also further benefits from 
giving more emphasis to system development alongside system operation. 
FRAM is another option as a systemic approach to accident analysis. It is an 
interesting approach, quite distinct from AcciMap and STAMP in that it does 
not include a hierarchical model of a sociotechnical system and is more 
focussed on performance variability. When used in accident analysis, FRAM 
is said to consider what should have gone right, but did not, rather than 
focussing on what went wrong (Hollnagel, 2012). The developer of FRAM, Erik 
Hollnagel, criticises both AcciMap and STAMP, stating that the methods are 
limited by their reliance on a system model or model of an accident. Hollnagel 
suggests the models place an a priori interpretive structure on the accident 
event, which means the value of the results are dependent on the correctness 
of the model. Although the model improves the efficiency of the approach, 
simplified models may contain incorrect assumptions (Hollnagel, 2012). It is 
true that for system models to be usable they need to provide some 
simplification of reality and assumptions are made, however system models 
provide useful tools for the communication of results and ideas (Hettinger et 
al., 2015). FRAM does use some graphical descriptions of its results, but the 
graphical element is relatively unstructured and Hollnagel considers FRAM a 
method not a model, contrasting the approach with STAMP and AcciMap. The 
main problem this author had with FRAM when considering the use of the 
method was the difficulty in understanding the approach. There was also a lack 
of example applications to guide understanding at the time of this research. 
These difficulties meant FRAM was not given further consideration for use. 
In summary, STAMP is chosen as the focus of this research for several 
reasons, namely: its theoretical underpinning in systems theory and clear 
embodiment of systems theory concepts (Underwood and Waterson, 2014); 
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its movement away from identifying causal links between events; its structured 
consideration of human decision-making (Leveson, 2012), a critical 
component in the operation of healthcare systems; and the availability of 
method guidance (Leveson, 2012) and example applications (Leveson et al., 
2016; Pawlicki et al., 2016; Raman et al., 2016).  
1.3 Research aims and objectives 
This research aims to further the current understanding of the application of 
STAMP to healthcare incident analysis by meeting the following objectives: 
• To describe the known issues in healthcare incident analysis current 
practice. 
• To evaluate the application of STAMP to healthcare incident analysis 
with healthcare stakeholder input. 
• To examine the effectiveness of the approach and issues regarding its 
adoption. 
1.4 Research questions 
With the stated research aims and objectives in mind the following research 
questions will be addressed: 
• How do healthcare stakeholders perceive the usability and utility of 
STAMP in application to healthcare incident analysis? 
• How effective is STAMP in healthcare incident analysis?  
o Can STAMP be used in the analysis of different types of 
healthcare incident? 
o Can STAMP be used in the analysis of individual incidents and 
the aggregated analysis of multiple incident data sets? 
1.5 Research scope 
With the research undertaken in England, it is focussed on the UK’s National 
Health Service (NHS) healthcare system. STAMP is applied to incidents, or 
adverse events, within the NHS.  
The NHS is a huge organisation employing over 1.5 million people (NHS 
Choices, 2016) with a budget of around £123.5 billion for 2017/18 (Department 
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of Health, 2015). The government is responsible for healthcare in the UK, with 
the NHS funded by taxation and free at the point of use for all UK residents 
(NHS Choices, 2016), with the NHS in England dealing with over one million 
patients every 36 hours (NHS Choices, 2016). 
The NHS has a responsibility for the safety of the patients they are treating 
and define patient safety as the avoidance of unintended or unexpected harm 
to people during the provision of health care (NHS Improvement, no date).  
NHS organisations are advised to record incidents relating to patient safety so 
learning can take place to reduce the risk of similar incidents occurring again, 
the NHS National Reporting and Learning System receives over two million 
reports each year (NHS Improvement, 2017). 
1.5.1 Terminology 
Within safety literature, and NHS patient safety practice and documentation, 
the terms accident, incident and adverse event are all used to refer to events 
where something has gone wrong. Definitions of these terms can differ greatly 
between industries and disciplines. Leveson (Leveson 2012, p. 181) has given 
a definition of an accident as: ‘an undesired or unplanned event that results in 
a loss of human life or human injury, property damage, environmental pollution, 
mission loss, etc.’ The Leveson definition is used within this thesis for accident, 
incident and encompasses other terms for patient safety incidents such as 
adverse event. 
1.6 Thesis structure 
The thesis structure is shown in Figure 4. The thesis is comprised of eight 
chapters which are summarised below: 
Chapter 1 - This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. Introducing the 
research problem, the research aims, objectives and questions, and the 
structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 - The second chapter presents a review of the background literature 
most relevant to the thesis. This includes literature on accident investigation, 
accident analysis methods and issues in healthcare incident investigation. 
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Chapter 3 - This chapter describes the research approach, research design, 
methodology and ethical approval process for this research. Case study 
procedures are detailed, including the criteria for evaluating STAMP 
applications. 
Chapter 4 - This chapter presents the first case study applying STAMP in 
healthcare. The case study begins with an interview study investigating the 
issues with current practice healthcare incident investigation. Following this, 
STAMP is applied to the large-scale failings at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust 
and its hospital between 2005 and 2009. The reports from the public inquiry 
into the events are used as data for the analysis. This is combined with 
interviews and a workshop with healthcare stakeholders to gain insight into 
their perceptions of the usability and utility of STAMP.  
Chapter 5 – Following on from Case Study 1, this chapter presents the second 
case study which examines the application of STAMP to a small-scale 
hospital-based medication incident. STAMP is applied with input from the 
healthcare stakeholders involved in the original RCA-based investigation. 
Building on from Case Study 1 the stakeholders’ perceptions of STAMP are 
collected.  
Chapter 6 - In this chapter the third case study is presented. STAMP is applied 
in the analysis of 41 suicide incidents of community care patients from one 
Mental Health Trust. The findings from the STAMP analysis are contrasted 
with findings from interviews with 20 community-based mental health 
professionals on how their practice creates safety in suicide prevention. 
Chapter 7 – This chapter discusses the findings of the research and performs 
a cross-case analysis. The themes from the case studies are presented, the 
application of STAMP is evaluated, analytical generalisations made and 
limitations to the research considered. 
Chapter 8 - This chapter summarises the main findings and presents the 
conclusions of the research. The contribution to knowledge is presented and 
the potential for future research is discussed.    
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Figure 4 Outline of thesis 
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Chapter 2  - Background literature 
2.1 Introduction 
To work towards the aims and objectives of this research, a first consideration 
is what has been done before and the background literature to the research 
and research problem. This chapter presents a literature review that sets the 
scene of how issues in healthcare incident analysis relate to the wider accident 
analysis literature and how analytical techniques developed in safety research 
may be able to improve incident investigation in healthcare. The review 
introduces literature on accident analysis in safety critical industries and the 
current state of incident investigation in healthcare. Moving towards ways to 
improve healthcare incident analysis, attention is given to the systemic 
accident analysis techniques most highly valued in safety science research. 
The final sections of the review focus on the application of the systemic 
accident analysis approach of STAMP in healthcare.  
2.2 Identification of literature 
The area of interest for this review, in accident analysis, is a large topic within 
Human Factors and Ergonomics (HFE) and safety literature (Salmon et al., 
2011). The size of the topic does not lend itself well to a systematic search of 
literature, at least for the initial purpose of the review. The author’s education 
in HFE and background reading around the topic area gives an awareness of 
key literature and authors, such as Jens Rasmussen, James Reason, Erik 
Hollnagel and Nancy Leveson. This knowledge was used as a starting point 
for identifying literature for the review.  
Previous work has reviewed accident causation models (Hollnagel, 2004; 
Underwood, 2013) and when new accident analysis methods are introduced 
they tend to be presented with a critique of other methods (Rasmussen and 
Svedung, 2000; Leveson, 2004, 2012; Hollnagel, 2012). Rather than duplicate 
previous work, this review uses this literature to give an overview of accident 
causation models and analysis methods as an introduction into the research 
within this thesis. Similarly, there are numerous textbooks on accident 
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investigation (Johnson, 2003; Salmon et al., 2011) and these are used to give 
an overview of the area. Research in accident analysis has tended to focus on 
developing and refining theories on accident causation and the development 
of methods for accident analysis (Woodcock, 1995). But considerations of bias 
and other factors influencing the outcome of accident investigations are also 
important (Woodcock, 1995) and these are also considered within the review. 
The latter parts of this review concern the application of STAMP in healthcare 
and a literature search is used to identify relevant articles. The strategy used 
here includes the search of a resource provided by the STAMP community at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
(http://sunnyday.mit.edu/STAMP-publications-sorted.pdf), electronic 
databases (Scopus, ScienceDirect and PubMed) and web search engines 
(Google, Google Scholar) with multiple search terms and following reference 
trails provided by identified literature. The review is limited to English language 
literature. 
2.3 Learning from accidents 
Several reasons have been given for studying past events (Benson, 1972), for 
accident analysis, the reasoning would fit with the aim of developing 
systematic knowledge about the world to improve our ability to predict and 
control (Benson, 1972; Fischhoff, 1980). Accident analysis is motivated by the 
future prevention of accidents, which requires that we understand how they 
happen so we can improve our ability to effectively guard against them 
(Hollnagel, 2004). Prior to considering this analysis of accidents, it is first 
necessary to explain what literature in the area considers an accident to be.  
Hollnagel (2004) discusses the origin of the word accident, noting that 
dictionary definitions include reference to unpredictability, lack of human 
intention and loss or injury. The term accident can also be used to refer to an 
event, the outcome of an event, or the possible cause (Hollnagel, 2004). 
Hollnagel (2004) uses the term to refer to the event, not outcome or cause and 
defines an accident as ‘a short, sudden, and unexpected event or occurrence 
that results in an unwanted and undesirable outcome’ (Hollnagel 2004, p. 5). 
The event or occurrence must be the result of human activity, either directly or 
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indirectly (Hollnagel, 2004). Leveson (2012) uses a similar definition, noting 
that definitions of basic terms can differ between disciplines and industries, 
she provides a definition that reflects usage in system safety, defining an 
accident as: ‘An undesired or unplanned event that results in a loss, including 
loss of human life or human injury, property damage, environmental pollution, 
mission loss, etc.’ (Leveson 2012, p. 181). These definitions of an accident 
encompass failures of many forms and degrees of severity, and a range of 
phenomena referred to in safety research and practice, including incidents and 
adverse events (Hollnagel, 2004).      
From the definitions alone, it is obvious why there is a desire to prevent 
accidents and prevention of accidents is of great concern when failure in an 
organisation’s activity has the potential for catastrophic consequences. This is 
the case in so-called safety critical industries such as nuclear, rail, aviation, 
shipping, oil and gas, and healthcare. People using and coming into contact 
with these services place trust in the organisations providing the service to 
prevent accidents and maintain safety (Johnson, 2003). There are numerous 
examples of accidents in these industries with consequences in loss of human 
life, financial cost and damage to an organisation’s reputation. To use just two 
examples to illustrate the cost of accidents: The capsizing of a ferry off the 
coast of Zeebrugge in 1987 involving failure in the closure of the ship’s water 
tight bow doors, was reported to result in 192 people drowning and millions of 
pounds in cost to the organisation that owned the ferry (Hopkins, 1999); The 
1984 toxic gas leak from a chemical plant in Bhopal in India killed at least 2000 
people, injured over 200,000 and resulted in a settlement of $470 million to be 
paid to victims (Hopkins, 1999).  
Organisations have a responsibility to prevent accidents that could result from 
their activities, along with being bound by regulations, organisations in safety-
critical industries employ safety management systems to control and manage 
safety (Johnson, 2003). These systems include accident reporting 
mechanisms that aim to reduce the frequency of accidents and mitigate their 
consequences through learning from the analysis of the accidents reported 
(Johnson, 2003). There is a recognition that it may be unrealistic to prevent all 
accidents (Hollnagel, 2004), however it is recommended that organisations 
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learn as much as possible from accidents when they occur (Reason, 2008). 
As a process, accident analysis is much like other research and investigative 
endeavours, Salmon et al. (2011) summarise a generic accident analysis 
procedure as shown in Figure 5. The process includes a search for data on an 
accident, the use of methods to analyse this data and the generation of 
recommendations to prevent future accidents.            
Define aims 
of analysis
Select 
appropriate 
analysts
Select 
appropriate 
method(s)
Collect data 
regarding 
accident
Apply 
method(s)
Generate 
recommendations
 
Figure 5 Generic accident analysis procedure, adapted from Salmon et al. (2011) 
The quality of the accident analysis process is important in maximising learning 
from accidents and the prevention of future accidents. This includes how data 
on the accident is collected, the analysis methods available (Salmon et al., 
2011) and how people and organisations react to accidents. The quality of an 
accident investigation can be affected by both the analysts and the influences 
on them, and the analytical approach taken, with numerous works discussing 
how these factors influence investigation outcome (e.g. Lundberg et al. 2010; 
Rasmussen 1990; Woods & Cook 1999; Dien et al. 2012). 
2.4 The current state of incident analysis in healthcare 
At the time of writing, several recent papers have reported on a dissatisfaction 
in current practices in healthcare incident analysis in both the UK (Peerally et 
al., 2016) and USA (Kellogg et al., 2016; Trbovich and Shojania, 2017). 
Incident investigations are said to focus on individuals rather than 
organisational factors (Vincent, Taylor-Adams and Chapman, 2000) 
commonly resulting in poorly designed and ineffective remedial actions, which 
often focus on staff retraining and changes in policy (Wu, Lipshutz and 
Pronovost, 2008; Kellogg et al., 2016; Peerally et al., 2016). This 
ineffectiveness has been linked to the limitations in the choice of analyst and 
analytical approach. Investigations are generally undertaken by busy clinical 
staff, who lack safety expertise, as a side task to their main work activities 
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(Peerally et al., 2016) and these analysts are guided by a flawed reductionist 
approach in the root cause analysis technique (Peerally et al., 2016; Trbovich 
and Shojania, 2017). This criticism of current practice in healthcare incident 
analysis touches upon concerns well known to HFE and safety science 
research on accident analysis.  
2.5 Accident analysis and bias 
Woodcock (1995) has written on bias in accident analysis and highlights the 
significance of analysts themselves, in that regardless of the actual processes 
of an accident, it is the causes identified by the analyst that determine the 
generation of recommendations. Accident analysis is shaped by causal 
explanations and causal attribution (Rasmussen, 1990; Hollnagel, 2004; 
Leveson, 2012), with humans having an almost innate desire to determine 
cause when faced with an accident (Hollnagel, 2004). This desire is linked to 
a human motivation to relieve anxiety, with a feeling of power given through 
tracing an unknown back to a known (Nietzsche, 1990; Hollnagel, 2004). 
Although the motivation for finding an explanation for an accident may be high, 
the process of assessing an event after the fact gives rise to complications. 
When backtracking from an accident effect, people trace back searching for 
facts related to the accident from which they can explain why it has happened 
and to determine its cause (Hollnagel, 2004).  
Researchers have described difficulties in this causal analysis and efforts in 
understanding past events by following a chain from effect to cause. The 
search for cause might be influenced by certain types of bias, derived from 
both motivations and common cognitive phenomena (Woodcock, 1995). 
Rasmussen suggests that the search for cause is terminated when an analyst 
is satisfied that they have an explanation for the accident (Rasmussen, 1990). 
This satisfaction and resulting termination is influenced by an analyst’s 
pragmatic and subjective stop-rules, which are dependent on their frame of 
reference, their familiarity with the context and the analysis aim (whether to 
explain an accident, allocate responsibility or to make system improvements) 
(Rasmussen, 1990). It is said there are typical reasons for investigations to be 
stopped including: the causal path can no longer be followed because 
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information is missing; a familiar, abnormal event is found to be a reasonable 
explanation; or, a cure is available (Rasmussen, 1990). There is a tendency 
for the analyst to see what they expect to find and a sensitivity to the topics 
discussed in their professional community (Rasmussen, 1990). Lundberg et al. 
(2010) describe some sources of bias in accident analysis as being well known, 
referencing Chris Johnson’s handbook on incident and accident reporting 
(Johnson, 2003), they summarise the following types of bias:  
- Author bias, a reluctance to accept findings from investigations 
undertaken by others.   
- Confirmation bias, a tendency to seek to confirm previously held beliefs 
about cause. 
- Frequency bias, occurring when analysts regularly observe certain 
causal factors, a tendency to classify causes into common categories 
irrespective as to whether those causes applied to the incident.  
- Recognition bias, arising when analysts have a limited vocabulary of 
causal factors. An analyst may attempt to make an incident fit to one of 
those factors, potentially disregarding the complexity of the incident 
circumstances. 
- Political bias, where those with a high status can unduly influence 
investigation outcome.  
- Sponsor bias, where the desire to protect the image of the investigated 
or investigatory organisation influences the investigation.  
- Professional bias, where the analyst is drawn to identifying incident 
causes that are acceptable to their colleagues. (Johnson, 2003; 
Lundberg, Rollenhagen and Hollnagel, 2010) 
The phenomena of hindsight and outcome bias are also identified in the 
literature as potentially influencing accident investigation (Woods and Cook, 
1999; Dekker, 2006). Hindsight bias is well-documented in psychology 
literature (Woods and Cook, 1999) and refers to the effect of knowledge of 
accident outcome on an analyst’s judgement. With hindsight, having the 
accident to look back upon enables the analyst to judge the sequence of 
events leading up to a known negative outcome, giving them more information 
than the people involved in the accident had at the time. This more complete 
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knowledge gives rise to the tendency to overestimate the predictability or 
foreseeability of that outcome to those involved in the processes prior to the 
accident (Fischhoff, 2003; Woods & Cook, 1999). Further to this, there is an 
outcome bias, where a negative outcome, as there is in an accident, can 
influence the judgement of the processes and decisions linked to that outcome. 
Research has shown that those with knowledge of a negative outcome, judge 
the process, decision or action linked to that outcome more severely (Woods 
and Cook, 1999).  
In the description of cognitive phenomena, such as hindsight and outcome bias, 
the safety literature often references works in experimental psychology. As it 
is useful to give an understanding of the research that gave rise to 
considerations of analyst bias this literature is discussed in Appendix 1. For 
clarity and flow, the following sections only consider work that is directly related 
to accident analysis. 
2.5.1 Bias and influencing factors in accident investigation 
There is a lack of literature directly examining bias in accident investigation 
and few empirical studies have been found. Seven experimental works were 
identified (summarised in Table 1) and two interview-based studies with 
accident investigators (summarised in Table 2), but most works in this area are 
theoretical discussions of the issues. The empirical studies are reviewed 
following a summary of the theoretical discussion in the area.  
As briefly introduced in section 2.5, Rasmussen (1990) has discussed the 
issue of ambiguous and implicit stop-rules that determine when a causal 
search stops and define an analyst’s causal explanations. Within this 
discussion, Rasmussen proposes that an analyst will focus on what they 
consider to be abnormal, searching backwards through a chain of events and 
attempting to explain all conditions through discovery of events or acts that 
they find abnormal (Rasmussen, 1990).  
This identification of abnormality can be a big factor in an analysis but is 
dependent on an analyst’s familiarity with the accident context, with the analyst 
interpreting events by consulting precomputed schemas and frames of 
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reference (Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Rasmussen, 1990; Woodcock, 1995). 
In the case of accidents, the analyst will also be making comparisons with 
mentally constructed representations. Kahneman and Miller (1986) have 
developed theory on the use of norms in human interpretation of events and 
causality. They say that experienced events are interpreted in a rich context of 
remembered past experiences and constructed representations of what could 
have been, might have been, or should have been (Kahneman and Miller, 
1986). In the case of examining events leading up to serious accidents, events 
may be compared to counterfactual alternatives that are constructed ad-hoc, 
rather than retrieved from past experience (Kahneman and Miller, 1986). 
Events will be considered abnormal if they don’t meet the expectations of an 
analyst and they are able to retrieve or construct alternatives for what should 
have been (Kahneman and Miller, 1986). This gives some indication of how 
the thinking of an analyst can mould an accident investigation. 
It is thought that an analyst’s frame of reference can affect the full process of 
an accident investigation, not only the interpretation of information, but also 
the search for possible causes (Woodcock, 1995). For efficiency, an accident 
investigation will require the formulation of initial informal ideas on causality to 
guide the gathering of relevant evidence and information (Johnson, 2003). The 
ideal is for this process to continue in an iterative loop, whereby understanding 
gained by the evidence informs the analyst who can then update their original 
beliefs on the causes of the accident (Johnson, 2003). However, this ideal can 
be limited by an individual’s interpretation of cause and its dependency on their 
subjective frame of reference (Johnson, 2003). In turn, an analyst’s frame of 
reference can be restricted by their initial view of the accident and lead the 
analyst to seek evidence that supports this view (Johnson, 2003). Different 
analysts may bring different frames of reference to the search for cause and 
the interpretation of an accident (Woodcock, 1995; Woodcock et al., 2005). 
Identification of cause can depend on what the analyst has learned previously 
(Woods et al., 2010), discussions and trends in the analyst’s professional 
community (Rasmussen, 1990), and there is evidence from experimental work 
of analyst background affecting accident interpretation (Svenson, Lekberg and 
Johansson, 1999).  
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2.5.1.1 Experiments examining analyst bias 
Seven studies involving experiment-based investigations into analyst bias and 
influencing factors were identified and are summarised in Table 1. The limited 
number of relevant studies may be due to the difficulties in investigating real 
world accident investigations in a controlled manner. Indeed, a number of the 
identified studies use students as participants, rather than trained accident 
investigators, and only examine the interpretation and analysis component of 
an investigation, missing the search for information about the accident, a 
limitation noted by Woodcock (1995).  
One set of studies can be grouped as directly related to attribution theory 
(Mitchell and Wood, 1980; Dejoy, 1987; Lacroix and Dejoy, 1989; Hofmann 
and Stetzer, 1998) (see Appendix 1 for discussion of attribution theory). These 
studies focus on the role of supervisory workers in the analysis of accidents 
and the factors that influence their attribution of cause in relation to the worker 
they are supervising. The studies reference Green and Mitchell’s (Green and 
Mitchell, 1979) attributional model and stress the distinction between causes 
that are internal and causes that are external to the worker. Internal causes 
would include the worker’s personality, ability or effort. External causes would 
include difficulty of task, environmental factors, available support and quality 
of information (Mitchell and Wood, 1980). Supervisors are shown to have a 
general bias for attribution to internal worker cause (Mitchell and Wood, 1980; 
Dejoy, 1987; Hofmann and Stetzer, 1998), with poor work history and 
increased severity of accident consequences increasing the rate of internal 
attributions (Mitchell and Wood, 1980). When attributions are directed at 
internal worker factors, remedies are in turn directed at the worker in the form 
of training or punishment (Mitchell and Wood, 1980). There are conflicting 
results on whether the proposal of remedial action is affected by accident 
consequence severity, with a study involving nurses and nursing supervisors 
showing increasingly punitive remedies with increased consequence of 
accident (Mitchell and Wood, 1980). These findings were not replicated in a 
study involving student participants (Lacroix and Dejoy, 1989). These studies, 
whilst having robust experimental design, were limited by the approach to 
accident stimulus, with participants given information about an accident and 
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then providing ratings of severity and responsibility. This approach lacked the 
realism of an investigation’s information search and depth of analysis.   
Other research has shown the reading of accident reports to reinforce pre-
existing views, with participants’ previously held beliefs affecting their 
interpretation of accidents (Plous et al., 1991). In a series of experiments by 
Plous, participants read excerpts regarding the accident at Three Mile Island 
in 1979 and the 1980 false missile alerts at the USA’s Strategic Air Command. 
Prior to reading the excerpts, the participants reported their beliefs and 
attitudes regarding nuclear energy and nuclear deterrence. After reading the 
excerpts, the participants were asked open and closed questions on their 
conclusions on the safety of nuclear energy and nuclear deterrence. Plous 
found that those that supported the technologies prior to reading the excerpts 
focussed on the safeguards in those technologies working, whereas those with 
prior opposition focused on the occurrence of the failure. Furthermore, after 
reading about a technological breakdown, supporters felt the chance of a 
catastrophic accident was lower than they previously assumed, in contrast 
opponents reported the opposite (chance of accident higher than previously 
assumed) (Plous et al., 1991). These findings show a confirmation bias style 
effect called biased assimilation (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979; Lord and 
Taylor, 2009).  Biased assimilation is said to occur when perceptions of new 
evidence are interpreted in a way which assimilates the information into pre-
existing assumptions and expectations (Lord and Taylor, 2009). Plous suggest 
this effect could be reduced through giving analysts explicit instructions to be 
as objective and unbiased as possible, this strategy has previously produced 
reductions in the biased assimilation effect (Lord, Lepper and Preston, 1984). 
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Table 1 Studies on bias and factors influencing accident analysts 
Study Research design Participants Accident stimulus Main findings Main limitations 
Mitchell and 
Wood, 1980 
Repeated 
measures 
(counterbalanced) 
23 nursing supervisors Patient safety incident 
 
Nurse work history, 
likely causes and 
consequences 
manipulated 
General bias for 
attributions to nurse 
(nurse as cause, remedy 
directed at nurse) 
 
Poor work history and 
severe outcome 
produced nurse directed 
attributions 
Analysts provided with 
accident report rather than 
complete full investigation 
Repeated 
measures 
(counterbalanced) 
23 nursing supervisors Patient safety incident 
 
Attribution information 
and consequences 
manipulated 
Attribution to nurse and 
severe consequence 
resulted in nurse directed 
remedy 
 
The more serious the 
consequences, the more 
punitive the remedy 
DeJoy, 1987 Independent 
measures 
153 students enrolled 
on risk management 
course 
(role of worker 
supervisor) 
Multiple-cause 
occupational accident: 
6 versions/conditions 
Supervisors focus on 
internal worker causes 
when faced with 
conflicting causal 
information 
Analysts provided with 
accident report rather than 
complete full investigation 
LaCroix and 
DeJoy, 1989 
Independent 
measures 
162 students enrolled 
on risk management 
course 
(role of worker 
supervisor) 
Multiple-cause 
occupational accident: 
8 versions/conditions 
Internal causes produced 
greater ratings of worker 
responsibility and worker-
directed corrective 
actions 
 
Outcome severity did not 
affect responsibility 
attribution or remedy 
Analysts provided with 
accident report rather than 
complete full investigation 
Plous, 1991 Lab-based 
Observational 
43 students: 
22 supporters and 21 
opponents of nuclear 
energy/deterrence 
Three Mile Island 
nuclear accident 
1980 USA false missile 
alerts 
Prior beliefs affected 
interpretation of 
accidents 
Participants not 
trained/experienced 
investigators 
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Study Research design Participants Accident stimulus Main findings Main limitations 
Lab-based 
Observational 
45: 
24 pro-deterrence 
21 anti-deterrence 
1980 USA false missile 
alerts 
Prior beliefs affected 
interpretation of 
accidents 
Analysts provided with 
excerpt rather than 
complete investigation 
Lab-based 
Observational 
63 students Three Mile Island 
nuclear accident 
Prior beliefs associated 
with participant 
interpretation of accident 
Hofmann 
and Stetzer, 
1998 
Independent 
measures 
Survey response 
2094 employees of 
large utility company 
 
Occupational accident 
scenarios 
 
Manipulated 
informational cues 
(internal or external 
cause) 
Supervisors tended to 
attribute cause to worker 
more often than workers 
 
Workers in teams that 
communicated about 
safety issues were more 
likely to attribute to 
internal cause 
Anonymous survey 
responses 
Svenson et 
al., 1999 
Lekberg, 
1997 
Lab-based 
Observational 
40 students (20 
engineers, 20 
psychologists) 
Patient safety Legal analysis focus on a 
single person. HFE 
analysis attributed 
responsibility to other 
agents 
 
The number of 
acceptable solutions was 
related to the analyst’s 
background 
Participants not 
trained/experienced 
investigators 
 
Analysts provided with 
accident report rather than 
complete full investigation 
Woodcock 
et al., 2005 
Observational 
 
Simulated 
investigation 
 
15 practicing safety 
specialists, from a wide 
spectrum of industries 
Occupational accident 12 of the participants 
considered multiple 
hypotheses 
 
Little overlap among 
participants in factors 
considered 
 
No consistent bias 
towards management or 
worker attribution 
Main study aim was to 
evaluate simulation 
technique rather than 
investigate bias 
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Study Research design Participants Accident stimulus Main findings Main limitations 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Simulated 
investigation 
106: 
Various job 
backgrounds 
15 investigators 
16 given HFE training 
 
Aviation scenarios Experience in 
investigations increased 
fact retrieval 
 
Participants did not seem 
to favour a category of 
fact over another based-
on background  
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Other studies have considered the influence of analyst background on 
investigation outcome. Svenson et al. (1999) compared legal and HFE 
perspectives on the analysis of three patient deaths during dialysis in hospital. 
A legal inquiry was contrasted with analyses by analysts with psychology (20 
psychology students) and engineering (20 engineering students) backgrounds. 
The legal analysis attributed responsibility to an individual nurse, a result linked 
to both the analyst’s background and the analysis aim. In contrast, the 
psychology and engineering analysts attributed responsibility to other agents 
along with the nurse, including the equipment constructor, instructors and 
hospital management. The study reported that the identification of acceptable 
solutions was related to the analyst’s professional background, with the 
engineers identifying more solutions to avoid future incidents than the 
psychologists (Svenson, Lekberg and Johansson, 1999). The authors of the 
study advise that analysts with differing professional training should perform 
investigations jointly. 
The study by Svenson et al. (1999) is weakened by its use of students as 
participants rather than experienced investigators and its lack of realism 
regarding the provision of an accident report to the analysts. Woodcock et al. 
(2005) criticise previous studies and their limitations in lacking similarity to real-
world investigation tasks, with participants analysing reports rather than 
undertaking an investigation. They created a simulated investigation for 
studying the reasoning of accident investigators, with participants having 
experience of safety practice or investigation. An interesting finding of the first 
study by Woodcock et al. (2005) was that each participant retrieved different 
factors in the search for information about the accident. Furthermore, there 
was little overlap among the participants in terms of factors considered, leading 
Woodcock et al. to question whether safety practitioners have a common 
knowledge base. In contrast to earlier experiments, that found supervisors to 
have an attribution bias towards internal worker causes, the investigator 
participants emphasised management and design-centred factors more often 
than worker-centred factors in identification of cause (Woodcock et al., 2005). 
The role (e.g. analyst, attorney) of the investigators did not predict the type of 
conclusions reached in the investigations and overall the studies did not find 
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consistent bias based on analysts’ industry background (Woodcock et al., 
2005). The second study of Woodcock et al. (2005) also investigated the use 
of analytical tools to aid investigators and found that when used more factors 
contributing to an accident were identified.      
To summarise this set of experiments, it seems that although supervisors may 
be biased towards attributing causality to worker-based factors, the experience 
of safety professionals can lead investigations towards other managerial and 
design-based factors. Prior-beliefs do seem to influence the interpretation of 
accidents, but this has not been tested in full accident investigations or with 
trained investigators. 
2.5.1.2 Studies interviewing accident investigators 
In studies that interview accident investigators (shown in Table 2), participants 
tend to report influences that relate to organisational factors and pressures, 
rather than flawed thinking (Lundberg, Rollenhagen and Hollnagel, 2010). 
Lundberg et al. (2010) found themes on practical considerations during both 
the investigation of an accident and the design of remedial actions, and 
Johnson (2003) has reported on influences that can affect investigator 
decision-making. Both of these studies make reference to confirmation bias 
that arises when an analysis is conducted to simply confirm an initial 
hypothesis of an accident’s cause (Johnson, 2003); or remedial actions are 
already considered prior to the analysis, with data collection aimed at these 
preconceived ideas (Lundberg, Rollenhagen and Hollnagel, 2010). Ambiguity 
in decisions to halt a causal search also appear in the interviews, with 
descriptions including stopping based on an investigator’s feeling and 
satisfaction, and stopping when remedial actions can be formed, or not going 
beyond what is practical to deal with (Lundberg, Rollenhagen and Hollnagel, 
2010).  
Other reported influencing factors have a link to an analyst’s frame of reference, 
in frequency bias, recognition bias and professional bias (Johnson, 2003). 
Frequency bias occurs when investigators become familiar with certain causal 
factors that are frequently found in investigations, future accidents are then 
likely to be classified according to common causal categories (Johnson, 2003). 
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Similarly, recognition bias is described as arising when investigators have a 
limited vocabulary of causal factors, they then attempt to make accidents fit 
with those factors irrespective of the circumstances of the accident (Johnson, 
2003). Professional bias occurs when an investigator’s professional 
colleagues or peers favour particular outcomes from causal analysis, the 
investigator may then be influenced to fit their analysis to the accepted 
outcomes (Johnson, 2003).  
Table 2 Interview studies with analysts reporting on factors influencing investigation outcome 
Study Method Participants Main findings 
Reported in 
Johnson, 
2003 
Interview, 
survey, 
observational 
studies 
Accident 
investigators 
Author bias, confirmation bias, 
frequency bias, recognition bias, 
political bias, sponsor bias, 
professional bias 
Lundberg 
et al., 2010 
Interview study 22 accident 
investigators 
(different 
domains) 
Factors leading investigations away 
from ideal mostly organisational 
rather than related to flawed thinking 
 
Practical considerations during 
investigation: 
- Expertise and competencies 
- Investigation resources 
- Availability of data 
- Political considerations 
- Stop rules 
Practical considerations during 
design of remedial actions: 
- Expertise and competencies 
- Potential risk created by 
remedies 
- Fixes may be decided upon 
prior to investigation 
- Decisions on 
implementation may not be 
up to investigator 
- May be outside of 
organizational 
boundaries/control 
- Ease of implementation 
considered 
- Cost-benefit balance 
- What is known to work 
 
A note should be made about the limitations of these studies. In the case of 
Johnson (2003) the methods and results are not well reported, the description 
of the identified biases occur in a textbook and empirical work is referred to, 
but not described and no original reference relating to the data collection is 
provided. Lundberg et al. (2010) do a much better job of reporting a study, but 
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their data collection is limited to interviews, with findings subject to what 
investigators are able to articulate and willing to report.  
2.5.1.3 Organisational influences in accident analysis 
Several of the factors influencing accident investigations identified in the 
research (Johnson, 2003; Lundberg, Rollenhagen and Hollnagel, 2010), are 
related to organisational influences, with accident investigators not immune to 
the organisational and political pressures that surround them. Accident 
analysis has been summarised as a series of decision-making that is open to 
influence by organisation culture and the self-interests of the analysts 
themselves (Dien, Dechy and Guillaume, 2012). With accident investigators 
being normal human beings, constrained by common cognitive and 
organisational limits on rationality (Sagan, 1994; Dien, Dechy and Guillaume, 
2012). 
Investigations are susceptible to the effects of organisational culture and 
hierarchy protecting the organisational image and the roles of high-level 
executives (Sagan, 1994; Dien, Dechy and Guillaume, 2012). This is seen in 
two biases described by Johnson (2003): sponsor bias, which occurs when an 
investigation is influenced by the potential effect on the prosperity or reputation 
of the organisation the investigator manages or is responsible for; and political 
bias, arising when a high-status individual’s judgement commands influence 
because of their status rather than the value of the judgement itself (Johnson, 
2003). Lundberg et al. (2010) also note the influence of management on 
investigation findings: management may be defensive when faced with 
criticism of themselves and may question the validity of findings; and decisions 
on remedial actions may also be outside of the investigator’s power and open 
to influence from an organisation’s hierarchy (Lundberg, Rollenhagen and 
Hollnagel, 2010). Sagan (1994) argues of the importance of considering the 
issues of power and interests in organisational safety. Organisational hierarchy 
plays a role with the lessons and actions favoured by the most powerful actors 
(the managers and executives at the top of the hierarchy) often taking 
precedence (Sagan, 1994). This is evidenced with the assertion of many 
technological accidents being blamed on human error by operators (the most 
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proximate cause) rather than faulty design or mismanagement by higher levels 
(Sagan, 1994).  
Dien et al. (2012) mention the effects of a culture of efficiency, which leads 
investigators to focus on manageable causes where corrective measures are 
within organisational boundaries. This is evidenced in interviews with 
investigators, who suggest they may avoid suggesting remedies that are 
outside of organisational boundaries, are difficult to implement, aren’t known 
to work, or don’t fit with cost-benefit considerations (Lundberg, Rollenhagen 
and Hollnagel, 2010).     
Accident investigators can be positioned both internally and externally to the 
organisation under investigation. External investigators could be more 
independent than internal investigators and less susceptible to organisational 
culture and hierarchical pressure, finding it easier to question things that an 
internal investigator couldn’t (Dien, Dechy and Guillaume, 2012). However, 
having external investigators is not considered a perfect solution, as they may 
be disadvantaged with a lack of understanding of power relationships and 
historical trends (Dien, Dechy and Guillaume, 2012). Alongside the 
consideration of the position of the investigation team is investigator 
competency, with a broad expertise needed for high quality investigations. 
Johnson (2003) considers a need for expertise in the domain under 
investigation, accident investigation itself, along with technical, engineering 
and human factors expertise. Dien et al. (2012) adds a need for knowledge of 
organisational approaches to safety to competencies in carrying out accident 
investigation. 
The aim of an investigation is a further factor that will influence an investigator’s 
approach and interpretation of an accident. Rasmussen (1990) contends that 
an accident analysis can be done for explanation, allocation of responsibility 
or for system improvements. Accident explanation requires finding a cause or 
causes that are familiar to the analyst (Rasmussen, 1990). Allocation of 
responsibility will require tracing back events to identify a person who made an 
error and were in power of their actions (Rasmussen, 1990). Whereas system 
improvement is said to require a focus on the causal network and identification 
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of an effective cure (Rasmussen, 1990). An example of these differences 
found in the empirical work is seen in Svenson et al. (1999) where a legal 
analysis was compared with a Human Factors analysis, while the legal 
analysis focusses on an individual and allocation of responsibility, the Human 
Factors analysis considers other agents and environmental factors.    
2.5.2 Section summary 
This section considered the biases and organisational factors that can 
influence the interpretation of accidents and investigation outcomes. These 
biases can be both internal to the analyst, in terms of their thinking and 
cognitive bias, and external to the analyst, in the form of pressure to appease 
their organisation and managers. These factors are an important consideration 
in any efforts to improve healthcare incident investigation practices.  
2.6 Accident analysis and analytical approach 
A potential way of overcoming issues regarding flawed thinking in accident 
investigations is in the use of analytical tools that can guide analysts and the 
investigation process. Much of the focus in attempts to improve accident 
investigation has been on refining theories on accident causation and the 
development of methods for accident analysis (Woodcock, 1995; Rasmussen, 
1997; Hollnagel, 2004; Leveson, 2004). Research developments regarding 
accident causation, the evolution of causation models and the development of 
corresponding analytical approaches has been reviewed previously (Hollnagel, 
2004; Underwood, 2013). There is no desire for this review to duplicate work, 
so within this thesis this literature is covered somewhat superficially. More 
attention is given to STAMP and its previous application in healthcare.  
2.6.1 Perspectives on accidents and models of accident 
causation  
Reason (2008) has considered four perspectives that can be taken when 
viewing unsafe acts: the plague model, person model, legal perspective and 
system perspective. The plague model is described in terms of a reaction to 
epidemiological studies linking error and human error to deaths (such as to the 
Harvard Medical Practice Study (Brennan et al., 2004)). Human error gets put 
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into the terms of an epidemic and analyses conducted with this line of though 
would likely result in countermeasures focussing on the removal of error. 
Reason considers this a misleading perspective in terms of confusing error 
with its occasional bad consequences, pointing out that humans are fallible, 
with errors arising from highly adaptive mental processes (Reason, 2008). 
The issue of attributing the cause of an accident to human error has been 
discussed at length elsewhere (e.g. Rasmussen 1990; Woods & Cook 1999; 
Woods et al. 2010). To summarise the issue, research in safety has given an 
understanding that organisations can migrate towards risk, the stage for an 
accident being prepared through time by the efforts of workers under 
competing pressures to be both efficient and thorough (Rasmussen, 1990). 
These normal everyday variations in a worker’s performance can release an 
accident, however, had that particular action or cause been avoided by some 
additional safety measure, the accident would very likely be released by 
another cause at another point in time (Rasmussen, 1990). Furthermore, there 
are complications in defining human error with reference to normal practice 
when the work is less procedural and stable, and involves complex decision-
making (Rasmussen, 1990; Leveson, 2004). Therefore, explaining accidents 
in terms of events, acts and errors is felt to have limited application for 
improving the design and safety of systems (Rasmussen, 1990).  
Following on from the plague model are the person and legal models, which 
both can continue to allow focus on human error and human as hazard thinking. 
The person model takes a view of unsafe acts as mostly arising from wayward 
mental processes such as inattention and at times, culpable negligence. With 
this perspective, countermeasures will often be aimed at individuals through 
means such as retraining and blaming (Reason, 2008). The person model is 
popular and appealing to organisations and particularly managerial levels due 
to its focus on the frontline of a work system (Reason, 2008). Reason (2008) 
believes the appeal is due to the ease of identifying proximal causes and the 
errors of people, which means an investigation need not look any further. 
Furthermore, the focus on errors at the frontline minimises organisational 
responsibility (Reason, 2008). The legal perspective takes a view that highly 
trained responsible professionals (e.g. doctors, pilots) should not make errors, 
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this view has a focus on culpability and punitive counter measures (Reason, 
2008). The final perspective is in the system model, which in Reason’s view is 
an accident explanation that goes beyond local events and considers 
contributing factors in the organisation and system.   
Further reflection of perspectives in accident investigation are seen in the 
development of accident causation models, which form the basis for 
investigating and analysing accidents (Leveson, 2004). The choice of accident 
model used in accident investigation is of fundamental importance as it can 
influence an investigation in terms of data collected, analysis outputs and 
investigation outcome (Lundberg, Rollenhagen and Hollnagel, 2009). 
Hollnagel (2004) in reviewing the development of accident causation models 
has categorised the models into three groups: sequential, epidemiological and 
systemic. Previous work has reviewed these model types and their strengths 
and weaknesses (e.g. Hollnagel 2004; Leveson 2012; Underwood 2013), so 
they will only be summarised here.  
Sequential accident models were the first models developed in safety research 
and are the simplest type. They views accidents as occurring as the result of 
a chain of events, with an unexpected event initiating a sequence of events 
and consequences where the last one is the accident (Hollnagel, 2004), 
examples of this model type are the domino model (Heinrich, 1931) and the 
accident evolution and barrier model (AEB) (Svenson, 1991; Hollnagel, 2004; 
Reason, 2008). An investigation underpinned by this model and view of 
accidents would seek to identify cause-effect links, working backwards from 
an accident to identify underlying causes (Hollnagel, 2004). The main criticism 
of this model type is its oversimplification of accidents, particularly in complex 
cases and work systems, and the tendency to identify human error as the 
cause, an issue that has been well covered in previous works (Rasmussen, 
1997; Hollnagel, 2004; Leveson, 2004; Salmon et al., 2011). Leveson (2004) 
considers these sequential models as working well for accidents caused by 
physical components and for relatively simple systems, but that they are 
ineffective for the analysis of accidents in larger systems with interactive 
complexity.  
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The second category of accident causation models given by Hollnagel (2004) 
are the epidemiological models, which describe an accident in analogy with 
the spreading of disease (Hollnagel, 2004). These models have added 
considerations of the contributions to accidents of performance deviations in 
technology and human workers, and environmental conditions (Hollnagel, 
2004). The models feature consideration of barriers that could prevent 
accidents and the concept of latent conditions, conditions that are present 
within the system long before an accident occurs but that can contribute when 
other events trigger an accident. Latent conditions can include system design, 
resource provision and managerial decisions, among other things (Hollnagel, 
2004) and are in-line with research on large-scale accidents that pointed to the 
need for accident explanation to be in terms of structural and organisational 
properties, rather than just a causal chain of events (Perrow, 1984; 
Rasmussen, 1990). Hollnagel considers the Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) 
(Reason, 1997) to be an example of an epidemiological model, however, 
Reason disagrees with this categorisation and argues that SCM has a systems 
view. Reason (2008) holds a belief that all accident causation models meet the 
criteria for the systemic perspective and considers them all to have their uses, 
with no single right view of accidents. He sees a model’s practical utility as 
most important (Reason, 2008). 
The third category of accident model provided by Hollnagel (2004) is the 
systemic model. Models and methods within this category focus on the 
performance of a system as a whole, including both social and technical 
aspects (Hollnagel, 2004; Leveson, 2004; Salmon et al., 2011). The systemic 
view of accidents has been developed to fit with increases in size and 
complexity of human organisations. It was felt that viewing accidents as 
resulting from a chain of events was too simplistic and ineffective for accidents 
within complex systems. Rather than viewing accidents as resulting from a 
chain of events, systemic models view accidents as an emergent property of 
the overall system, arising from interactions between system components 
(Hollnagel, 2004; Leveson, 2004; Salmon et al., 2011). Systemic models 
consider the relationships between different parts of a system and how they 
interact with each other (Leveson, 2004). Systemic accident analysis models 
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and methods are highly valued in the research community (Leveson, 2004; 
Underwood and Waterson, 2013), however, Reason (2008) has warned that 
going too far with the systems perspective could be counterproductive for 
safety. Reason suggests that a severe systems perspective could lead to an 
excessive reliance on system measures and undervaluation of personal 
qualities. These personal qualities are important and necessary for system 
function, with frontline personnel unable to quickly redesign a system, but they 
can have the resolve to go the extra mile (Reason, 2008). People could fall 
prey to learned helplessness, thinking they can’t do anything as the problem 
is with the system (Reason 2008). Still, systemic accident analysis methods 
are generally more highly regarded within the research community than other 
methods, especially for use in analysing accidents in complex systems 
(Hollnagel, 2004; Leveson, 2012; Underwood and Waterson, 2014). 
2.6.2 Implications for healthcare incident analysis 
This discussion of the theoretical basis behind accident analysis methods has 
implications for healthcare, especially when considering that the RCA method 
adopted frequently by healthcare organisations is based on a sequential model 
of accident causation. Accident analyst methods guide an investigation and its 
analysts in the understanding of an accident scenario and the generation of 
effective recommendations, and potentially reduce the effect of bias.  
The complexity of healthcare systems would lead us to believe that sequential 
models and methods are not the most appropriate to use for incidents 
occurring within healthcare organisations. Healthcare systems have previously 
been described as sociotechnical systems, or complex systems containing 
social and technical aspects (Carayon et al., 2006) and they can be said to 
display several of the characteristics of complex sociotechnical systems 
provided by Vicente (1999), including:  
- A large problem space, with many factors to consider, such as the many 
different causes of ill-health.  
- Social, with healthcare services composed of many different healthcare 
professionals, staff and patients that need to work together to make the 
system function effectively.  
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- Heterogeneous perspectives, with space for conflicting values amongst 
the various healthcare stakeholders.  
- Dynamic, the effects of worker and stakeholder actions can be delayed, 
with workers having to anticipate the future state of the system.  
- Hazardous, there is a high degree of potential hazard. Inappropriate 
human beliefs, decisions and actions can potentially jeopardise public 
safety.  
- Coupling, healthcare systems can be composed of many interacting 
subsystems.  
- Uncertainty, there tends to be uncertainty in the data available to 
workers. With workers assessing the state of the system through 
imperfect data, from clinical diagnostic techniques for example. 
- Mediated interaction, with goal relevant properties unable to be directly 
observed by the human perceptual system, for example the blood 
pressure of a patient in an operating room.  
- Disturbances, with workers within healthcare services having to deal 
with unanticipated events and having to improvise and adapt (Vicente, 
1999).  
So, there is reason to believe that the systemic accident analysis methods 
developed for use in analysing accidents in complex systems would be more 
effective in healthcare than RCA.   
Previous research efforts regarding patient safety and incident analysis have 
developed incident analysis methods for healthcare or adopted methods from 
other industries. However, most of these efforts have used methods that are 
based on sequential or epidemiological accident causation models. For 
example, the London Protocol (Taylor-Adams and Vincent, no date; Vincent, 
Taylor-Adams and Stanhope, 1998), has been developed in the UK to guide 
healthcare incident analysis. The protocol and associated research (Taylor-
Adams, Vincent and Stanhope, 1999; Vincent, Taylor-Adams and Chapman, 
2000; Vincent, 2004) provide guidance for conducting interviews in incident 
investigations and a framework for the identification of contributory factors 
such as organisational, team and equipment factors. The thinking behind the 
contributory factors framework is based on the Swiss Cheese Model and 
54 
 
Reason’s work on organisational accidents (Reason, 1997) and is therefore 
associated with an epidemiological accident causation model. The framework 
has been integrated into current practice RCA application and should help 
identify factors beyond individual person factors. But as an analytical approach, 
it uses a clear cause-effect link (Hollnagel, 2004) and does not model the work 
system or do enough to examine the interactions between system components. 
Similarly, the Human Error and Patient Safety (HEAPS) incident analysis tool 
(Wakefield, 2007; Western Australian Department of Health, 2011) developed 
in Australia and licensed by ErroMed (website no longer exists) has a focus on 
contributory factors. Other efforts have included the adoption of Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) (Institute for Healthcare Improvement, no date; 
Day et al., 2006; Ashley and Armitage, 2010). FMEA is associated with a 
sequential event chain model and is criticised for conceptualising an accident 
as a linear chain of events, doing little to show other relationships between 
components within the work system (Leveson, 2004). 
The Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) model (Carayon 
et al., 2006, 2014; Holden et al., 2013), shown in Figure 6, is another relevant 
approach. The SEIPS model was developed as a framework for understanding 
the relationships between structures, processes and outcomes in healthcare. 
The SEIPS model emphasises system interactions and feedback loops, with 
healthcare organisations able to make changes in response to the collection, 
analysis and use of process and outcome data (Carayon et al., 2014). The 
model has been used to examine patient safety, including risk assessment and 
can be used to make sense of incident data (Carayon et al., 2014), but SEIPS 
does not provide a systemic accident analysis method as such, rather a high-
level framework to guide patient safety work.  
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Figure 6 Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) model, adapted from 
Carayon et al. 2006 and Holden et al. 2013 
Within the literature the systemic accident analysis methods of AcciMap, 
STAMP and FRAM are among the most commonly cited (Underwood, 2013). 
However, while regularly used in research, it is said the use of systemic 
accident analysis methods is less popular in industry accident investigation 
practices and work needs to be done to bridge the gap between research and 
practice (Underwood, 2013; Underwood and Waterson, 2013; Underwood, 
Waterson and Braithwaite, 2016). This thesis is focussed on the application of 
STAMP in healthcare, with the potential of STAMP in healthcare and some 
justification for the choice of STAMP introduced in Chapter 1. Further 
understanding of STAMP and justification for choosing the approach over 
AcciMap and FRAM can be found in the literature. 
When it has been compared with AcciMap and SCM-based methods, STAMP 
has been said to more clearly embody system theory and to benefit from 
showing the interactions between system components (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2014). Moreover, STAMP benefits from modelling the safety 
structure of a system, rather than just focussing on the accident itself, giving a 
deeper understanding of the system under analysis (Salmon, Cornelissen and 
Trotter, 2012). Another benefit of using STAMP is the availability of 
comprehensive method guidance (e.g. Leveson 2012) and the many examples 
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of past applications found in the literature, this is in contrast to FRAM which 
despite being the subject of a book (Hollnagel, 2012), lacks structured method 
guidance. Furthermore, there are few published examples of FRAM being 
applied to accident analysis, which could be used to guide an application. The 
remainder of this review will focus on STAMP and what can be learnt from 
literature on its previous application. 
2.7 STAMP  
STAMP was developed by Nancy Leveson at MIT and there are several texts 
detailing STAMP (Leveson, 2004, 2015; Leveson et al., 2012). In keeping with 
the other systemic methods, STAMP has been developed due to 
dissatisfaction with sequential linear accident models and to overcome the 
limitations in explaining accidents in terms of events, acts and errors 
(Rasmussen, 1990, 1997; Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 2012). In STAMP’s view, 
accidents occur when there is an inadequate enforcement of safety constraints 
on system components, resulting in the loss of control of a hazardous process 
(Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 2012). What sets STAMP apart from other 
methods is its control theory focus, the consideration of control and feedback 
loops puts STAMP in line with the SEIPS framework for patient safety work. 
STAMP also contains techniques for both prospective risk assessment and 
retrospective accident analysis. Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
is the hazard analysis technique that can be used in risk assessment, Causal 
Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) is the accident analysis technique 
(Leveson, 2012). Both STPA and CAST are based on STAMP’s view of safety 
and accident causation. 
Following influence from systems theory, STAMP describes a system as a 
hierarchy of control based on adaptive feedback mechanisms (Leveson, 2012) 
as shown in Figure 7. This hierarchical structure is also found in AcciMap, but 
differentiating STAMP is the representation of interactions and communication 
between the different levels of a hierarchy as control-feedback loops. At each 
level of the hierarchy the actors that can affect the status of the system are 
represented as controllers e.g. decision-makers at government and regulatory 
levels all the way down to an organisation’s frontline operations. In the model, 
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the arrows connecting the controllers represent control-feedback loops present 
at each system level; control actions are sent down to enforce safety 
constraints at lower levels, with feedback on the status of the lower system 
levels returned up the hierarchy. The returned information (feedback) updates 
the mental model of a controller in terms of the status of the component they 
are controlling, control actions can then be updated in accordance with this 
information to maintain control. STAMP also considers the behaviour-shaping 
mechanisms on these controllers and their decision-making, including their 
safety responsibilities, the context of their work, environmental factors and how 
this has influenced any unsafe decisions. Another important feature of STAMP 
is its consideration of safety constraints and control in both the design and 
operations of the system.  
 
Figure 7 Example of safety control structure, adapted from Leveson, 2004 
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Through the consideration of behaviour-shaping mechanisms and the 
information available to decision-makers at the time of the accident, STAMP 
can help to alleviate the effect of hindsight bias when making judgements on 
past human decisions (Leveson, 2012). The system view of STAMP also 
forces consideration of factors that may normally be omitted from an accident 
analysis (Leveson, 2004), such as organisational factors, decisions of 
managers and the design of the system. Which can prevent sole focus on 
frontline operations or following a line of inquiry based on prejudged factors 
and initial hypotheses. The developers of STAMP have said that the use of the 
approach can maximise learning from an accident and can come up with 
completely different views of accidents and their causes, even when using only 
the information presented in existing accident reports (Leveson, 2012).  
Many articles on STAMP and examples of STAMP applications can be found 
at the MIT online resource http://sunnyday.mit.edu/STAMP-publications-
sorted.pdf and this was used in the initial identification of relevant literature. 
This was followed up by an electronic search. 
2.7.1 STAMP in healthcare 
Few published studies that had applied STAMP in healthcare were identified, 
those found are summarised in Table 3. Of the four identified studies, two 
applied STAMP to the analysis of patient safety incidents, the other two used 
STAMP in a hazard analysis. As an extension to the healthcare sector there 
were other examples of application in the pharmaceutical and medical device 
industries, these studies are summarised in Table 4. 
The studies reporting on the application of STAMP to the analysis of patient 
safety incidents (O’Neil, 2014; Samost, 2015; Leveson et al., 2016; Raman et 
al., 2016) have shown STAMP to have some promise in terms of its ability to 
generate recommendations to improve healthcare systems. However, the 
methods of evaluating the application of STAMP have not been 
comprehensive or sophisticated and the studies predominantly simply 
demonstrate its application. O’Neil (2014) compares a STAMP analysis and 
recommendations to those made in an RCA analysis and concludes that the 
STAMP analysis gave a broader and more comprehensive set of accident 
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causes and recommendations. The study is limited by using a fictionalised 
incident story rather than a real live full incident investigation, but the incident 
story is said to be realistic and used in the training of those conducting incident 
analysis in healthcare. The other feature of these studies that limits learning 
on how well STAMP could fit to healthcare is in the lack of evaluation and 
feedback from the healthcare stakeholders that conduct incident analysis in 
current practice. 
Table 3 Studies applying STAMP in healthcare 
Study Area Analysts Evaluation Main findings 
O’Neil, 2014 
Master’s Thesis 
Fictionalised 
hospital 
pneumothorax 
incident 
analysis 
Researcher Demonstration 
Comparison 
with RCA 
STAMP analysis 
resulted in a 
broader set of 
accident causes 
and 
recommendations 
compared to RCA 
Leveson et al., 
2016 
Raman et al., 
2016 
Samost, 2015 
Cardiovascular 
surgery 
incident 
analysis 
Researchers Demonstration Identified the 
reasons behind 
unsafe behaviour 
to be related to 
system design 
Pawlicki et al., 
2016 
Samost, 2015 
Radiation 
oncology 
(hazard 
analysis) 
Teams of 
researchers 
and work 
domain 
experts 
Demonstration 
Comparison 
with FMEA 
STAMP identified 
83 unsafe control 
actions and 472 
causal scenarios 
Chatzmichailidou 
et al., 2017 
Surgical 
instrument 
retention 
(hazard 
analysis) 
Researchers Demonstration 
Comparison 
with BTA 
Concluded that 
STAMP and BTA 
can complement 
each other 
Both produced a 
set of solutions 
RCA: Root Cause Analysis 
FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
BTA: Bow-Tie Analysis 
 
The two studies applying STAMP in hazard analysis both report positively on 
the use of STAMP (Samost, 2015; Pawlicki et al., 2016; Chatzimichailidou et 
al., 2017). Along with demonstrating the application of STAMP, the studies 
make some comparison with the outputs from other hazard analysis methods 
in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Bow-Tie analysis (BTA). 
Chatzmichailidou et al. (2017) note difficulty in making direct comparisons 
between STAMP and BTA and instead reflect on how the methods 
complement each other. Pawlicki et al. (2016) noted some similarity between 
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the results of FMEA and STAMP, but that STAMP was uniquely different in 
highlighting the interaction of people, hardware and software.      
Table 4 Studies applying STAMP in pharmaceutical and medical device industries 
Study Area Analysts Evaluation Main findings 
Leveson 
et al., 
2012 
Couturier, 
2010 
Master’s 
thesis 
Pharmaceutical 
industry marketing 
of unsafe drug 
(hazard analysis) 
Researchers Demonstration STAMP generated a 
new set of 
recommendations 
 
Suggest STAMP and 
systems dynamics 
can be used to re-
engineer entire 
healthcare systems 
Balgos, 
2012 
Master’s 
thesis 
Medical diagnostic 
devices and 
medical case 
accident 
Researchers Demonstration 
Comparison 
with FMECA 
STAMP identified 
more hazards than 
FMECA and 
generated a new set 
of recommendations 
Antoine, 
2013 
PhD 
thesis 
Radiotherapy 
devices (hazard 
analysis) 
Researchers Demonstration Demonstrated fit of 
STAMP to medical 
device regulatory 
structure  
FMECA: Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis 
 
Studies applying STAMP in the pharmaceutical (Couturier, 2010; Leveson et 
al., 2012) and medical device (Balgos, 2012; Antoine, 2013) industries are 
similar to those in healthcare, in that they demonstrate use through application 
to a certain device or incident.  
Overall, the studies suggest that STAMP works well in the healthcare sector, 
but there is a lack of evaluation against any specified criteria. Most studies use 
the demonstration of an application and reflections from the analysts to 
evaluate the method, but STAMP has been compared favourably to the use of 
RCA on the same fictionalised healthcare incident (O’Neil, 2014). 
2.7.2 STAMP applications in other industries 
There are further application examples of STAMP in other safety-critical 
industries, but of most interest are studies using more sophisticated methods 
of evaluating the application of STAMP. Three studies were identified that used 
more formal methods of evaluating an application of STAMP, these are 
summarised in Table 5. 
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Two studies (Salmon, Cornelissen and Trotter, 2012; Underwood and 
Waterson, 2014) compared STAMP with AcciMap and a method based on the 
Swiss Cheese Model, in the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau model (ATSB). 
Salmon et al. (2012) liken STAMP to AcciMap in its focus on the entire 
sociotechnical system, but Underwood and Waterson (2014) suggest that 
STAMP more clearly embodies system theory, with its visual representation of 
system structure and interactions between components. Salmon et al. (2012) 
place a criticism of STAMP on the difficulty of fitting organisational and human 
failures within its taxonomy of control failures, this issue has potentially been 
addressed in the thesis of Stringfellow (Stringfellow, 2010) which focusses on 
human and organisational factors in a STAMP analysis. However, 
Stringfellow’s taxonomy is underused in published STAMP applications, 
perhaps being overlooked as a PhD thesis. Further criticism of STAMP come 
in potentially overlooking environmental conditions and the lack of use of the 
method outside of academic research (Salmon, Cornelissen and Trotter, 2012). 
In Underwood and Waterson’s (2014) study, the application time of STAMP 
was approximately double that of AcciMap and the ATSB model. Underwood 
and Waterson feel a further limitation of STAMP’s usage characteristics are in 
the method not lending itself to providing a simple graphical representation of 
an accident, limiting the ability to communicate the findings of an analysis when 
compared with AcciMap and the ATSB model. The practitioner evaluation in 
the third study (Underwood, Waterson and Braithwaite, 2016) also raises 
questions about the usability of STAMP, with the study’s accident investigator 
participants disagreeing that STAMP was easy to understand or use. 
Underwood et al. (2016) highlight a need to improve STAMP’s usability and 
graphical output. 
These studies provide useful insights into the application of STAMP and its 
strengths and weaknesses. There are some limitations in the literature in only 
one study providing a practitioner evaluation and that with a low number of 
participants. None of these studies applied STAMP in healthcare, nor was 
there any attempt to fit the use of STAMP into a current practice investigation.  
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Table 5 Studies applying STAMP in other industries 
Study Area Analysts Evaluation Main findings 
Salmon et al., 
2012 
Outdoor activity accident Researchers Comparison with 
AcciMap and HFACS 
Significant differences found across the 3 
methods 
 
STAMP had an additional analysis requirement 
in a need for domain data to construct SCS 
diagram 
 
Difficulty placing some of the human and 
organisational failures within STAMP taxonomy 
 
STAMP better placed to identify technical 
control failures as opposed to complex human 
decision making and organisational failures 
Underwood 
and Waterson, 
2014 
Train derailment Researchers Comparison with ATSB 
and AcciMap using an 
evaluation framework 
STAMP more clearly embodied the concepts of 
systems theory 
 
STAMP provides a visual description of the 
system structure and shows relationships 
between components 
Underwood et 
al., 2016 
Simulated investigation 
(partly field-based) on a 
rail-based accident 
scenario 
6 accident investigator 
practitioners (not 
experienced in 
STAMP) 
Practitioner evaluation 
via questionnaire and 
focus group 
 
Assessment of analyst 
outputs 
Use of STAMP resulted in slightly different 
collection of information about accident 
compared with ATSB 
 
Considerable variation among participants in 
identified system components, safety 
constraints and factors contributing to the 
accident. Participants tended to focus analysis 
at the frontline staff 
 
Some participants had difficulty in 
understanding the terminology of STAMP. 
Participants struggled to apply STAMP 
HFACS: Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
SCS: Safety Control Structure diagram 
ATSB: Australian Transport Safety Bureau model 
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2.8 Summary and gap in knowledge 
This review has presented the known issues in healthcare incident 
investigation and how these issues relate to HFE and safety research on 
accident analysis. Healthcare incident investigation is limited by the same bias 
and influencing factors as found in other industries. These limitations are 
further compounded by the lack of safety expertise held by the frontline staff 
undertaking incident investigation, who are in turn guided by RCA, a 
methodological approach not suited to complex sociotechnical systems. 
Systemic accident analysis methods are favoured by academic researchers 
for the analysis of accidents in complex systems, STAMP strongly embodies 
the systems theory that underpins those methods and benefits from the 
availability of structured method guidance. However, STAMP has had limited 
application in healthcare and very little has been done to formally evaluate its 
application in this domain. Questions have been raised about the usability of 
STAMP in its application in other industries, but the exploratory nature of this 
research make the findings somewhat preliminary. There is a gap in 
knowledge around the application of STAMP to the analysis of healthcare 
patient safety incidents, including evaluation against specified criteria and in 
how the healthcare stakeholders that undertake incident analysis perceive the 
usability and utility of the approach. 
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Chapter 3  - Research approach 
3.1 Introduction 
The research problem presented in Chapter 1 and literature review in Chapter 
2 has described a motivation to improve incident analysis in healthcare, it is 
felt that the adoption of STAMP as an analytical approach to incident analysis 
could improve the quality of investigation. However, the review of literature in 
Chapter 2 has shown few published studies applying STAMP to healthcare 
incident analysis and identified a gap in knowledge concerning an evaluation 
of the usability and utility of STAMP with healthcare stakeholders. This chapter 
describes the approach this thesis takes to researching the application of 
STAMP in healthcare and the steps taken to ensure the research is of high 
quality and undertaken systematically, sceptically and ethically  (Robson, 
2011). The sections in this chapter present information on the research 
approach, ethical approval process and the application and evaluation of 
STAMP.  
3.2 Developing the research approach 
In broad terms, the research approach has been described as the intersection 
between philosophy, research design and specific methods (Creswell, 2014). 
This encompasses the planning stages of research, from broad assumptions, 
to detailed methods, analysis and interpretation (Creswell, 2014). To develop 
a research approach, this research draws upon approaches, frameworks and 
methodology from the social sciences and design research. There is also a 
consideration for the approaches and methods used by previous research in 
accident analysis. 
3.2.1 Research paradigm  
Research endeavours are said to be underpinned by philosophical worldviews 
or paradigms (Robson, 2011; Creswell, 2014), the research paradigm forms a 
basis for how the research is undertaken and influences the choice of 
approach and methods. The research in this thesis relates to an applied 
research problem and in keeping with this, the approach is underpinned by the 
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pragmatic research paradigm, fitting the concern with applications and 
solutions to problems (Creswell, 2014).  
Pragmatism is one of several identified research paradigms, the others 
including positivism and postpositivism, which are often associated with 
quantitative research, and constructivism and transformative, often associated 
with qualitative research (Robson, 2011; Creswell, 2014). Pragmatism is often 
discussed as a way of justifying the combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in one piece of research (e.g. Robson 2011; Creswell 
2014). The pragmatic paradigm fits this thesis due to an emphasis on the 
research problem rather than a system of philosophy (Creswell, 2014). 
Methods and procedures are chosen based on the belief that they are the most 
appropriate for investigating the research problem.  
3.2.2 Research design 
This pragmatic paradigm opens the research to a choice of qualitative, 
quantitative or mixed methods and the selection of types of study judged to be 
most appropriate to understand the research problem and answer the research 
questions. Robson (2011) has proposed exploration, description and 
explanation as three common purposes of research. But also discusses an 
action perspective present in many studies, which go beyond exploring, 
describing and explaining to facilitate action, help change or make 
improvements (Robson, 2011). This thesis is not just seeking to describe and 
explain the current situation in healthcare incident analysis, rather it is 
concerned with an effort to improve that situation and aims to apply a method 
(STAMP) in the analysis of incidents and proposal of improvements to the 
design of healthcare systems. The interest in improvement and the application 
and validation of a method for design support is congruent with design 
research and the research conducted in engineering design (Blessing and 
Chakrabarti, 2009).  
Blessing and Chakrabarti (2009) describe one objective of design research as 
developing and validating design support, that is methods with the aim to 
improve design. Although they mostly refer to product design in their text, this 
objective can still hold true for service or system design. They stress the 
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importance of evaluation, which is needed to determine whether the 
application of design support leads to more success as determined by defined 
criteria (Blessing and Chakrabarti, 2009). When considering the aim of incident 
analysis as preventing future incidents and STAMP incident analysis as a form 
of design support, the generation of effective recommendations for incident 
prevention would be a criterion to determine its success. We would want to 
know whether the application of STAMP leads to the generation of remedial 
actions that are more effective than those proposed from current practice. But 
other criteria may also be important in determining the success of STAMP in 
healthcare. In aiming for improvement as well as understanding, design 
research is said to require three things:  
1. A model or theory of the existing situation  
2. A vision (model or theory) of the desired situation  
3. A vision of the support that is likely to change the existing situation into 
the desired situation (Blessing and Chakrabarti, 2009)  
To meet these requirements, this research develops an understanding of 
current practice in healthcare incident analysis, proposes the application of 
STAMP as a way of improving the current situation and develops a vision of 
how STAMP can be applied to improve current practice. 
These requirements fit into a four-stage framework proposed by Blessing and 
Chakrabarti (2009) to assist in the planning of design research to improve the 
chances of obtaining valid and useful outcomes, shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8 Design Research Methodology framework adapted from Blessing and Chakrabarti 
(2009) 
These four stages and the activities within those stages are used to guide the 
design of the research within this thesis and can be briefly summarised as 
follows: 
1. Research clarification: this stage aims to identify and refine the research 
problem that is the subject of the research, setting a realistic research 
goal through the analysis of literature. An initial description of the 
existing situation is developed as well as a proposal of a desired 
situation. 
  
2. Descriptive study I: this stage further describes the current situation in 
the area design support is to be applied in, with the intention to 
determine which factors should be addressed to make improvements. 
This stage can use a review of literature or empirical research if the 
literature is not comprehensive enough. 
  
3. Prescriptive study: in this stage the understanding of the current 
situation is used to further develop the vision of the desired situation 
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and develops support aimed at advancing the current situation to the 
desired situation. An initial evaluation of the success of the support can 
be made. 
 
4. Descriptive study II: this stage aims to evaluate the impact of the 
support and its ability to realise the desired situation (Blessing and 
Chakrabarti, 2009).  
It is noted that not all stages need to be completed in every piece of research 
and the selection will be based on resource constraints and practical 
considerations, but these four-stages provide a useful framework to give 
structure to the research within this thesis (as shown in Figure 9). However, 
first there needs to be further consideration of the type of study that is used in 
the stages of this framework. 
The research problem of this thesis is based on the application of a method in 
the real-world healthcare context. This leads the research to the field and the 
messiness of the real-world, where it is necessary to conduct the research in 
an open system without control over variables that would be maximised in 
laboratory-based experimentation. Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are a 
type of research design and experimental approach, that are used in 
healthcare and often felt to be the gold standard for research investigation in 
open systems (Robson, 2011). Experiments are designed to establish 
causation, with the common feature of deliberately varying something to 
discover what happens to something else later (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 
2002). Research using RCTs randomly assign participants to groups, one 
group will receive the intervention being investigated, another group will 
receive a placebo intervention (there can be more than two groups). What has 
happened to those two groups is then measured, with the effect being the 
difference between those that received the intervention and those that didn’t 
(Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002). Experimental designs such as the RCT 
design are equipped to deal with research questions that ask if an intervention 
is effective and to measure the size of that effect. However, RCTs and other 
experimental designs are not equipped to answer how and why type questions 
directly (Robson, 2011).  
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The questions this research is attempting to answer are how questions and 
within the social sciences a different research design, the case study, has been 
proposed as the preferred approach when the main research questions are of 
a how and why nature (Yin, 2013). The case study design is also appropriate 
when the researcher has little control over behavioural events and the focus of 
the study is a contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2013). All of which hold true 
for the research that forms this thesis: the research questions are of a how 
nature; the research interest includes the real-world healthcare context, where 
the researcher has little control over behavioural events; and incident analysis 
and issues with incident analysis are occurring in the present and ongoing, 
rather than an entirely historical phenomenon. The case study is a well-
established research design which involves an empirical investigation of a 
contemporary phenomenon, within its real-life context, using multiple sources 
of evidence (Robson, 2011; Yin, 2013). The focus is on a particular case, the 
case itself could be an individual, group or organisation, and takes into account 
its context (Robson, 2011). This focus on a single case leads to the main 
criticism or limitation of the case study design, in the difficulties of making 
generalisations from a single case to other contexts and situations (Robson, 
2011; Yin, 2013). A strategy to overcome this limitation, at least in part, is 
through a research design using multiple case studies. The evidence from a 
multiple case design is considered more robust than from a single case design, 
additional cases can duplicate the findings of the first case increasing the 
ability to convince of a general phenomenon (Yin, 2013). As in experiment-
based research, replication of studies can also include variation of conditions, 
rather than just duplication of the initial study, one or two conditions can be 
altered in the additional cases to see whether the findings can still be 
duplicated (Yin, 2013).  
This research employs a multiple case study design, STAMP is applied to 
patient safety incident analysis in three case studies, with the type of incident 
varied in each case. The case studies are situated in the design research 
framework provided by Blessing and Chakrabarti (2009) as shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 Overview of research approach 
3.3 Research clarification and descriptive stage 
The research clarification stage was covered in the Chapter 2 literature review, 
where the research problem and gap in knowledge were defined. Also present 
in Chapter 2 was an initial description of the current situation in healthcare 
incident analysis as presented in the literature. This current situation is further 
explored as part of Case Study 1 and is presented in Chapter 4. This 
descriptive stage provides detail on the current situation in healthcare incident 
analysis and further exploration of how STAMP can fit into current practice. 
Along with the literature review, the descriptive stage uses interviews with 
healthcare stakeholders to describe healthcare incident analysis and current 
issues in this area. 
3.4 Prescriptive stage 
The prescriptive stage aims to investigate the application of STAMP to 
healthcare incident analysis, this is done in three case studies. A multiple case 
study design was chosen to strengthen the ability to make generalisations. 
Within a case study design, generalisations are made analytically, rather than 
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statistically, so there is no power analysis to determine the sample size, 
instead the choice is down to the judgement of the researcher (Yin, 2013). It is 
suggested that two to three replications are enough when the theory of the 
research is straightforward (Yin, 2013). As this research relates to the 
application of an accident analysis approach based on strong theoretical 
foundations and already applied in safety-critical industry, it is felt that three 
cases would provide a strong enough replication of findings to contribute to 
knowledge in the area. 
The case studies are not simply a duplication, rather conditions are varied in 
each case study to provide a greater depth of understanding. The rationale for 
this is due to the varied nature of the healthcare context, healthcare incidents 
occur across hospital and community care and can be very different in nature, 
for example from medication prescription error incidents to patient suicide. The 
condition of type of patient safety incident is varied between cases: Case Study 
1 analyses a large-scale hospital-based organisational incident, Case Study 2 
analyses a small-scale hospital-based medication error incident, and Case 
Study 3 analyses a series of community-based patient suicide incidents. The 
progression and link between each case study is discussed further in chapters 
4, 5 and 6. Five components of research design are considered especially 
important for case studies: a case study’s questions; its propositions; its unit(s) 
of analysis; the logic linking the data to the propositions; and the criteria for 
interpreting the findings (Yin, 2013). Details on each case study, including the 
selection of participants as units of analysis and methods used are provided in 
each case study chapter. 
The case studies in this research use qualitative data and therefore take into 
account the fundamental characteristics of good qualitative research, in having 
an evolving design, the presentation of multiple realities, a consideration of the 
researcher as an instrument of data collection and a focus on participants’ 
views (Robson, 2011). The design is evolving in that each case study builds 
on the last, the case studies recruit multiple participants to give their views on 
healthcare, incident analysis and STAMP. The role of the researcher is 
accounted for and presented with each case study. Furthermore, the research 
follows two general rules for achieving validity in qualitative research, in 
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ensuring a fit between question, data and method and that each step in the 
analysis is properly accounted for (Richards and Morse, 2013).  
3.4.1 STAMP application process 
The accident analysis approach of STAMP, Causal Analysis using System 
Theory (CAST), is the approach used in the analysis of incidents throughout 
the case studies. In each case study STAMP was applied following the same 
protocol provided by method guidance. Professor Nancy Leveson, who 
developed the STAMP approach, has authored several texts which describe 
the process of applying STAMP. A full description of the process is given in 
Leveson (2012), in short, the approach is split into nine steps: 
1. Identify the system and hazard involved in the loss. 
2. Identify the system safety constraints and system requirements 
associated with that loss. 
3. Document the safety control structure in place to control the hazard and 
enforce the safety constraints. 
4. Determine the proximate events leading to the loss. 
5. Analyse the loss at the physical system level. 
6. Moving up the levels of the safety control structure, determine how and 
why each successive higher level allowed or contributed to the 
inadequate control at the current level.   
7. Examine overall coordination and communication contributors to the 
loss. 
8. Determine the dynamics and changes in the system and the safety 
control structure relating to the loss and any weakening of the safety 
control structure over time. 
9. Generate recommendations. 
Within the case studies, the author began the incident analysis using the 
documentary evidence from previous investigations, this is described fully in 
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each case study chapter. The safety control structure model diagrams were 
produced by the author using Microsoft Visio and discussed with a second 
researcher until agreement was reached. In each case study the control 
structure models were validated through discussion with healthcare 
stakeholder subject matter experts, the models were changed in accordance 
to the advice of the healthcare stakeholders where necessary. The diagrams 
were used to involve healthcare stakeholders in the analysis and in the 
participant evaluation of STAMP. Table 6 summarises the involvement of 
healthcare stakeholders and analysts in the different stages of the STAMP 
applications for each case study, further detail is provided in the case study 
chapters. 
Table 6 Summary of people involved in STAMP applications in each case study 
STAMP steps  People involved  
Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3 
1 to 3 
 
 
Author as main analyst, outcomes agreed with another 
researcher 
Validation of control 
structure model 
 
9 healthcare 
stakeholders 
4 healthcare 
stakeholders 
3 healthcare 
stakeholders 
4 to 9 2 researchers 2 researchers and 21 
healthcare 
stakeholders 
 
2 researchers 
Validation of 
recommendations 
n/a 4 healthcare 
stakeholders 
 
3 healthcare 
stakeholders 
 
3.5 Evaluation 
A key component of this research is in determining whether STAMP can be 
applied effectively in healthcare, this requires a method for evaluating its 
effectiveness. In this research the application of STAMP was evaluated 
through the perceptions of healthcare stakeholders on the usability and utility 
of STAMP in healthcare, and through reflections on demonstrated applications 
of STAMP and evaluating these applications against established criteria.  
3.5.1 Healthcare stakeholder evaluation 
Case studies 1 and 2 involved healthcare stakeholders in the STAMP analysis 
of incidents in interviews and workshops and collected feedback on their 
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thoughts about STAMP. Participants were asked questions that were designed 
to understand their views on three areas of the application of STAMP in 
healthcare, in the usability, utility and potential for future application. The 
participants completed an evaluation questionnaire (see Appendix 4) which 
required them to state their level of agreement with a number of statements on 
a 5-point scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, 
strongly agree) and answer open-ended questions. The following statements 
and questions were used on the questionnaire: 
Usability 
Statements on usability: 
• It was easy to understand the approach 
• The approach was easy to apply 
• The approach was presented clearly 
• The templates provided were useful 
Questions on usability: 
• Did you have any difficulty in identifying the systems and hazards 
involved in the incident? 
• How understandable did you find the control structure element of the 
approach? 
• Is there something that could make the use of the approach easier? 
Utility 
Statements on utility: 
• The approach has given me a different perspective on the incident 
• The approach is useful in learning from the incident 
• The approach is relevant to healthcare 
• The approach can help to make recommendations 
Questions on utility: 
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• How did the use of the approach impact your view and understanding 
of the incident? 
• Are there aspects of healthcare incidents that the approach does not 
seem to cover? 
• How well do you think the approach covers human decisions and 
control actions in healthcare? 
Future application     
Statements on future application: 
• The approach would be useful in the analysis of future incidents 
• Healthcare would benefit from the adoption of the approach 
• We would need expert help to apply the approach 
Questions on future application: 
• Do you feel the approach is something you could learn to use? If so, 
what kind of support would you need? 
General questions 
• What did you like about the approach? 
• What didn’t you like about the approach? 
Further to the questionnaire, the interviews and workshops used to introduce 
participants to STAMP were audio-recorded. Participants talked through their 
initial thoughts on STAMP and attempts to use the approach, and were asked 
to expand on the questionnaire comments by providing further discussion. 
3.5.2 Evaluation criteria 
Criteria to use in the evaluation of the STAMP application were sought from 
previous literature. Criteria have been previously developed to evaluate both 
accident models and investigation methods (Benner, 1985; Katsakiori, 
Sakellaropoulos and Manatakis, 2009).  
The early work of Benner (1985) developed 10 criteria for the evaluation of 
accident models, these are summarised in Table 7. Whereas, Katsakiori et al. 
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(2009) provide a set of requirements by which to evaluate accident 
investigation methods, summarised in Table 8. There are some common 
themes between the criteria for model evaluation and the requirements for 
investigation methods, such as: the need to represent reality (realistic criterion, 
validation requirement), provision of a detailed description of the accident 
(definitive criterion, descriptive requirement), ensuring the analysis does not 
lead to an oversimplification of the accident (noncausal criterion, revealing 
requirement) and a consideration of ease of understanding by non-specialists 
(visible criterion, practical requirement). The author predominantly uses the 
Katsakiori et al. (2009) requirements to evaluate the STAMP applications in 
each individual case study, with reference to Benner’s (1985) criteria made 
and used in the cross-case analysis presented in Chapter 7.  
77 
 
Table 7 Benner's (1985) criteria for accident model evaluation 
Criteria Description 
Realistic Model must represent reality: the observed nature of the accident 
phenomenon, sequential and concurrent events and their interaction 
with time, risk-taking nature of work processes. 
Definitive Model must define the data required to describe the accident 
phenomenon. Model must drive the investigation and analysis 
methods. Model must use definitive descriptive building blocks. 
Satisfying Model must contribute to achievement of an agency’s statutory 
mission. 
Comprehensive Model must encompass the development and consequences of an 
accident. Model must lead to complete description of the events 
involved, helping to avoid ambiguity or gaps in understanding. 
Disciplining Model must provide a technically sound framework and concepts for 
testing the quality, validity and relationships of data developed during 
an investigation. 
Consistent Model must provide guidance for consistent interpretation of questions 
arising during an investigation. 
Direct Model must provide for direct identification of safety problems in ways 
that provide options for their prompt correction. 
Functional Model must provide functional links to performance of worker tasks 
and work flows involved in an accident. Must make it possible to link 
accident descriptions to the work process in which the accident 
occurred. 
Noncausal Model must be free of accident cause or causal factors concepts. 
Addressing instead a full description of accident phenomenon, 
showing interactions amongst all parties and things, rather than 
oversimplification. 
Visible Model must enable investigators and others to see relevance of model 
to any accident under investigation easily and credibly. Interactions 
described should be readily visible, easy to comprehend and credible 
to the public and victims as well as investigators. 
  
Table 8 Katsakiori et al. (2009) requirements for accident investigation methods 
Requirement Description 
Descriptive Method should provide a detailed description of the accident, guidance 
to identify the complete set of facts relevant to the accident and the 
theoretical understanding behind the search. 
Revealing Method should distinguish between events and underlying causes, to 
guide the investigator to think about underlying causes. 
Consequential Method should allow for the generation of specific recommendations for 
accident prevention. 
Validation The methods should be valid and reliable. A valid method should 
promote, as far as is reasonably possible, correspondence between 
findings and reality. A reliable method should facilitate agreement 
between results and different investigators/users. 
Practical The method should be practical, in that the analysis can be made by 
ordinary safety persons, without the need for highly trained experts. 
Application 
field 
The investigation method should account for the specific context of the 
accident. 
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3.5.3 Further evaluation 
Previous research has evaluated STAMP by contrasting with other accident 
analysis methods (Salmon, Cornelissen and Trotter, 2012; Underwood and 
Waterson, 2014), including in healthcare where a STAMP application was 
compared with RCA (O’Neil, 2014). Case Study 2 uses a similar approach to 
further evaluate the application of STAMP in healthcare, by contrasting a 
STAMP analysis output with that of an RCA investigation. 
Case Study 3 differs from 1 and 2 in that it does not use a participant evaluation 
of STAMP. This was partly due to practical reasons of not having enough 
participant time to involve them in the STAMP application. Instead the findings 
and recommendations from a STAMP analysis are compared to interviews 
with healthcare stakeholders on what they found helped them create safety.  
3.6 Results analysis 
The approach to analysing the results is shaped by the theoretical propositions 
of the research and the research questions (Yin, 2013).  The research has 
started with the proposition that the application of STAMP could improve 
healthcare incident analysis. This leads the research to the application of 
STAMP in healthcare incident analysis and the research questions of how 
effective STAMP is and how healthcare stakeholders perceive the usability 
and utility of STAMP? This theoretical proposition guides the case study 
analysis, pointing to the relevant factors to be investigated and described in 
describing relevant contextual factors, demonstrating STAMP applications, 
evaluating those applications and analysing healthcare stakeholder 
perceptions of STAMP.  
The results of each case study were analysed within each case. Participant 
interviews and workshops were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim into 
the qualitative data analysis software, NVivo. NVivo was used to organise and 
manage this qualitative data, the transcriptions are coded into themes 
developed around the participants’ views on STAMP. Furthermore, the 
replication of studies in terms of STAMP application to healthcare incidents, 
healthcare stakeholder evaluation and evaluation against set criteria allows for 
a cross-case analysis. The findings from the case studies are compared and 
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key themes develop across all cases, this is presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 
7 also considers a plausible rival explanation or hypothesis (Yin, 2013) in that 
the effectiveness of STAMP may be greatly reduced due to the influence of 
factors other than analytical approach to accidents, such as organisational 
culture. 
3.7 Ethical approval and research governance 
The process for gaining ethical approval is summarised in Figure 10. As 
research based in the NHS, the first stage determined whether the study would 
require governance and/or ethical approval from the Health Research 
Authority (HRA) or NHS. The requirements for this approval were then 
completed. In combination, ethical approval was also sought from 
Loughborough University Ethics Committee. Ethical approval was granted by 
Loughborough University Ethics Sub-committee (Human Participants) for all 
three case studies. All study participants gave written informed consent  
Following use of the HRA decision tool (http://www.hra-
decisiontools.org.uk/research/) and discussions with NHS research 
governance managers, it was decided that case studies 1 and 2 did not require 
HRA or NHS ethical approval. Case study 3 required HRA approval and 
Loughborough University research sponsorship, but not NHS Research Ethics 
Committee approval. The process involved completion of the Integrated 
Research Application System (IRAS) process, development of a research 
protocol document following the HRA template and governance of study 
documentation by Loughborough University research office. Research 
governance was provided by Loughborough University Research Office and 
Leicestershire Partnership Trust Research and Development Office. The 
approval letter documentation is provided in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3.     
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Start
Advice from 
NHS research 
governance
HRA application 
required?
Complete HPSC 
approval 
process
Yes/maybe No
Is the study 
considered research 
by HRA?
Apply for HRA 
and HPSC 
approval via 
IRAS and to 
HPSC
Yes
Use HRA 
decision tool 
online
No
Is NHS ethics approval 
required? No
Yes
Did not occur for 
this research
Is LU sponsorship 
required? NoYes
Complete LU 
sponsorship 
approval 
process
Submit copy of 
HRA approval 
and protocol to 
HPSC
EndEnd
HPSC – Loughborough University Ethics (Human 
Participants) Sub-Committee
HRA – Health Research Authority
IRAS – HRA Ethics Application System
LU – Loughborough University
End
 
Figure 10 Ethical approval process flowchart 
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Chapter 4  - Case Study 1 
Descriptive stage – Current practice in healthcare 
incident analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The literature review in Chapter 2 introduced the criticism of current practice 
in healthcare incident analysis (section 2.4). The concerns raised in the 
literature were based on reviews of incident investigation reports and lacked 
the views of healthcare stakeholders. The initial investigation in Case Study 1 
sought to further explore current practice in healthcare incident analysis 
through interviews with healthcare stakeholders. This initial exploratory work 
completes the descriptive stage of the research and aims to provide an 
understanding of the context for the application of STAMP in the prescriptive 
studies, to assist in the analysis and interpretation of results.    
4.2 Aims and objectives 
This study aims to investigate the current state of healthcare incident 
investigation and related issues. The study has the following objectives: 
• To gather healthcare stakeholder perspectives of healthcare incident 
analysis 
• To identify themes in healthcare stakeholder perspectives on incident 
analysis 
4.3 Methods 
Interviews were conducted with nine healthcare stakeholders. The interviews 
were unstructured, with participants asked to describe previous involvement in 
incident investigations, the methods they’ve used and for their views on current 
practice, which led into further discussion.  
The study recruited healthcare stakeholders that were involved in patient 
safety-related work in their organisations (e.g. staff involved in incident 
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investigations, heads of patient safety in providers and commissioners, patient 
safety researchers and educators). Participants were contacted by email via 
patient safety interest groups in the East Midlands regional area, such as the 
East Midlands Academic Health Science Network (http://emahsn.org.uk/) and 
the Leicestershire Improvement, Innovation and Patient Safety Unit 
(https://www2.le.ac.uk/partnership/liips). All participants gave written informed 
consent. Relevant information about the participants is summarised in Table 
9. 
Table 9 Summary of interview participant information 
No. Role Healthcare 
experience 
Patient safety investigation 
experience 
1 Commissioner, head of 
patient safety  
28 years 13 years in patient safety roles 
Knowledge of SCM and RCA 
2 General Practitioner and 
Senior Lecturer 
14 years Conducted investigations in clinical 
role and involved in improving 
methods 
Knowledge of SCM and RCA 
3 Provider, Trust lead for 
patient safety 
35 years 8 years in role involving review of 
RCA reports 
10 years investigation experience 
Knowledge of SCM and RCA 
4 Commissioner, quality 
assurance 
Previously Chief Nurse 
30 years Involved in investigations and 
patient safety throughout career 
Knowledge of SCM and RCA 
5 Nurse and Senior Lecturer 14 years 8 years in clinical and educational 
roles  
Knowledge of RCA 
6 Commissioner, deputy 
director of nursing and 
quality 
34 years 20 years 
Knowledge of SCM and RCA 
7 NHS Improvement, clinical 
advisor 
32 years 15 years 
Knowledge of SCM, RCA, FMEA 
8 Hospital medic and patient 
safety improvement lead 
10 years 4 years 
Knowledge of SCM, RCA, HFACS, 
AcciMap 
9 Manager of simulation 
centre 
20 years Involved in patient safety 
education of clinicians 
Knowledge of SCM, RCA, HFACS, 
AcciMap, STAMP 
SCM: Swiss Cheese Model 
RCA: Root Cause Analysis 
HFACS: Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
FMEA: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
 
The interviews were transcribed verbatim into NVivo and coded by the author 
into main themes. 
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4.4 Findings 
In keeping with the literature on healthcare incident investigation, the 
participants suggested that current practice predominantly uses RCA as the 
analytical approach. Similarly, the participants’ criticisms of current incident 
investigation practices were in keeping with previous literature (e.g. Peerally 
et al. 2016). The main themes arising from the interviews were:  
- Analysts may lack safety expertise 
- Superficiality with a tendency to focus on individuals and blame 
- Analysis outcomes influenced by ease of implementation 
- Influence of organisational hierarchy 
- Influence of organisational complexity 
- Desire to use group discussion in future analysis 
These themes are described in the following sections and illustrated with 
participant quotes. 
4.4.1 Analysts may lack safety expertise 
The participants described current practice incident investigations and stated 
they were generally undertaken by clinical healthcare staff. A concern 
regarding the quality of investigations and analysis was that these staff may 
be lacking in safety expertise and training in investigation techniques. 
‘…it's very complicated, I think you have individuals who may be trained 
or not-trained in root cause analysis and investigation. I think you've 
got the quality of the training and that depends on how the training is 
delivered, who delivers it. I think you've got individuals in place that feel 
they don't need any training, because they've been there, seen it, done it, 
so you've got that sort of culture.’ – Commissioner quality assurance 
(Participant 4) 
‘In my experience, I've found that quite often people are not skilled in 
RCA tools and techniques, they're not following the process as it should 
be followed. What people seem to find difficult with RCA is actually 
identifying what the care delivery problems and the service delivery 
problems are.’ – Regulator clinical advisor (Participant 7) 
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Participants felt there was a general lack of HFE and safety expertise within 
healthcare and the staff that undertake investigations, although this was 
starting to change with more education in HFE and safety. 
‘I think it depends on who you speak to, so a lot of the younger consultants 
and practice development teams and things like that who have grown up 
with this idea of influences on performance. Not necessarily the jargon of 
Human Factors but the fact that there are other factors that influence 
performance. But even when I started 10 years ago, that wasn't in the 
curriculum. So, I was never taught to think about how all these things 
work, think about how the equipment is designed what errors could 
come into it, we were never taught it, it is in there now, it's beginning to be 
in there. So, I think it's changing.’ – Medic and patient safety lead 
(Participant 8) 
‘I think the technique means that's how people go around getting the 
information and I think for a lot of people that we've trained in RCA we give 
them a toolkit and it's got all of these things in it and they use them quite 
literally. And we've not to this point put in more about the Human 
Factors element into our training of how we train our investigators.’ – 
Provider patient safety lead (Participant 3) 
4.4.2 Superficiality with a tendency to focus on individuals and 
blame 
Some participants reported that investigations can seem superficial, with a 
tendency to focus on the actions of individuals, rather than perform a deeper 
system analysis. Furthermore, there were occasions when the incident reports 
would seek to attribute blame.   
‘…and I think there's a feeling that perhaps we're not using incidents 
to get to the underlying safety issues. That we're tending to focus 
mainly on the story of the events without looking at them more deeply 
to understand what they tell us about the underlying systems, 
structures, processes of care. And that even when we get that 
information, we're not reliably feeding that back to the frontline. So, to some 
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extent there's arguably a tick box culture about the way we approach safety 
incidents. Incident happens, we need to do an investigation and we need 
to come up with action points that we then tick off and we can say right 
we've done that.’ – General Practitioner (GP) and educator (Participant 2) 
‘I think if you look at a lot of the investigations, people will just look at the 
individual, they won't look at the system. In healthcare particularly there 
is still, it's changing, but there is still that belief that things go wrong 
because somebody did the wrong thing. And not considering why 
they did the wrong thing. That's historical, it's been there for a long time, 
there's a whole traditional idea of individual blame vs systems blame.’ – 
Medic and patient safety lead (Participant 8)  
‘I don’t think the investigations go far enough. I think it’s just like a 
fact-finding mission. Who did what, how did it happen, what time did 
it happen and what was the outcome out of it, did it affect the patient 
or not affect the patient. It seems to say okay let’s not do that again, but 
it doesn't seem to go any further and I think from my opinion this is why 
sometimes we have the same incident happen again. We are very good at 
finding the facts and almost who gets the blame for it, but it doesn't always 
go any further than that.’ – Nurse and educator (Participant 5) 
‘You've got the blame culture that still is apparent, so not our fault, it was 
an individual’s fault, when actually it was clearly a system issue… And we 
still get very defensive reports. Blaming an individual as well, that tends 
to come through in some reports we see, which is interesting.’ – 
Commissioner quality assurance (Participant 4) 
‘…we very rarely find out what a person who was integral to an incident, 
what was happening for them at that specific moment in time. We don't ask 
them if they were okay, we don't ask them if they've not been getting any 
sleep or they were so busy they couldn't think straight. We ask them why 
they made the error. But we don't dig into how they were on that day, 
was it noisy, was it down a telephone, was there any interference. 
There's lots and lots of things, we don't dig into that as part of RCA’ – 
Provider patient safety lead (Participant 3) 
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4.4.3 Analysis outcomes influenced by ease of implementation 
Participants reported a tendency for analysis recommendations to focus on 
policy and retraining, rather than system design. It was suggested this was due 
to the difficulties and cost in implementing large organisational change, it is 
simply easier to retrain an individual or alter a policy and the investigations 
would focus on remedial action that was easiest to implement  
 ‘…we looked at the themes and trends and we also looked at the action 
plans, and they did a piece of work whereby they reviewed the action 
plans and they found that most of the actions were weak actions. 
Relying on training staff, putting policies into place, that kind of thing, 
that wouldn't fundamentally change practice.’ – Regulator clinical advisor 
(Participant 7) 
 ‘…we held a learning from incidents workshop recently where we had 
some focus group discussion. People who are involved in patient safety 
investigations did say that they come up with actions so that they can 
demonstrate that they've undertaken an action. So, this is an action 
that we can tick off and we can say that we've done it, whereas I don't 
think we're being critical enough of ourselves about the actions that 
we recommend. And I don't think that in a lot of cases there's particularly 
any expert advice on okay well we've come up with this idea that we'll 
design a proforma, is this actually the thing that's going to make a 
difference?’ – GP and educator (Participant 2) 
‘So, the recommendations that come out of our reports are generally 
focussed on retraining or education, raising awareness that the 
incident has happened, reflection for the people involved, and 
probably writing a new policy or editing a policy. They will have an 
impact but they're probably not as effective (as other actions). And there's 
two reasons why that happens I think: because the analysis isn't in-depth 
enough, so we can't truly identify where the changes are that will actually 
make a big difference. But also, going back the old NPSA, I do remember 
them saying when we read the documentation that they sent out that 
recommendations should be focussed on things that you can actually do, 
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which makes sense of course. So, there's two sides to it, there's the we 
don't know what the true learning is and then on the other side there 
are so many barriers in place to put the big effective remedies.’ – 
Medic and patient safety lead (Participant 8)  
‘Our action planning is rubbish, so even if we do quite well on our 
investigation and almost stumble across the things that need doing, we 
write an action plan that is very weak. And we tend to fixate on the things 
that we think we can do. ‘We need a new IT system, has anybody got any 
money, no? OK’ so what we’ll do is just put a little patch in.’ – Commissioner 
patient safety manager (Participant 1) 
4.4.4 Influence of organisational hierarchy 
Some participants suggested that organisational hierarchy had an influence on 
the individuals undertaking investigations, with motivation for them to focus on 
areas that would not push responsibility to their seniors. 
‘Because we write one report with one action plan. That action plan is 
supposed to fix it and it’s one action plan from one incident and the people 
writing it have only got quite a small sphere of control. So, they’re not 
going to write it’s the chief executive’s fault, he needs to invest £2 
million in this, it is career limiting. They’re not going to say that 
somebody in the middle made the mistake, because it’s somebody in 
the middle that is probably doing the investigation. So, we’ll easily just 
fall for that easy solution which is the nurse gave the wrong drug, we’ll teach 
the nurse to give the right drug next time…We know it’s not the fix, but the 
way we do it is we go well we’ll just retrain the nurse. Because that’s the 
easy one to do. We could look and say, she has 45 patients to look after, 
she hadn’t had a break, the drug was missing from the trolley, she had to 
go and get it from somewhere else. And we might write all of that, but when 
it comes down to it we’ll retrain her, instead of saying that whole piece of 
that hospital needs restructuring, we need to work it differently, we need a 
different system for getting our drugs in.’  – Commissioner patient safety 
manager (Participant 1) 
88 
 
There was a further example of staff being overruled by seniors when raising 
issues regarding an investigation. 
‘…when I raised that issue, I was told it shouldn't have happened anyway. 
But I think can we look at those issues and make sure that whatever the 
circumstances the team brief is done, whatever the circumstances there's 
a good communication process, or the channel of communication is open. 
So everybody knows and is aware of what's happening. I was overruled.’   
– Nurse and educator (Participant 5) 
4.4.5 Influence of organisational complexity 
There was awareness of difficulties for large organisations to effectively learn 
from incidents and implement effective remedial actions.  
'The frustration I think for, certainly from a commissioning perspective and 
as a provider in the past, has been I know what I would do with that 
information and that learning and sometimes the frustration can be 
you don't actually see that enacted directly. However, I have absolute 
appreciation of how massive it is, how massive some of these big 
Acute Trusts and some of the learning, and various people and it's 
everybody’s an expert and actually we need to understand exactly what will 
work within that organisation.’ – Commissioner quality assurance 
(Participant 4)  
A further difficulty in healthcare incident investigation is that incidents can 
cross organisational boundaries, whereas an investigation may be limited to a 
single healthcare organisation. 
‘And the work that we have been doing really is about how do we do 
incident investigation and learning from incidents within that kind of more 
collaborative framework. Because what's happened historically is if 
something has happened in hospital it has been investigated in the 
hospital. So, the hospital will look at the things that they did but it's 
quite likely that the error trajectory would have started somewhere 
else in the system. So, someone who has a bad hospital outcome, it 
might be that there were things that went wrong in the hospital, but it 
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might also be that something went wrong in Primary Care, maybe 
their admission was delayed or maybe their ambulance didn't arrive 
promptly. Or something might have happened before they reached the 
provider where the bad thing might have happened. So, what we're trying 
to do is to look at how we do more collaborative investigation. And then 
how do we get that information back in a timely effective way, to the people 
who need to learn from it.’ – GP and educator (Participant 2) 
4.4.6 Desire to use group discussion in future analysis 
Some participants discussed an interest in moving on from current RCA 
practice, which use statements and individual interviews, to using peer panels 
and group discussion. The benefit of group discussion was seen in the 
facilitation of learning and in enabling frontline staff to design their own 
remedies. 
‘So, one of the things that we're trying to investigate is maybe moving 
away from RCA as such. But using things like peer panels and stuff 
like that. Now I know there are pros and cons but there's also something 
around the dialogue and the debate with clinicians.’ – Commissioner quality 
assurance (Participant 6) 
 ‘…one stage is how do you get the information out of the people who were 
involved in the incident. Because the information that you need from them 
is not just what happened but why it happened the way it did. So, for 
example you might get some information from a nurse on a hospital 
ward where they say well, we gave the wrong drug and okay that could 
be the end of your investigation. But you might get out of the nurse 
well the drug was in the wrong place. What you might get out of a 
bigger group of people is some discussion about the level behind that, 
which was well we didn't have enough time to check or we don’t follow the 
protocol for double signing out of drugs. Or something like that. You're 
perhaps less likely to get that out of an interview with a single person, you're 
more likely to get that maybe out of a group of people talking about the 
incident together…  
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…So, one of the models that we're hoping to try is the idea that soon after 
an incident everyone involved in the incident will sit down together, 
perhaps with a facilitator and would talk about the incident and go 
through it. So rather than people being interviewed individually, which 
seems to be the way things happen now, people can talk about the incident.’ 
– GP and educator (Participant 2) 
‘And what we do there is we get the team that were part of the incident 
together and sit and it does quite naturally flow. And we've had some 
good results from that, in that people immediately own what's 
happening, they've been very open and honest. And we've felt that 
we've gleaned more information about what things were like at the time, by 
everybody saying and reminding each other. But it helps people to open-
up. And then when it comes to what would we need to change, to stop 
this happening again or to reduce the chances, they then come up 
with some of the solutions for that. Rather than a manager writing an 
action plan and saying here you go this is what you're going to do. 
And everyone going 'we can't do that' because that's what quite often 
happens, it feels imposed as well.’ – Provider patient safety lead 
(Participant 3)   
4.5 Summary 
The findings provide background and context for the prescriptive studies 
investigating the application of STAMP in healthcare. One interesting finding 
is in participants focussing on factors other than the analytical approach used. 
It may be that healthcare stakeholders have a lack of awareness of 
methodological issues and instead relate weaknesses in current practice to 
problems with the analysts chosen and organisational influences. However, 
some of the issues discussed and the ways the participants see incident 
analysis moving forward, could be assisted by using STAMP. This provides a 
vision for how STAMP could help current practice in incident analysis and 
improve the quality of investigations, by: 
- Giving a system perspective and moving the analysis from a focus on 
individuals and blame. 
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- Guiding the analysis to consider the wider system, crossing 
organisational boundaries. 
- Providing a system model (safety control structure diagram) that can be 
used in group discussion. This system model could facilitate an 
accurate comprehension of factors impacting system performance and 
provide a basis for a common mental model among stakeholders 
(Hettinger et al., 2015). 
This generalisability of the study findings is limited by the small sample size 
and the sample of participants (who had an interest in patient safety) may not 
be representative of the wider healthcare community. Still, the study provides 
confirmation of findings from previous literature and a basis for understanding 
the context that STAMP will be applied in. The next part of this case study and 
the other two case studies apply STAMP to healthcare incidents and evaluate 
its effectiveness. This vision of how STAMP could improve current practice is 
used in the evaluation of STAMP and interpretation of findings. 
STAMP application to the 2005-2009 Mid-Staffordshire 
NHS Trust failings 
4.6 Introduction 
The case study now moves into the prescriptive stage of the research and a 
focus on the application of STAMP in healthcare. Previous research 
investigating the use of STAMP in a healthcare context has applied the 
approach to hospital-based incidents of a small scale. For example, surgical 
adverse events involving small teams (Leveson et al., 2016; Raman et al., 
2016) and in hazard analysis of a radiation oncology process (Pawlicki et al., 
2016). This chapter presents a case study applying STAMP to a large-scale 
organisational accident in the healthcare context. A large-scale incident should 
provide the necessary data for a detailed system analysis to provide a 
demonstration of an application of STAMP in healthcare and allow for an 
evaluation of this application. Furthermore, previous research has lacked 
discourse from healthcare stakeholders regarding their perceptions of STAMP. 
This study conducts interviews and a workshop with healthcare stakeholders 
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to capture their thoughts on the usability and utility of STAMP. The failings at 
the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust between 2005 and 2009 offer the opportunity 
to apply STAMP to an organisational accident. 
4.6.1 The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust failings 
The failings at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust between 2005 and 2009 are well 
publicised and the subject of previous investigations (Healthcare Commission, 
2009) and a public inquiry (Francis, 2013a). The initial investigation into Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Trust by the Healthcare Commission in 2009 followed-up 
on reported high mortality rates and concerns from local people about 
standards of care. The final public inquiry report described the events as 
conditions of appalling care in the main hospital serving Stafford and its 
surrounding area between 2005 and 2008 (Francis, 2013a). The public inquiry 
report put forward 290 recommendations crossing all levels of the health 
service up to the Department of Health.  
4.7 Aims and objectives 
This study aims to examine the application of STAMP to a large-scale 
organisational failure in the healthcare context. To meet this aim, the study has 
the following objectives: 
• To demonstrate the application of STAMP in a healthcare context 
through the analysis of the Mid-Staffordshire inquiry reports following 
the STAMP methodological approach 
• To examine healthcare domain experts’ perspectives of STAMP’s utility 
and usability   
• To evaluate and reflect on this STAMP application  
4.8 Methods 
The research design follows a case study approach (Yin, 2013), with 
documentary analysis and interviews used as data sources. The Mid-
Staffordshire Trust case was purposefully selected for accident analysis due 
to its large-scale, the availability of data in the public inquiry reports and the 
publicity around the events increasing awareness among participants. The 
author first applied STAMP to the analysis of the Mid-Staffordshire case, 
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following this healthcare stakeholders were introduced to this demonstration 
of STAMP and asked to provide their thoughts on the usability and utility of 
STAMP in interviews and a workshop.  
4.8.1 STAMP analysis 
The analysis used the reports from the Healthcare Commission investigation 
(176 pages) (Healthcare Commission, 2009), the independent investigation 
under the NHS act (Francis, 2010a, 2010b) and the public inquiry (Francis, 
2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013a) as data. The first report consisted of two 
volumes (455 and 367 pages), the public inquiry report consisted of an 
executive summary (125 pages) and three volumes (692, 668 and 434 pages).  
Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) was applied in accordance with 
Leveson’s published guidance (Leveson, 2004, 2012) and using the 
organisational error taxonomy provided by Stringfellow (Stringfellow, 2010). An 
initial analysis was conducted by the author with the analysis outcomes 
discussed with another HFE researcher until an agreement was reached. The 
safety control structure from the analysis was initially developed prior to the 
interviews with the healthcare stakeholders (Table 9) described in section 4.3. 
The interviewees were used as subject matter experts to validate the control 
structure model and the model was altered in accordance with the information 
they provided.  
The initial control structure is shown in Figure 30 in Appendix 5, the final control 
structure is shown in Figure 11. The initial control structure included a model 
for both system design and system operation and was presented on an A3 
sized page. The main change to produce the final control structure was a 
simplification of the model to make it readable and presentable on A4 sized 
documents, this included merging the design and operation elements.      
4.8.2 Healthcare stakeholder interviews and workshop 
4.8.2.1 Interview protocol 
The healthcare stakeholders from the descriptive part of the case were 
introduced to STAMP in their interviews following the discussion of current 
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practice presented in section 4.3. All nine participants had prior knowledge of 
the Mid-Staffordshire Trust inquiry, but only one participant had previous 
knowledge of STAMP. Refer to Table 9 for information about the interview 
participants. All interviews were conducted by the author. 
The interviewees were introduced to STAMP by the interviewer with the use of 
printed slide handouts (presented in Appendix 6). The interviewer talked 
through the slides and the theoretical basis of STAMP which was followed by 
a talk through of STAMP applications in healthcare and the Mid-Staffordshire 
analysis. An A3 printed copy of the safety control structure developed from the 
Mid-Staffordshire analysis (Appendix 5) was provided to participants and 
explained.  
The interviews were semi-structured, with participants invited to validate the 
safety control structure and provide comments on STAMP during the 
explanation if they wished. Following this the participants were asked to 
complete the questionnaire on the usability and utility of STAMP (Appendix 4), 
with their responses followed up on by the interviewer for further discussion. 
The interviews were between 25 and 110 minutes in duration (mean 60 
minutes). There were three shorter interviews of 25 to 30 minutes with 
participants that had previously attended presentations on STAMP by the 
author at patient safety events. All interviews were audio-recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. 
4.8.2.2 Workshop protocol 
A workshop was used to gather further healthcare stakeholder perceptions of 
STAMP with more efficient use of time. Workshop attendees were healthcare 
professionals who were involved in patient safety-related work and were 
undertaking postgraduate studies in HFE. Table 10 summarises the 
information about the nine workshop participants.   
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Table 10 Summary of workshop participant information 
No. Role Healthcare 
experience 
Patient safety investigation 
experience 
10 Clinical lead risk and 
governance 
10+ years 4 years 
Knowledge of SCM, RCA, 
AcciMap 
11 Risk manager 7 years Intermediate 
Knowledge of RCA, BTA, 
AcciMap 
12 Educator 32 years Minimal 
Knowledge of SCM, RCA, 
AcciMap 
13 Information analyst infection 
prevention team 
4 years Knowledge of RCA, AcciMap 
14 Emergency Department 
consultant 
22 years Minimal 
Knowledge of AcciMap 
15 Junior ergonomist 13 years Minimal 
16 Patient handling trainer 20 years 3 years 
17 Moving and handling team 
manager 
23 years Part of current role 
Knowledge of ATSB, 
AcciMap 
18 Back care advisor 17 years 2 years 
SCM: Swiss Cheese Model 
RCA: Root Cause Analysis 
BTA: Bow-Tie Analysis 
ATSB: Australian Transport Safety Bureau accident investigation model 
 
The workshop had a similar protocol to the interviews, with STAMP first 
introduced in a PowerPoint presentation similar to the slides used in the 
interview hand-outs (shown in Appendix 7). Following the introduction, 
participants were provided with a copy of the previously developed safety 
control structure and a printout of a newspaper report on the Mid-Staffordshire 
failings (see Appendix 7). Participants were asked to participate in the analysis 
and to complete the evaluation questionnaire (Appendix 4). Following 
completion of the questionnaire the participants were invited to give comments, 
which lead to some discussion of the approach, this discussion was audio-
recorded and transcribed verbatim. The workshop was 60 minutes in duration 
and all participants provided written informed consent. 
4.9  Results 
4.9.1 STAMP analysis 
Information from the inquiry reports was used to identify the systems, hazards 
and safety requirements related to the failures. A model of the safety control 
structure at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust at the time of the failings was then 
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built, this model was slightly altered after discussion in the interviews and the 
final version is provided in Figure 11. While a STAMP analysis considers both 
design and operations, these are presented within one diagram. The roles and 
responsibilities of controllers at each system level were then analysed, starting 
at the lower system level and the physical processes involved in the incidents 
(see Appendix 8).  
The previous investigation reports used as data for the analysis had 
predominantly focussed on the areas of the hospital with suspected high 
mortality rates and/or had been the subject of a high number of complaints. 
This included Stafford hospital’s accident and emergency (A&E) department, 
emergency assessment unit and Wards 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12. 
4.9.1.1 System, hazards and safety requirements 
The goal of a healthcare system is to promote and protect the health and 
wellbeing of its users. The inquiries into the Mid-Staffordshire incidents 
describe issues of poor care received by patients, with episodes of patient 
harm and an overall high mortality rate. Therefore, this analysis focuses on the 
control structure related to the standards of care and the reduction of avoidable 
harm to the patient. The associated hazards are patient exposure to poor 
standards of care, with relevant loss events defined as death, injury or illness 
to a patient. The system safety requirements can be identified as follows: 
1. Reduce avoidable harm from rates of healthcare associated infections 
(ensure a clean environment and patients’ hygiene needs met). 
2. Patient to receive required medical treatment efficiently. 
3. Fulfil patients’ nutrition and hydration needs. 
4. Avoid patient harm from falls (preventative measures and 
reporting/recording of falls). 
5. Prevent harm from confused patients to themselves or others (risk 
assessments and observations where necessary). 
6. Avoid drug errors. 
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4.9.1.2 Safety control structure 
The safety control structure developed in the analysis is shown in Figure 11, 
due to the size of the control structure the full depth and detail of the analysis 
could not be provided within the main diagram. The main diagram provides an 
overview of the system, the full analysis is heavily detailed, so only examples 
of the analysis at different levels are provided in this chapter in Figure 12 and 
Figure 13, the full analysis is provided in Appendix 8.   The positions of Figures 
12 and 13 within the main diagram are highlighted.
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Figure 11 Mid-Staffordshire safety control structure 
Figure 12 
Figure 13 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure high standards of care are maintained
• Report incidents and concerns
Context:
• Working in busy, chaotic and understaffed wards
• Receiving inadequate training and development
• A lack of senior staff in some areas
• Equipment lacking in some areas of the hospital
• Working with patients with a high dependency 
level
• Staff were reluctant to speak out against the 
poor standards of care in fear of wrath of some 
senior nurses
• Staff expected to falsify records in order to avoid 
breaching waiting time target
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate execution of control actions, with cases 
of inadequate care provision: 
• Inadequate patient hygiene practices
• Inadequate prevention of patient falls, issues with 
observation, recording and risk assessment
• Inadequate patient handling practices
• Inadequate pressure area care
• Failure to monitor and maintain drip bags
• Failure to ensure nutritional requirements met
• Minimal patient observation and examination
• Communication and coordination issues: Inadequate 
record keeping and lack of clear registration of 
patient transfer between wards. Lack of appropriate 
nutrition and hydration charts
• Communication issues: Reports of issues with 
attitudes of staff towards patients and families 
impacting on patients raising concerns
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Reporting of incidents did not seem to result in 
action, which deterred future reporting
• Layout of hospital made it difficult to observe 
patients in some areas
• Trust staff isolated from other trusts and 
developments in care for continuous learning
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure high standards of care, hygiene and 
cleanliness are maintained
• Organise and supervise wards and junior staff
• Ensure reporting and investigation of incidents
Context:
• Trust lacked senior nurses e.g. only 3 matrons 
across whole trust up to 2008 when number was 
increased to 12
• A&E chronically understaffed in terms of 
consultants and nurses
• Reported low staff morale following strain of 
trust financial difficulties, cuts and difficulties in 
delivering acceptable standards of care
• High sickness rates among staff
• Some community support services not 
satisfactory for discharge
• Pressure to discharge patients to accommodate 
patient intake from A&E
• Large variation in standards of care between 
wards
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Cases of 
poor standards of care
• Inadequate feedback: Pressurised junior staff to alter 
records on discharge times to meet targets
• Inadequate communication channels/learning 
processes: Forceful management styles, particularly 
in A&E, stopped junior staff from raising concerns
• Inadequate execution of control action with 
ineffective management of discharge processes: 
Premature discharge, protracted discharge 
processes, failure to communicate arrangements to 
patients, failure to ensure adequate support
• Inadequate safety management processes: Cases of 
alleged staff misconduct not being addressed with 
governance proceedings
• Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes: Staff appraisal and professional 
development afforded low priority
• Inadequate feedback: Incident report forms 
sometimes found to be inaccurate and misleading
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Focussed on meeting targets, which was seen as 
a priority across trust
• Disengagement between management and 
clinicians
• Reporting of incidents did not seem to result in 
action
• Trust staff isolated from other trusts and 
developments in care for continuous learning 
and understanding of status of trust
Supervision CommunicationIncident reporting
 
Figure 12 Analysis of nursing care 
100 
 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure quality and safety of patient care
• Ensure learning and improvement following 
investigation of incidents and complaints
• Manage systems for the management of risk to 
patient safety and wellbeing. Ensure reporting of 
serious incidents to SHA and NPSA
Context:
• Responsibil ity for most of risk management and 
governance system devolved to divisions in 2007
• Trust cost improvement plan in action with 
board setting savings plan and divisions 
responsible for implementation
• Cost improvement plans were identified as a risk 
to patient safety and wellbeing
• High staff turnover and sickness, difficulty 
recruiting 
• Changes in staff skill mix resulted in a lack of 
senior nurses and increase in support staff
• Disconnect between clinical staff and 
management with clinicians feeling their 
concerns were ignored
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Failed to 
maintain high standards of care
• Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes: Complaints and incident investigations 
undertaken by frontline staff. Staff lacked training 
and time for investigation resulting in varied quality
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Surgical 
division described as dysfunctional in RCS review
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Problems in 
medical and surgical divisions often listed on risk 
register but not resolved
• Inadequate allocation of resources: A&E had issues 
with low staffing levels, lack of leadership, lack of 
equipment and lack of high quality training
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Clinicians felt concerns were not listened to by 
trust leadership and the trust focused on 
financial strategy
• A closed culture among clinicians with reluctance 
to adopt national guidance such as from NICE 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Improve patient care and outcomes through 
systematic review, evaluation and implementation of 
change
• Ensure high standards of care, hygiene and 
cleanliness are maintained
Context:
• Continual change in clinical leadership at board 
level – clinical governance predominantly 
overseen by director of nursing
• Clinical governance lead did not feel adequately 
trained or experienced for role
• No lead for clinical audit for a year prior to April 
2007
• Clinical audit lead had other research and 
development commitments and a substantial 
workload
• Director of infection control role regularly 
changed between personnel
• Improvements in infection control in 2008 noted 
by DH and HCC
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes: 
• Clinical audit weak and disjointed. Lacked planning 
and not linked to other governance
• A lack of follow-up after audits to ensure changes 
and improvements were made
• Inadequate robustness in review of patient deaths
• Did not participate in the audits of specialist medical 
and surgical societies
• Coordination and communication issues: Disconnect 
between divisions, departments within divisions and 
the central audit team
• Inadequate enforcement of safety constraints: 
Hygiene and cleanliness standards not maintained
• Inadequate interactions with external bodies: Did not 
report 2005-2006 increase of C.difficile to HPA, SHA 
and trust board
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Filtering of information on complaints and 
incidents did not give adequate information for 
board to judge standards
• Reassured that high mortality rates were due to 
poor coding
• Inadequate use of data to drive and generate 
audit
Policy/guidance Audit
 
Figure 13 Analysis of Trust clinical governance 
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DH – Department of Health. HCC – Healthcare Commission. HPA – Health Protection 
Agency. NICE – National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. NPSA – National Patient 
Safety Agency. RCS – Royal College of Surgeons. SHA – Strategic Health Authority. 
 
4.9.2 Participant responses on usability of STAMP 
Responses for STAMP’s usability are presented in Figure 14, participants were 
more negative about the usability of STAMP than they were its utility, with 45% 
of participants disagreeing that it was easy to understand (72% neutral or 
negative) and 34% disagreeing that it was easy to apply (78% neutral or 
negative). Responses on usability are dependent on the way STAMP was 
presented and the time available to explain and demonstrate STAMP. Several 
participants made comments about needing more time and practice with the 
method, however, they were largely positive about the presentation of STAMP 
(56% positive responses) and the provision of templates in the control 
structure output (61% positive). 
  
Figure 14 Healthcare stakeholder perception of STAMP usability (n=18) 
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The comments provided by participants and responses to open questions give 
further insight into their perception of STAMP. The study asked a lot of the 
participants in getting an understanding of STAMP from a one-off presentation 
with little time to digest. The participants described their struggle to grasp 
STAMP’s concepts, but this initial exposure garnered some interesting insights.  
‘I don't think it is easy to understand, I can't get my head around it and 
that's why I say perhaps it would have been better if I could have read about 
it and digested it, that might have been easier perhaps… It's almost 
mapping isn't it, it's almost a process mapping type thing. That's what you're 
doing isn't it. And you're looking for weaknesses in the process? And what 
could be strengthened to prevent an incident from occurring.’ – Regulator 
clinical advisor (Participant 7) 
‘…it's not a way of thinking that people are that familiar with, or 
historically it's not a way that people have been familiar with. There's 
probably a generation of doctors coming through now who have a little bit 
more understanding of the patient safety agenda. But in terms of looking at 
different models for understanding an incident, I doubt many healthcare 
people will be able to, unless they have a very specific patient safety brief, 
will be able to say well actually I prefer a control-feedback model, or I prefer 
a root cause analysis technique because of this. I don't think people are 
that sophisticated, but in a way that's about how you translate the 
method/model into something that's accessible to the people at the 
frontline.’ – GP and educator (Participant 2) 
‘…but it was for me a convoluted system. And the reason I talk about 
the applicability in practice, I think and I'm not too good at the tool, 
but I feel that this could take a long time, to get through all these loops. 
You know if somebody can do it, it's great. I think in healthcare, and I've 
been working like 16 years in the hospitals, if something seems to be a little, 
just a tiny bit difficult or time consuming it won't go any further. I think 
probably because everybody is so busy, and they are thinking okay if it's 
taking 15 or 20 minutes just to explain that to me, how long is it going to 
take me to use it or to do it.’ – Nurse and educator (Participant 5) 
103 
 
‘It's just about more time to understand it, so that's not a criticism of this. 
I think if we were going to apply this we would need training.’ – 
Commissioner quality assurance (Participant 4) 
‘It's a lot to take in if you haven't got any Human Factors or systems 
background and you need to learn the language. I think it's one of the 
more complex tools of the ones I've come across in terms of 
immediately being able to get into it.’ – Educator (Participant 9) 
4.9.2.1 Case specific issues of usability 
Mid-Staffs itself is a large complex case which impacts on the usability of 
STAMP and there are potential case-specific issues of usability which are 
mentioned by the participants. 
‘I suppose it just looks a bit complex maybe, well that looks complex 
but that's the Mid-Staffs, and that was complex anyway wasn't it. 
Looking at these sorts of models, it looks easier to understand in a simple 
sort of form presented there (examples of smaller scale incident in aviation 
and healthcare). And those examples are easier to understand I think. 
When I first saw that I thought it was too much, but I guess that's what 
happened didn't it in terms of Mid-Staffs, it was complex. But the actual 
concept itself looks straightforward.’ – Regulator clinical advisor 
(Participant 7)   
‘I would say I disagree that it is easy to use for such a complex case. 
I think I could do it on a smaller case more easily. And, we might be 
able to do quite an interesting one on the syringes. Because I think that's 
quite fascinating around how that happened. And how the change 
happened without a control. So, I think that would be quite an interesting 
one. The hazard here (Mid-Staffs) is huge and complex.’ – Commissioner 
safety manager (Participant 1) 
4.9.2.2 Difficulties and time taken to do a full system analysis 
Also linked to the size of the Mid-Staffs case, but with a potential generalisation 
to other case studies, is the time and human resource needed to do a full 
system analysis. Mid-Staffs is somewhat different to normal incident 
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investigation practice as it was the subject of a national public inquiry and the 
inquiry had resources far beyond a healthcare provider investigation. The 
participants made a point of needing to see STAMP being used in normal 
practice incident investigations. 
‘One of the problems I think, is if you start looking at a whole 
sociotechnical system using this approach, what you'll end up with is 
you can get into so much detail so quickly, that you end up making it 
massively overcomplicated. So what level of controls will you be putting 
in and suddenly you start going well if I need to put a control for this, do I 
need to put a control for this. So, you need to be very tightly controlled on 
what you are trying to get from your analysis. You could almost do a 
STAMP analysis for every single aspect of this STAMP analysis. Because 
within treatment/care/hygiene/discharge process, you could do a STAMP 
analysis, just on those things there, or just on treatment. Did the treatment 
work, did they know what treatment they were going to have? And suddenly 
it's like wow and if you actually did it for the whole multi-factor it would 
actually blow everyone's minds.’ – Emergency Department Consultant 
(Workshop participant 14) 
‘I think that Staffs is an example where you had somebody make a report 
for national learning, so using this structure where every part of it is so 
relevant to failures at every single level. But that took somebody and a 
team fulltime to investigate the system. There's two reports with 
recommendations which are still being acknowledged and therefore I'm 
not sure how applicable this would be within the time limits available 
in a hospital.’ – Workshop participant  
4.9.2.3 User-friendly definitions and control-feedback in healthcare 
There were some concerns about the language used in STAMP and defining 
what is a control or feedback in the healthcare context. Furthermore, with 
clinical staff often undertaking incident investigation there will need to be some 
translation of terms into language they are familiar with, as they are neither 
system engineers nor human factors specialists. 
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‘It doesn't describe things how we describe things, I think it's the 
language, it isn't congruent with healthcare staff and that is going to switch 
them off.’ – Commissioner safety manager (Participant 1) 
‘And when you say a control or control measure, how are you kind of 
defining those? Budget is a control measure I guess yeah. Would 
workforce review be a control mechanism or a feedback, it depends what 
you mean by it probably. I was going to make the same point about clinical 
audit, that in a way audit is both a feedback mechanism and a control 
mechanism. I think probably workforce planning is the same isn't it.’ – GP 
and educator (Participant 2) 
‘I think in terms of being very clear about which things are control 
mechanisms and which are feedback mechanisms that's probably quite 
important to crystallise…And I think with clear definitions over feedback, 
control mechanisms and the human controller and the control 
process, if you can come up with definitions of that and it might even be 
worth thinking about is if you were thinking about using these in real life 
investigations is to do that and try and sense check that with people who 
are front facing clinicians. And with some patient safety people and say 
does this make sense to you and getting some feedback on your 
definitions.’ – GP and educator (Participant 2) 
‘I think systems theory I get because I've read about it a lot and done work 
with it and I think my concern always with these sorts of things is that the 
people in healthcare that generally do the investigations are the 
frontline staff, people that have worked on the frontline. So, their 
language is very different to the management strategic language as 
such. And so often trying to explain to people what we mean by 
company/management/regulatory agencies is difficult and actually defining 
who these different groups are I think is important. So, I think that has to 
be described more to be able to support people to use it.’ – Medic and 
patient safety lead (Participant 8)  
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4.9.2.4 Model too prescriptive 
There were comments about the method or model being too prescriptive. This 
is perhaps a reflection on the provision of a control structure that was near 
completion, rather than the participants being able to build the model from 
scratch.  
‘…and then there's also a question about whether, it's a little bit about any 
qualitative research, do you do a kind of grounded theory approach, 
where you start with the facts of the case and try and build the model. 
Or do you start with this as a framework and then say this is an 
example of and try and fit the data to the model or do you fit the model 
to the data. The difficulty with grounded theory type approaches where the 
data rules is that it's very resource intensive because you have to remake 
a model every single time, the problem with a framework approach is that 
you miss the unexpected because you're not looking for it. So, if it's a thing 
about getting understanding I think there's got to be enough flexibility in the 
model that you can kind of also identify x factors, the unexpected, the stuff 
that doesn't fit into the model and not lose that or make people who are 
involved in the investigation feel like that sort of x factor stuff isn't of interest 
because it doesn't fit to the model.’ – GP and educator (Participant 2) 
‘Far too complicated and rather than the method guiding you through 
the process, I'm finding that we're looking at evidence to try and fit it 
in, it's like a reverse effect.’ – Workshop participant 
4.9.2.5 Control structure does not highlight flaws 
The participants also voiced concerns about the control structure appearing 
robust in the templates provided. That it showed the present structure without 
highlighting weaknesses, giving the impression the system was functioning 
well. 
‘I think a limitation is it does need a bit of explaining to go with it, for example 
when we're aware what the failures were, you have to think what the failure 
could be and then attach it to the diagram. It doesn't immediately tell you 
what's happened, but I get that it's a tool for looking at something. But 
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I think you could very easily look at that (control structure) and think 
that everything is fine, because all this stuff is there (control structure).’ – 
Workshop participant   
‘It's not telling me anything about the humans in here. Would you need 
another one that parallels the human part of it? Could you add some of the 
human bits that were happening. This is really just an organisational 
structure. But you could have an overlay that says, 'telling what they want 
to hear', 'asking only what they want to know', that's what was happening 
here, these people told them only what they thought they wanted to hear 
and when fed back down they only asked what they wanted to hear. But 
on this structure, you don't see that weakness, because you see it 
goes up and goes around and you think that looks good, that's what 
we need to do.’ – Commissioner safety manager (Participant 1) 
4.9.3 Participant responses on utility of STAMP 
The scale-based responses on the utility of STAMP in healthcare are 
presented in Figure 15. Most of the responses were positive, particularly in 
terms of STAMP’s relevance to healthcare and the method giving a different 
perspective, with 78% of participants giving a positive rating (agree or strongly 
agree). Participants were more negative about how useful the application of 
STAMP was in learning from the incident and in helping to make 
recommendations (17% disagreeing to both statements), the reasoning behind 
this is explored further in the answers to open-ended questions. 
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Figure 15 Healthcare stakeholder perception of STAMP utility (n=18) 
4.9.3.1 Participant discussion of Mid-Staffordshire incident based on 
control structure diagram 
As an aside to the main aims and results of the study, in exploring the safety 
control structure diagram the participants discussed the issues involved in the 
Mid-Staffs incidents. One main topic of discussion was on the filtering of 
information from the frontline, to hospital management, Trust board and 
beyond. Or in other words a lack of vertical alignment through inadequate 
feedback. This resulted in incomplete mental models and understanding of the 
hospital’s status among leaders and regulators. 
‘Well it all started down here didn't it really, because people were trying to 
tell them there was something wrong. But then it wasn't actually getting 
filtered up was it. And then these guys at the top and the Trust Board, 
they were only given a certain amount of information. Which was 
filtered here somewhere because they thought well, we better not let 
them know because we'll end up losing our jobs. So, there was a 
certain amount of filter applied here as well. For me there's something here 
about filters at play, as well, in terms of how the problem is reported and 
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exactly how it's described.’ – Commissioner quality assurance (Participant 
4) 
‘One of the things was that staff performance was felt to be an HR job, so 
the board didn't look at the serious incident reports, because they 
said that's HR or that's operational and we're strategic. So, the board 
had it in their head that they were strategic and these serious incidents 
where patients were coming to harm, which were probably poorly written, 
weren't even viewed, they were not even sighted on them. Now, the nurses 
stopped writing incident reports because they were ignored, so they 
stopped making them.’ – Commissioner safety manager (Participant 1) 
‘I think that's common across the NHS, things stop here or sometimes here, 
but rarely get to there (pointing to levels on diagram). I think, without making 
excuses for NHS organisations, I think some of that is down to the fact 
that… if you think of a triangle and the bottom of the triangle is very wide 
and it's all of the clinical things that are going on across an 
organisation with 6500 staff and thousands of patients, all of that is 
going on. And then once a month there are a few hours that they get 
to hear about things, so it's got to channel up, so things get honed, 
pressed and then the idea is that the Trust board get to know the highlights, 
the high-level things, but what's squeezed out along the way is dependent 
on who is doing the filtering as it were. If you think of it like a sieve almost.’ 
– Provider patient safety lead (Participant 3) 
4.9.3.2 System versus person perspective  
While there were positive comments around STAMP’s systems view and its 
avoidance of blame, there is a feeling that further consideration of individual 
attitude, behaviour and personality is important in healthcare. 
‘This is more a systems non-blame isn't it, there definitely needs to be more 
of this in healthcare. And this is how we try to work, very much around 
the system approach so why did the individual do that. So, for me it's 
the understanding of the individual within the system and what I mean by 
that is what was the individual doing, what was their role, what was the 
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expectations, what pressure was there?’ – Commissioner quality 
assurance (Participant 4)     
‘I think a big part of healthcare and I don't care what anybody says, but a 
big part of healthcare depends upon the consultants and their attitude. 
So, there's a lot of work that staff do within hospitals that panders to 
consultants’ personalities, that plays a massive part. The behaviour and 
the personality of the individual is huge, a massive part. And I've 
worked with many different consultants in my time, both medical and 
surgical, so I think you've got that whole ego that you pander to.’ – 
Commissioner quality assurance (Participant 4) 
‘So, what did I like about the approach, no blame. No system is truly no 
blame but what this almost says is that if you were approaching this from 
the point of view of a clinician you can almost say we've been here before 
and we understand that this incident in front of you relates to the 
whole system. And if I'm the person who is involved in the incident, I can 
say that there was a problem here, here, here and here. And the people 
who are facilitating this discussion are expecting that because they've put 
it in the model.’ – GP and educator (Participant 2)  
‘Well I like the systems approach. It's quite interesting though because I 
think you could use it just to map out what a system already looks like rather 
than looking at it for incidents. Just to highlight to people the complexity of 
the system they're working in, then if they're thinking of introducing a new 
policy or procedure, actually understanding how it was going to fit into that 
and how that would work in practice. Because then you will probably realise 
there are 20 different interfaces and changes and processes and controls 
that you'd have to change to get that result changed. So, it's quite useful 
I think in that way, to describe how complex the system is rather than 
just looking at incidents.’ – Educator (Participant 9) 
Furthermore, there were felt to be intricacies of healthcare work that STAMP’s 
high-level system view may miss the detail of.  
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‘I think you can remove the human too much, in healthcare a lot of the 
potential errors come from human interfaces, I think you miss out the 
nuances, the small little things which might be missed looking at the 
system. Which may be squishy bits, we might not capture that. So, if you 
could combine this with the Swiss Cheese Model maybe, that sort of model.’ 
– Workshop participant 
‘I think that with most of these systems methods that they need to be 
contextualised to healthcare more, I think that's always the issue with a 
system method coming from outside of healthcare…And the other thing 
with healthcare is that because there are so many people involved 
with it and fairly little technology, there's always the question that 
actually looking at the wider system, the environment therefore does 
take the focus off the teams and the individuals. So, by being system 
focussed we're actually being detrimental to our incident investigations 
because we're not looking where we need to look as much. There's 
arguments for both sides.’ – Medic and patient safety lead (Participant 8)  
‘The working norms have a much bigger impact and I think the 
environmental influences are much less controlled for in healthcare. 
There's no way that you would let a plane take-off in the state that some 
A&E departments run to or even the state that our emergency clinic gets to 
on some days, just in terms of numbers of patients crowding in. So, the 
environment is less controlled. And I think it's important that that is kind of 
reflected, I think the bit that's missing potentially from this model is that 
there are some environmental inputs at each level. And even that some of 
the things that happen further up will shape the environment. From things 
that happen at this level will impact on decisions about hospital buildings 
and whatever that affects the model. There's just so many things, the 
environment is much less controlled and there's a lot of less structured stuff 
that goes on in healthcare.’ – GP and educator (Participant 2) 
Some participants did comment positively on STAMP’s consideration of mental 
models, in terms of an individual’s decision-making and shared mental models 
in decision-makers throughout the system. 
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‘What I liked about it was the mental model, the process, because I 
think that's important, that shared mental model. Which I don't think 
people often have. Or one level up believes that the person below them is 
adhering to policies and procedures or they understand what they're doing, 
and their mental model is different and hence that loop breaks down when 
there are errors and mistakes. Because they're working on a completely 
different mental model or a slightly different mental model. So, I think that 
for me was very interesting because healthcare is very much about mental 
models, although there are policies and procedures and clinical guidelines 
and stuff. It's very much the people on the ground make a decision based 
on their experience and what they understand the system to be.’ – Educator 
(Participant 9)  
4.9.3.3 Oversimplification and underplaying of relationships, culture 
and environmental factors 
There were comments to suggest STAMP’s control-feedback focus may not 
capture or document the softer side of healthcare systems, including culture 
and relationships between organisations. Some participants felt the control 
structure provided a simplified view that didn’t account for the complexity of 
relationships and relationship building between personnel and organisations, 
and how these relationships effect safety management. Culture was also a 
talking point in terms of relationships between groups and the behaviour of 
individuals. 
‘I think there's something for me about… this model’s fine…but a lot of this 
is dependent on the relationship with other people. I think it's dependent on 
trust building. I think the control structure diagram is very 
straightforward from a model perspective. But, when one is managing 
patient safety there are also the intricacies of relationship building 
when it comes to the commissioners versus the providers. NHS 
England versus commissioners, Care Quality Commission (CQC) again is 
seen as another authority. Everyone is on the same page, if a patient was 
to ask, yes, we're all here for patient safety, but it is about how that is then 
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mobilised. And then we manage another provider and it's a very different 
relationship.’ – Commissioner quality assurance (Participant 4) 
‘Culturally there's a layer of things that happen in terms of 
relationships between these different groups that's going to have an 
impact on how the model works as well. So, I'm just thinking about this 
as a discussion, if I was picking up on this model and using it for a 
discussion, I might be saying well I'd like to also bring in what were the 
environmental factors, or the cultural factors, and trying to make people 
more aware of those.’ – GP and educator (Participant 2) 
Further comments referenced a perceived underplaying of culture within the 
STAMP control structure and method. 
‘Is it missing anything? Healthcare environment, workplace climate 
as well, because that's a big thing for us. So, we've got our 
organisational culture but if you go to our maternity unit compared to our 
acute medical unit the atmosphere there would be so different.’ – Medic 
and patient safety lead (Participant 8)  
‘You might want to think about that. About how this methodology can 
be applied to culture. Because I think when we talk about culture, what 
are we talking about, we're talking about individuals at play in a system 
aren't we. We're talking about behaviours, we're talking about personalities 
as well, which is what I've just described. And I think it's also about how 
those personalities are managed. And I don't mean sort of performance 
managed, I mean how does the system manage an individual personality, 
whatever it might be. So, within healthcare we have egos, we have 
people/consultants that have perhaps been in the post for years and years 
and think they know it all, so we have that culture. We have individuals that 
are perhaps not trained well enough or have a lack of confidence or have 
had a bad experience and therefore their confidence has been knocked. 
So, you've got all of that at play. You've got the pressure of targets, you've 
got the hours that staff have been on duty. You've got a team that might 
not function together well enough, because the team dynamics haven't 
been thought through.’ – Commissioner quality assurance (Participant 4) 
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‘It's often about the culture of the organisation and leadership as well. 
I think very much so. Certainly, I see that in my current role. And it's having 
a strong executive team who are well known to staff and think that's really 
important. And the sort of culture that's initiated in the organisation, if it's an 
open culture and the staff feel able to report and escalate concerns and 
things like that. I think you can't underestimate that really.’ – Regulator 
clinical advisor (Participant 7) 
4.9.3.4 Safety constraint concept and potential negative impact on 
innovation 
One participant pointed to a potential negative consequence of a rigid control 
structure that could apply too much constraint, particularly in terms of 
innovation and change. It was felt that healthcare was already too bureaucratic 
and not optimal for innovation. 
‘Now healthcare is criticised for being very bureaucratic. And one of 
the things when you talk to the military, the reason that things have 
advanced so quickly in the military is because the surgeon general, when 
they were doing all their amputations, they used to sew the flap round the 
end in a particular way. And at the end of each week, he would have a 
teleconference with his surgeons and everything and they'd say you know 
what we've had a few of those wounds breaking down this week it's not 
holding. So, they go right, next week we're going to do it like this. We're 
going to try crossing it over a different way, using a different stitch and let's 
see if that's better. So next week, that's what they did. In healthcare, not 
a chance, you might have to write a paper on it, you'd have to get your 
evidence, you're going to have to look at NICE guidance. We couldn't 
do that at that speed. That's the structure and that's what they're able to 
do.’ – Commissioner safety manager (Participant 1) 
4.9.3.5 The layout of the control structure diagram 
Positive comments about the diagram reflected its mapping of the whole 
system. Some participants viewed the diagram as a process map or simple 
organisational hierarchy. 
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‘So, all of this (pointing to model) I know, and all of what went wrong I know, 
it (diagram) looks like the usual linear hierarchical approach I would 
look at.’ – Commissioner safety manager (Participant 1) 
Some participants questioned the layout of the control structure diagram, 
particularly the vertical hierarchy which left patients at the bottom. The concern 
was that they were being viewed as less important than those higher on the 
diagram. 
‘Do you know the over thing as well, an optical thing, I don't think this 
(diagram) should be this way round, I think it should be something like 
that. Or even inverted. Because I just think it implies that they're right at the 
top and the patients are right at the bottom. I think there's something 
about the patients and how do they translate across this thing. I think 
they should be all the way along, it's their pathway. So that's the patient 
pathway or the experience maybe.’ – Commissioner quality assurance 
(Participant 6)   
Furthermore, several participants mentioned communication and coordination 
across organisations that may be on the same level when looking at a vertical 
hierarchy. This coordination amongst organisations on the same level of 
hierarchy is perhaps not best represented in a vertical hierarchy control 
structure.  
‘…so that's my observation, if we're looking up and down this (control 
structure diagram) for the solution, is it right? And do we need to look 
more across here at this level for the solution.’ – Commissioner safety 
manager (Participant 1)  
The diagram was felt to be too simplified, of course there is a trade-off here 
between having a usable and readable diagram of appropriate size, and the 
inclusion of relevant and necessary detail.  
‘The other thing that you haven't got in this, is the complex thing 
around commissioners, the fact that we're all the same but all slightly 
different. They've all got their own identity. So, for one acute provider, 
they’ve got 26 commissioners to report to. Specialised commissioning, 
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because they're a commissioner and so are public health and screening.’ 
– Commissioner quality assurance (Participant 6) 
‘There's a whole set of cross-organisational things. Because the 
implication of the model is that this group is responsible for everything that 
affects this group. And I recognise that there's some control and feedback 
mechanisms that will sort of skip that group, and some that will go around 
in circles across those layers. And the difficulty coming back to what 
we've been looking at doing across organisations is that there's much 
less communication across providers. And there's filtering at each 
stage.’ – GP and educator (Participant 2)   
‘And I can see there being some difficulty in accounting for the sort 
of complexity, because these people will not necessarily be working 
all to the same systems.  The nurses will be using different methods of 
documentation, different checklists, different guidelines from the ones that 
the doctors will be using. So, these people are often not working to the 
same remit and working to the same specific documents.’ – GP and 
educator (Participant 2) 
4.9.3.6 Learning from the incident and making recommendations 
When describing the issues with making recommendations, the issues were 
not method specific, rather a current and ongoing problem in terms of 
recommendations being actionable and then being implemented.  
‘I think it does help with understanding the incident. I think the difficulty 
is…there's an argument that the learning is only done when the 
changes are made. And I don't think this rectifies it, I think it's a kind of 
diagnostic aid and potentially an aid to the kind of things that you might 
want to put in place. So, I think it probably gives you a diagnosis and 
potentially a prescription.’ – GP and educator (Participant 2) 
‘Once we've done it (the STAMP analysis) how do we then decide what 
we're going to do? Because we're getting used to picking out which bits 
didn't work, but then how are we going to decide what we're going to do 
with those. Because actually when we look at this (control structure), lots 
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of these things look like a good idea and probably someone put them in, in 
relation to something previously. So how do we know what will work? With 
this, so we don't want Mid-Staffs to happen again and we map this out. 
How do we know where to start? That's roughly where we get to at the 
end of an investigation, whatever method we've used, if we've found a 
lot of things, how do we know which one to start with and then how do we 
know the best way of fixing that.’ – Workshop participant 
‘What tends to happen is it (recommendations) focusses down the 
chain, so you tend to focus on the lowest actors and do weak 
solutions like training and things like that. So, it's about how could a 
tool like this support the fact that you need to bring it to the higher 
level, and then how is that communicated across and that's a really 
interesting challenge. Because it sounds like the responsibility when these 
things are passed back flows down to the lowest denominator.’ – Workshop 
participant 
Method specific problems referred to, include the need for expertise in using 
the method. 
‘I don't know how useful it is to learn from an incident if you're really 
not well versed in the technique. And I think you need to have an expert 
there who understands the process to actually get the learning out from it.’ 
– Educator (Participant 9) 
Furthermore, the systems view was felt to perhaps lead to recommendations 
that weren’t affordable to healthcare or were out of the control of the 
organisation investigating. 
‘Because it will take us down to a system that we can't afford. It's 
going to do it too well! Or it's going to make recommendations out of 
our control. So then would there need to be a hierarchy (of 
recommendations), but then we'll always go for the cheap option.’ – 
Commissioner safety manager (Participant 1) 
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4.9.4  Participant responses on future application of STAMP 
Participants were asked further questions on STAMP’s potential for future 
application in healthcare, with their responses summarised in Figure 16. Most 
participants felt positive that STAMP would be useful in the analysis of future 
incidents (67% agree or strongly agree), but that healthcare would need expert 
help to apply (67% agree or strongly agree). Participants were less positive 
that healthcare would benefit from the adoption of STAMP (39% agree or 
strongly agree). This seems contradictory to the positivity around STAMP’s 
use in future incident analysis but may be a product of the complexity around 
incident analysis and political factors influencing implementation of remedial 
actions. 
 
Figure 16 Healthcare stakeholder perception of STAMP's potential future application (n=18) 
Participants noted the potential use of the control structure diagram in group 
discussion. 
‘…I think presenting people with a model as the basis of a discussion 
could be quite useful, whether you present it to them as an individual or 
whether you present it to them as a group, on theoretical grounds I think 
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there's an argument for doing both. Because in a group you'll often pick up 
on the things like the shared experience, so you'll pick up on the working 
norms. You'll pick up on the times when the policy is not followed. Or you 
have a conflict between what's on paper and what we do. And there's quite 
a lot of those. People develop these informal workarounds and sometimes 
don't think about the potential consequences of them. Talking to people as 
individuals you're more likely to get the more personal thing of I feel I did 
this wrong, but someone might not say something in a group if they're likely 
to be judged negatively by their peers. But equally that relies on a good 
facilitator. But I think giving people a model that they can conceptualise 
the incident with would be a very useful way of leading to discussion.’ 
– GP and educator (Participant 2)  
Expert help was felt to be particularly necessary in moving from analysis to 
effective remedial action. 
‘Where expert help might be needed is around facilitation of helping 
people to decide on and implement effective new feedback and 
control mechanisms. Because there's a whole set of skills involved in 
effective control and feedback intervention and a lot of the 
recommendations that come out of the investigations, as written at the 
moment, suffer from a little bit of politicians’ logic. This idea that something 
must be done, or we need to demonstrate that we're doing something. 
Whereas what should be happening is we should be saying okay let’s look 
at the facts of the case, integrate that with relevant theory, and I think that 
involves safety systems people, and make an intervention that's likely to 
work and then audit to see if it is working. And I think we tend to make huge 
numbers of recommendations as a result of patient safety incidents, but 
they're often things that are easily achievable and perhaps don't relate to 
the kind of deeper systems issues.’ – GP and educator (Participant 2) 
4.9.4.1 The most negative critiques and comments 
Within the workshop, three participants gave a more negative critique of 
STAMP in comparison to other workshop and interview participants. These 
comments are of interest in showing the potential extremities of reactions to 
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STAMP. However, this negativity may be a product of the workshop structure 
and the limited time participants had to learn about and use STAMP, as 
evidenced in the comments. 
‘Implies control systems work, too many assumptions…To do it properly, it 
is too complicated’ – Emergency Department Consultant (Workshop 
participant 14) 
‘Doesn’t show where things went wrong. It’s a picture, no analysis…It’s 
too complicated’ – Clinical lead risk and governance (Workshop 
participant 10) 
‘So complicated, I think things can be easily missed, rather than 
STAMP guiding you through the investigation process you are fitting the 
evidence into STAMP. Far too complicated for an hour session’ – Moving 
and handling team manager (Workshop participant 17) 
4.9.5 Overall evaluation of STAMP application 
4.9.5.1 Descriptive requirement            
The descriptive component relates to the requirement for the method to guide 
an investigator to identify the complete set of events and circumstances 
relevant to the accident (Katsakiori, Sakellaropoulos and Manatakis, 2009). In 
this case, as a re-analysis of a previously completed investigation, this is 
difficult to evaluate. What can be said is that STAMP showed a capacity to 
organise a large amount of information into a hierarchical structure and control-
feedback format. This format demonstrated how limitations in information flow 
effected the decision-making of workers and managers at all levels and their 
ability to fulfil safety responsibilities.    
4.9.5.2 Revealing requirement 
This component requires the method to distinguish between events and 
underlying causes (Katsakiori, Sakellaropoulos and Manatakis, 2009). STAMP 
fulfils this requirement; the method goes beyond a consideration of events 
alone and considers system structure in terms of control-feedback loops. 
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Furthermore, STAMP has a consideration for the interactions and connections 
between the system’s technical aspects, people and the organisation. 
4.9.5.3 Consequential requirement 
This requirement means the method should allow for specific 
recommendations to be formulated to prevent future accidents. STAMP should 
allow for this and this has been shown previously (e.g. Leveson et al. 2016). 
However, in this case due to the number of recommendations made in the 
original reports, it is difficult to formulate recommendations that are different to 
the original investigation in order to evaluate STAMP based on this 
requirement. 
4.9.5.4 Validation requirement 
This component requires the method to be valid and reliable. Facilitating 
agreement between different investigators/analysts and the results they 
produce, and correspondence between analysis findings and reality 
(Katsakiori, Sakellaropoulos and Manatakis, 2009). This is not possible to 
evaluate in this case due to the analysis being completed by one researcher. 
4.9.5.5 Practical requirement 
This requirement considers the need for training to use the method, with 
domain personnel able to use the method rather than just highly trained 
experts. There is reason to believe that STAMP requires substantial training in 
order to use effectively (e.g. Underwood et al. 2016), this is further evaluated 
in the questions to healthcare stakeholders who are mostly in agreement that 
they need training and/or external help. 
4.10 Discussion 
The application of STAMP to the Mid-Staffordshire case organised the public 
inquiry data into a format of control-feedback structure and process models for 
human decision-making. STAMP was a good fit for the issues of vertical 
alignment within the hospital and connections to external organisations. And 
STAMP was both descriptive and revealing in providing a way of organising 
and communicating the underlying system issues. One benefit of the use of 
STAMP was the visual output in the safety control structure diagram and 
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process models, which allowed for discussion of the case with participants. 
Healthcare stakeholders were generally positive about STAMP’s utility, but 
less positive about its usability.  
A main theme arising from the healthcare stakeholder comments regarded a 
system versus person perspective in viewing incidents and incident cause. In 
keeping with Reason’s (2008) warning for issues at the extremities of both a 
system and person perspective (see literature review 2.6.1). Some participant 
comments displayed a wariness of the systems view of STAMP and the 
potential detraction from individual responsibility and professionalism that is 
highly valued in healthcare. Along with issues of underplaying the role of 
personalities and attitudes in safety management, there was a concern that a 
high-level system view may not consider the detail and nuances of healthcare 
work. Taking a system view the impact of personalities and attitudes could be 
considered as a failure of the system to effectively identify and control for these 
issues (Dekker, 2011) but it may still be that a STAMP-based investigation 
overlooks these types of problems. In terms of the details of work and in 
particular, worker adaptation and deviation from policy and procedure may be 
better accounted for in a Safety II type view and a FRAM analysis. Some 
participants also felt STAMP may underplay cultural aspects.  
Definitions of terms are a key point in both the utility and usability of STAMP. 
Defining precisely what a control action is in healthcare proved difficult for the 
author and the participants. Furthermore, there is a thought that actions 
beyond those enforcing safety constraints may be important to capture in a 
healthcare STAMP analysis. This will be revisited throughout the thesis, along 
with other issues of usability, with evidence from further case studies. 
4.10.1 Limitations 
The purposive sampling meant selected participants already had an interest in 
patient safety and through it, HFE methods. This sample may not be 
representative of the wider healthcare stakeholder population. 
A further limitation comes in this being a reanalysis rather than investigation 
from scratch. A reanalysis could not show how STAMP could influence data 
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collection and the analysis was reliant on a previously undertaken investigation. 
Furthermore, participants were only partially involved in analysis, as it was not 
practical to train them in STAMP and this limitation will be reflected in their 
perception of STAMP. 
4.10.2 Reflective Summary 
One point made by the participants was an interest in how STAMP would fit 
within the confines of a current practice hospital-based investigation, rather 
than to a national public inquiry. This is an interesting line of inquiry followed 
up in a further case study. Furthermore, it was noted that healthcare deals with 
a range of incidents that stretches to suicide and homicide in mental health 
care, which may be vastly different to the type of incident analysed in this case 
study. It would be interesting to see how STAMP deals with this type of incident 
and this is followed up in a further case study. 
A major theme was around the system versus person perspective and STAMP 
potentially underplaying individual factors and the nuances of healthcare work. 
This study did not interview healthcare staff directly involved in the incidents 
or that worked for Mid-Staffordshire Trust. Another interesting line of inquiry 
would be to investigate the differences between a STAMP analysis of past 
events and in-depth interviews with relevant healthcare stakeholders to 
explore their experiences of work. 
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Chapter 5  - Case Study 2: STAMP application in 
normal practice incident analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrated the application of STAMP to a large-scale 
organisational disaster, which was the subject of a highly-resourced national 
inquiry. The first study and comments from study participants highlighted the 
need to demonstrate STAMP’s application in regular patient safety incident 
investigation practices. Application in regular practice will enable the 
consideration of constraints on practice in terms of time available, human 
resource and availability of incident data. Incident investigations are 
undertaken on all identified serious incidents, which are often on a small scale, 
such as medication error incidents. 
Within healthcare there is growing awareness of issues with current practice 
in incident investigation, with questionable quality of investigations and 
analysis resulting in ineffective recommendations and action plans (Wu, 
Lipshutz and Pronovost, 2008; Kellogg et al., 2016; Peerally et al., 2016). 
Limitations identified include an over reliance on the promotion of a flawed 
reductionist approach in RCA and a lack of utilisation of external safety 
expertise (Wu, Lipshutz and Pronovost, 2008; Kellogg et al., 2016; Peerally et 
al., 2016). The application of an HFE researcher-led STAMP analysis could 
potentially improve the quality of incident investigation, this study aims to 
integrate a STAMP analysis into current practice. 
5.1.1 Case study setting 
The study is centred on a medication error incident (an insulin overdose case 
from a prescription error) involving two healthcare providers in the UK serving 
a population of around one million; an Acute Trust employing over 14,000 staff 
with a 900-bed hospital and a Trust providing community health services which 
employs over 5,000 staff. The incident involved a patient being administered 
an overdose of insulin on three occasions following a drug prescription error. 
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Drug prescription errors have previously been identified as the most common 
type of medication error (Bates et al., 1995; Leape et al., 1995) and in the UK, 
it is believed that up to 1.5% of hospital prescriptions may contain a medication 
error (Dean et al., 2002). 
The events leading up to the incident can be summarised as: A patient was 
admitted to a hospital emergency department following a fall at home and 
subsequently transferred between wards. After being found to have a high 
blood glucose level a review by a diabetes specialist nurse (DSN), it was 
suggested that the patient should start insulin glargine U100 10 units once per 
day. The recommended dosage was misread by the prescribing doctor and 
100 units were prescribed instead of 10 units. The high dosage was 
administered twice at one provider ward and then following discharge to 
another provider ward, a further time before the error was identified by an 
advanced nurse practitioner. The patient was subsequently readmitted to 
hospital. 
The incident was the subject of a formal investigation, undertaken through 
RCA by a team of healthcare professionals. The investigation followed the 
NPSA level one investigation profile (NPSA, 2008): Level one is a most 
commonly used concise investigation for incidents that resulted in no, low or 
moderate harm to the patient. This investigation team included an investigation 
chair, two team leads and seven team members. Information gathered by this 
team included interviews with key staff involved in the incident, statements 
from nursing and medical staff involved in the incident, a review of an incident 
report form, review of medical and nursing records, and review of procedures 
and protocols. The report from this investigation was subsequently used as the 
initial basis for the STAMP analysis. 
5.2 Aims and objectives  
The study aims to investigate the application of an HFE-led STAMP analysis 
within a current practice healthcare incident investigation. To meet this aim, 
the study has the following objectives: 
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• To facilitate the application of STAMP in an ongoing medication incident 
investigation  
• To compare the original RCA-based recommendations with the 
recommendations formed after the STAMP analysis 
• To examine healthcare domain experts’ perspectives of STAMP’s utility 
and usability   
• To evaluate and reflect on the STAMP application  
5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 STAMP analysis 
Based on the RCA-based investigation report, STAMP was applied through 
two healthcare stakeholder workshops facilitated by two HFE researchers with 
the following profiles:  
1. Junior HFE researcher (the author), a graduate member of the 
Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors (CIEHF) whom 
had previously graduated from an MSc in HFE, currently PhD 
researcher on healthcare systems ergonomics. This researcher acted 
as the main facilitator and analyst. 
2. Senior HFE researcher, an associate member of the CIEHF and 
lecturer in systems HFE with 14-year research experience in healthcare 
ergonomics. This researcher oversaw and supervised the analysis. 
The two HFE researchers conducted an initial STAMP-based incident analysis 
using the data from the RCA report.  
The process of applying STAMP to accident analysis is presented in section 
3.4.1 and described fully elsewhere (Leveson, 2012), the steps were slightly 
modified in this case study and are used in further descriptions of the method 
process. So, the process is summarised here again, into the following eight 
steps:  
1. Identify the system and hazard involved in the incident 
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2. Identify the safety-related constraints and responsibilities, 
associated with that incident 
3. Document the safety control structure in place to enforce the safety 
constraints and control the hazard 
4. Determine the proximate events leading to the incident and analyse 
the frontline operations present at the lower level of the control 
structure  
5. Analyse the higher levels of the control structure determining how 
and why these managerial levels contributed to the inadequate 
control of the hazard 
6. Examine overall coordination and communication issues between 
controllers that could have contributed to the incident 
7. Determine any changes and weakening in the control structure that 
occurred over time and contributed to the incident  
8. Generate recommendations for remedial action and strengthening 
of the safety control structure (Leveson, 2012) 
The application of STAMP in this study contained several stages and these 
are summarised in Table 11 with detail on the people involved and the time 
taken to complete. Two HFE researchers carried out step 1-3 prior to step 4-
8, which were carried out with healthcare staff. 
For step 1-3, two HFE researchers carried out the reanalysis of the RCA report 
using STAMP. The two researchers created a draft safety control structure 
model to be utilised in the subsequent healthcare stakeholder workshops, this 
is presented in Figure 52 in Appendix 9.  
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Table 11 STAMP incident analysis process 
Steps People involved Time Outputs 
STAMP step 1-3 
(Reanalysis of the 
RCA report) 
-Senior and junior HFE 
researchers  
5 hours Safety control structure 
Preparation of 
material for 
workshops 
-Senior and junior HFE 
researchers 
8 hours Safety control structure 
templates 
Step-by-step method 
guide 
Presentation slides 
STAMP step 4-8  
(Workshop 1 and 2)  
-Senior HFE researcher 
-Junior HFE researcher 
-Additional researcher 
-18 healthcare 
stakeholders 
3 hours Validated safety control 
structure 
Ideas for 
recommendations 
-Senior HFE researcher 
-Junior HFE researcher 
-3 healthcare 
stakeholders involved 
in RCA of the incident 
-Healthcare 
stakeholder present at 
workshop 1 
2 hours Validated safety control 
structure 
Information on incident 
and healthcare work 
domain 
Ideas for remedial 
action 
Healthcare stakeholder 
feedback on approach 
Synthesis of 
workshop outputs and 
documentation of 
recommendations 
-Junior HFE researcher 8 hours Recommendations for 
remedial action 
 
5.3.2 Healthcare stakeholder workshops 
The study involved healthcare stakeholders in the STAMP analysis with 
facilitation by external HFE researchers. The involvement of healthcare 
stakeholders as domain experts is imperative in the validation of STAMP’s 
system models (Hettinger et al., 2015) and the development of more relevant 
and effective recommendations for change. Stakeholder involvement was 
done through two workshops. The workshops introduced accident analysis 
concepts and the STAMP approach presented by an HFE researcher. 
Following the introduction, the safety control structure system model was 
provided to the participants and they were invited to take part in the analysis 
using a step-by-step method guide. The first workshop aimed to develop 
recommendations for remedial action, in addition to this the second workshop 
aimed to evaluate the utility and usability of STAMP with feedback from the 
original RCA investigation team. 
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5.3.2.1 Workshop 1 
The first workshop was three hours in duration with 18 attendees from 
healthcare including members of local commissioning groups, patient safety 
managers, front line staff and patient representatives, facilitated by three HFE 
researchers. All participants were from the same regional healthcare where 
the incident occurred, but none of them were involved in the original RCA 
investigation. The workshop was arranged through a patient safety group with 
participants invited by the group administration, no further information was 
collected on the participants. Following the introduction to STAMP the 
participants were asked to participate in the incident analysis, working in three 
separate groups each with a safety control structure system model, method 
guide and facilitation by an HFE researcher. The presentation slides from the 
workshops are shown in Appendix 10.      
5.3.2.2 Workshop 2 
The second workshop was two hours in duration and facilitated by two HFE 
researchers. The workshop was attended by four healthcare professionals 
(with an average of 31 years healthcare experience), including three involved 
in the original RCA investigation, participant information is summarised in 
Table 12. During this workshop, following the presentation of the concepts of 
STAMP, the safety control structure system model was validated, and the 
participants were invited to contribute to the analysis, using the model and 
STAMP concepts as discussion points. At the end of the workshop the 
participants were asked to give feedback on the utility and usability of the 
STAMP approach. This workshop was audio-recorded. 
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Table 12 Summary of workshop participant information 
Participant Role Healthcare 
experience 
Patient safety 
investigation experience 
1 Advanced nurse 
practitioner – diabetes 
34 years Very little 
2 Consultant nurse 
advanced practitioner 
33 years Intermediate 
Knowledge of SCM, RCA 
3 Medication safety 
pharmacist 
30 years Several years 
Knowledge of SCM, RCA, 
FMEA 
4 Clinical director 27 years 19 years 
Knowledge of SCM, RCA, 
FMEA  
SCM: Swiss Cheese Model 
RCA: Root Cause Analysis 
FMEA: Failure Mode Effects Analysis 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 STAMP analysis 
5.4.1.1 Comparison between STAMP and RCA processes 
Key information from the RCA and STAMP processes is presented in Table 
13. Along with the different analysis methods used, there were differences in 
the people involved, their areas of expertise and the approach to group work. 
The timescales set for completion of the investigation in the policy is 60 
working days, but the actual time taken for the RCA process was not recorded.  
The HFE-led analysis added 26 working hours.  
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Table 13 RCA and STAMP processes 
 RCA STAMP 
People involved Assistant Chief Nurse 
Patient Safety Coordinators 
Diabetes Consultant 
Consultant Nurse  
Lead Specialist Nurse 
Education and Practice 
Development Lead 
Senior Diabetes Specialist Nurse 
Medication Safety Lead 
Pharmacist 
Consultant Nurse 
HFE researchers 
Healthcare stakeholders  
 
Original investigation team 
members: 
Senior Diabetes Specialist 
Nurse 
Medication Safety Lead 
Pharmacist 
Consultant Nurse 
Expertise Work domain HFE with work domain input 
Time taken Unrecorded 26 hours 
Data used Interviews and written statements 
from staff involved in incident 
Incident report form 
Medical, nursing and electronic 
records 
Procedures and protocols 
RCA report 
Healthcare staff involvement in 
workshops  
Collaborative 
work 
Meeting 
Review group 
Workshops 
Analytical 
approach 
Linear cause-effect model with 
contributory factors 
Systemic model with control-
feedback focus 
Representations 
used 
Fishbone diagram Safety control structure 
 
The RCA investigation was led by two Patient Safety Coordinators with a team 
of seven clinical staff and chaired by an Assistant Chief Nurse. The RCA used 
data from interviews and documentation which was analysed using timeline, 
fishbone diagram and incident decision tree tools. This process can be 
described as predominantly work domain expertise led, using a linear cause 
effect analysis model. In contrast, the STAMP process was led by HFE 
expertise, with the facilitated participation of work domain experts through 
workshops, using a systemic accident analysis model.   
5.4.1.2 Comparison between STAMP and RCA outputs 
The RCA identified a root cause in the prescription error by the doctor following 
misinterpretation of the specialist nurse recommendation, stated as human 
error. Incorrect dose administration by the nurses was also identified as a 
service/care problem. These two issues were then the subject of further 
analysis using the incident decision tree and fishbone diagram.    
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The RCA approach uses a contributory factors classification framework (NPSA, 
2009) and maps identified factors to an Ishikawa fishbone diagram (Ishikawa 
1982; NPSA, 2016) as seen in Figure 17. The classification framework 
encourages identification of contributory factors from an individual to 
organisational level and presents these in list form.  
 
Figure 17 RCA Fishbone diagram 
The RCA can be contrasted with the STAMP approach where a qualitative 
model of the system is formed which includes modelling relationships and 
interactions between system components through control-feedback loops, as 
shown in Figure 18.  
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Patient
Management
Audits
Reports
Policies, procedures, 
form templates & training
Management
Audits
Reports
Policies, procedures, form 
templates & training
Clinical status
Physiological status 
inc. blood sugar
Supervision
Hospital Ward
Prescribing doctor
Diabetes specialist 
nurse (DSN)
Ward nurse
Pharmacy dispenser
Medication
Inc. insulin
Prescription
Medical notes
Assessment form
DSN mentor Ward managerSupervising consultant
Supervision
Work 
instructions
Rehabilitation Ward
Advanced nurse 
practitionerWard nurse
Discharge summary
Prescription
Pharmacy dispenser
Prescribing doctor
Prescription
Medication Inc. 
insulin
Medication
Inc. insulin
Medication
Inc. insulin
Supervision
Clinical status, physiological 
status inc. blood sugar, 
prescription chart &medical notes
Discharge summary
Prescription
Hospital Care Community Care
Clinical status, physiological 
status inc. blood sugar, 
prescription chart &medical notes
 
Figure 18 Safety control structure for insulin prescription and administration 
The control structure could be modelled up to government level as shown in 
Case Study 1, however, a system boundary was placed around the care 
provided in the hospital and community care centre and stops at management 
level. This boundary was placed to fit the information provided within the RCA 
report and to keep the analysis within the locus of control of the healthcare 
providers. 
STAMP’s safety control structure model is used to identify weaknesses in the 
control structure and control-feedback flaws. STAMP considers four types of 
hazardous control actions (Leveson, 2012): 
i. Control actions necessary to enforce safety constraint are not given 
(control action not given) 
ii. The necessary control actions were provided too early or too late 
(incorrect timing) 
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iii. Unsafe control actions were provided (unsafe control action given)  
iv. Control action stops too soon or is applied too long (incorrect duration) 
STAMP also analyses the behavioural shaping mechanisms for decision-
making of the actors within that system in terms of a process or mental model. 
This being the actor’s understanding of current system status which needs to 
be regularly updated. The mental model of a decision maker can be incorrect 
due to poor feedback and incorrect information about system status as 
illustrated in Figure 19. The identified control flaws are compared with the 
contributory factors identified by the RCA in Table 14. 
 
Doctor
Mental model
Correct prescription? 
yes/no
Unsafe control action: 
unclear handwritten 
treatment 
recommendation
Unsafe control action: 
incorrect dosage of insulin 
prescribed
Missing feedback: 
no immediate prompt to 
help identify error
Missing feedback: 
no check/communication 
with DSN
Safety responsibility:
Prescribe correct dosage of insulin
Pharmacy dispenser
Diabetes specialist nurse
 
Figure 19 STAMP analysis of individual controller 
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Table 14 RCA contributory factors and STAMP control flaws 
System level RCA identified contributory factors STAMP identified control flaws 
Diabetes 
specialist 
nurse 
Ambiguity in the recommendations in terms of written 
clarity 
Control flaw: Issue in communication and coordination 
with prescribing doctor 
Mental model: Recommendation correctly interpreted and 
correct prescription made 
Feedback flaw: No feedback post recommendation 
Doctor 
(hospital) 
 
Failure to 
further query 
the 
recommended 
dose 
Patient: Altered neurology, poor history of diabetes 
compliance. IV steroids falsely elevated blood glucose 
Task: New prescription should trigger check of dose 
Communication: Misread prescription 
Team: Advice written on form was unclear 
Training: Insulin e-learning not mandatory 
Working condition: Not doctor’s base ward 
Equipment: Glargine available in different strengths 
Control actions not given: Doctor did not question high 
recommended dosage or review suggestion thoroughly 
Mental model: Incorrect understanding of patient status 
and required prescription 
Feedback flaw: Coordination and communication issue in 
handwritten notes and lack of face-to-face handover at time 
of writing prescription 
No feedback after prescription made 
Nurse 
(hospital)  
 
Failure to 
query dose of 
the insulin 
prescribed 
Individual: Both nurses in post for 12 months or less 
with no previous competency issues 
Task: Glargine medication stock was on ward 
Communication: Dose not cross checked between 
form completed by specialist nurse and doctor’s 
prescription 
Team: Both nurses part of an established team 
Training: Insulin e-learning not mandatory for staff 
Working condition: Prescription completed on form, 
not electronic prescribing 
Control action not given: Nurse did not query the dosage 
except for with peers and did not cross-check with 
specialist nurse documentation or patient notes 
Mental model: Accepted doctor’s prescription as correct. 
Nurses recognised prescription as a large dose but they 
had seen large doses of insulin prescribed before 
Feedback flaw: The charts readily available to ward nurses 
had high dosage on them. The nurse questioned between 
themselves but not to specialist nurse or senior staff 
Pharmacy 
(hospital) 
Missed opportunity to identify the error when 
prescription checked prior to the patient being 
transferred 
Control action not given: Pharmacy did not cross-check 
prescription against patient records (medication stock was 
on ward). Prescription was checked prior to patient being 
transferred but issue not identified 
Mental model: Prescription is appropriate 
Organisational 
(hospital) 
Insulin safety identified as a high priority and 
implementation of a new safety strategy has begun 
A team of specialist diabetes nurses has been 
established 
Control action provided too late: Assessment form 
documentation not in format currently advised. Not updated 
until triggered by incident 
Nurse 
(Community) 
Previous administration of dose and discharge 
documentation provided rationale for nurse to 
administer dosage 
Control action not given: Nurse did not query the dosage 
Mental model: Accepted prescription as correct 
Feedback flaw: Medication dosage had been administered 
twice previously and on discharge documentation 
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The RCA focussed on the hospital doctor and nurses and the factors 
contributing to their involvement in the incorrect prescription and administration. 
The use of an incident decision tree tool, that seeks to determine the actor’s 
intention and blameworthiness of human error (Reason, 1997; Meadows, 
Baker and Butler, 2005), absolves those actors of blame, but this focus means 
less attention is paid to other areas of the system, as shown in Table 14. 
A major difference between RCA and STAMP is in STAMP’s modelling of the 
system. RCA does not model the relationships between system components 
and it does not build a model of the system. Contributory factors are attached 
to the identified service problem and presented in list form, whereas the 
control-feedback relationships presented in STAMP’s safety control structure 
provide analysis of interactions within the system.    
Another major difference is in STAMP’s explicit consideration of both the 
system operation and the system development or design. The consideration 
of system design led the analysis to questioning the processes involved in the 
introduction and redesign of the diabetes assessment form and the change 
management processes involved in the specification, creation, review and 
approval of the form. There was also questioning about the design of 
information systems, with information given to the prescribing doctor split 
between electronic and paper format.      
5.4.2 Recommendations 
Both analyses produced recommendations to prevent future incidents, with a 
summary of these presented in Table 15. In comparing the analyses 
recommendations, STAMP generated additional recommendations for 
system-level improvement, especially with consideration that two system-level 
improvements from RCA referred to the initiatives which were already being 
conducted prior to the incident: i) the review and implementation of the new 
diabetes assessment form; ii) the implementation of the insulin strategy. The 
RCA-based recommendations focussed on staff training and personal 
reflection, whereas the STAMP analysis broadened the discussion and 
recommendations to systemic issues (service development and change 
management), rather than just the operation management issues. 
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Table 15 Comparison of recommendations for remedial action from RCA and STAMP 
analyses 
Category of 
countermeasure 
RCA-based recommendations STAMP-based recommendations 
Individual behaviour Personal reflection to be 
undertaken  
Roll out and ensure 
compliance to insulin safety e- 
learning for all medical and 
nursing staff 
Ensure doctors, nurses and 
pharmacists are given clear safety 
responsibilities (check and query) 
and understand these 
responsibilities 
Tools, technology 
and physical 
environment 
Review and implement new 
diabetes assessment form 
 
Review and implement new 
diabetes assessment form 
Review electronic information 
system for potential inclusion of 
DSN treatment recommendation 
Feedback to pharmaceutical 
company about name of 
medication 
Tasks and 
organisation 
Implement insulin safety 
strategy (on-going) 
 
Ward management to regularly 
reinforce to nurses the 
expectation to query prescriptions 
where there is a concern 
regarding dose or administration 
instructions 
Ensure channels of enquiry to 
ward leadership or original 
treatment team are available 
Ensure prescribers, dispensers 
and administrators of medication 
have comprehensive and clear 
information of patient status and 
treatment plan 
Train DSN’s as prescribers to 
enable them to prescribe insulin at 
time of patient assessment 
Design process to include DSN 
check with patient after 
administration of medication 
Change 
management 
None Revise the design process 
(specification and testing) for form 
templates and other electronic 
and paper-based information 
systems.  
Revise the documentation review 
process. The review process 
needs to be able to efficiently 
manage change, with timely 
review and implementation of new 
documentation 
Ensure future design of software 
includes specification and 
assessment of user needs 
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5.4.3 Participant responses on usability of STAMP 
The participants were generally positive about the usability of STAMP as 
shown in Figure 20 . Although their comments suggested that it was difficult to 
understand at first and they felt they needed more practice and examples to 
get to grips with the method. None of the participants disagreed with any of the 
statements on usability, with 75% agreeing STAMP was easy to apply and 
easy to understand. 
 
Figure 20 Healthcare stakeholder perception of STAMP usability (n=4) 
As well as desiring more time and further opportunities for application, the 
participants pointed out some of the difficulties in evaluating their use of 
STAMP, having used it on an incident they had previously been involved in 
investigating.  
‘We need another session with longer time to go through an example. It 
would also be useful to look at an incident which had not been investigated 
before to see how the solutions were different from other analysis. With the 
example used we had been involved in looking at it and therefore not 
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coming at it fresh. Use this method first and then compare with conducting 
an RCA.’ – Medication safety pharmacist (Participant 3) 
‘It was initially hard thinking in this way as it was a different approach. 
Confidence and competence will increase with repeated use.’ – Clinical 
director (Participant 4) 
5.4.4 Participant responses on utility of STAMP 
The healthcare stakeholders played a vital role in providing work domain 
knowledge and contributed to the analysis and generation of 
recommendations. Feedback on the utility of the STAMP approach was 
generally positive, with all four participants agreeing that STAMP was useful 
in learning from the incident and it can help make recommendations, as shown 
in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21 Healthcare stakeholder perception of STAMP utility (n=4) 
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The participants found the approach helped them think about the incident in a 
systemic way as shown in the following quotes. 
‘The approach enables us to think more broadly about system controls 
and failure points’ – Clinical director (Participant 4) 
‘Previously I felt my team were really to blame, but after this I now know it 
was multifactorial and all the people involved had a part to play’ – 
Advanced nurse practitioner (Participant 2) 
‘It made me think of the interactions between people. All the 
groups/individuals involved and where the problem could occur or how it 
could be picked up. It helped look at the staff groups and their interactions 
with each other.’- Medication safety pharmacist (Participant 3)  
‘It was useful to see and discuss the various different interactions 
where the problem could have occurred, and communication perhaps didn’t 
happen or could go wrong. It gives a good view of the mechanisms in 
place for feedback and how people are making the decisions.’ – Medication 
safety pharmacist (Participant 3) 
5.4.5 Participant responses on future application of STAMP 
The participants were positive about the future application of STAMP in 
healthcare, as shown in Figure 22. On future application, in the comments 
given, all participants indicated that further experience with the method and 
HFE experts’ help would be required. 
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Figure 22 Healthcare stakeholder perception of STAMP's potential future application (n=4) 
5.4.6 Overall evaluation of STAMP application 
5.4.6.1 Descriptive requirement 
As noted by the participants, the descriptive requirement, in terms of the 
guidance provided by the method to identify the complete set of facts relevant 
to the incident, is difficult to evaluate in this case. This is due to the 
investigation and fact-finding being undertaken prior to the STAMP 
intervention. STAMP does order the information about the incident into visual 
outputs.   
5.4.6.2 Revealing requirement 
As in the first case study, STAMP has guided the analysis to think about 
underlying causes rather than just events. The participants noted this as a 
positive in their feedback on STAMP, that it helped them think systemically and 
particularly about the interactions between people and teams. Furthermore, 
STAMP’s consideration of system development/design pushed the analysts to 
ask questions beyond the immediate incident, particularly in terms of change 
processes and equipment design.  
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5.4.6.3 Consequential requirement 
In this case STAMP was used in the development of recommendations for 
incident prevention. These moved beyond those identified by the RCA analysis 
and included recommendations at different levels of the hospital system. In 
terms of implementing these recommendations, practical issues still apply as 
they would with any analysis tool. 
5.4.6.4 Validation requirement 
For STAMP’s models and analysis, validation came through the input from 
work domain experts. Inter-rater reliability, in terms of agreement between 
different investigators using the method was not tested as such, rather 
agreement was reached through discussion between the different researchers 
and participants. 
5.4.6.5 Practical requirement 
The participants felt they would have difficulty conducting a STAMP analysis 
without further support and training. However, the intervention with HFE 
researchers facilitating STAMP was not particularly resource intensive. 
5.5 Discussion 
This study applied an HFE-led STAMP analysis in a current practice 
healthcare incident investigation. In doing this, the study built on the findings 
from Case Study 1 (Chapter 4) by considering the constraints of normal 
practice in healthcare incident investigation and applying STAMP to a common 
hospital-based small-scale incident. The use of STAMP and collaboration 
between HFE and healthcare stakeholders was found to facilitate systems 
thinking, impacting the thinking of some of the original investigators of the 
incident and guided the development of underlying system-based 
recommendations. Healthcare stakeholders were generally positive about 
STAMP’s utility, usability and potential future use. Participants didn’t have as 
much trouble analysing this case as they did with the complexity of the Mid-
Staffs case and were more involved in the analysis and development of 
recommendations. Again, the participants felt they needed more practice and 
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more time to learn STAMP. Furthermore, many felt external help was required 
to apply the method properly.  
Findings from Case Study 1 showed the development of more effective 
remedial actions to be a key feature in participants’ thoughts and they were 
not all convinced this could be improved by STAMP. Here, participants were 
positive about their ability to make additional recommendations based on the 
STAMP analysis. However, this does not remove the issues with 
implementation of remedial actions.  
5.5.1 Limitations 
In this case study, an obstacle was found in healthcare stakeholder availability 
and getting stakeholders together in the same place, at the same time, to 
conduct a STAMP workshop of worthwhile duration. The first workshop was 
opportunistic in its use of a patient safety interest group platform to use a 
prearranged group session to perform the analysis. For the second workshop 
there were difficulties in getting the group together at the same place and same 
time, it was heavily reliant on a facilitation from one of the participants and after 
expecting around 10 stakeholders to attend only four turned up for the second 
workshop. The session was not long enough to achieve a full analysis and 
explore all issues in depth, but extra time was not available. These factors 
mean the analysis is heavily reliant on the work done by the HFE analysts and 
this is limited by their knowledge of the incident and healthcare system, 
particularly in this case where only limited data was available from the single 
incident report.  
5.5.2 Reflective summary 
STAMP can be effectively used to conduct analyses on batches of similar 
incidents. Leveson, et al (2016) used 30 adverse cardiovascular surgery 
events using one safety control structure with various control flaws from all 
incidents overlaid. This both increases the quality of the analysis through the 
additional data and cuts the time taken for each individual analysis. Although 
slowing the response to each individual incident these would be actioned 
through initial RCA analysis, with the HFE analysis providing a review process. 
In this way, HFE expertise can be effectively utilised in collaboration with 
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healthcare professionals. Future studies may benefit from this aggregated 
incident analysis. 
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Chapter 6  - Case study 3: STAMP aggregated 
analysis of patient suicide incidents 
6.1 Introduction 
The two previous case studies have drawn interest towards the use of multiple 
incidents in an aggregated analysis to improve the data available to use in 
STAMP. Furthermore, Case Study 1 developed a theme around STAMP’s 
application in healthcare being limited by a system view potentially overlooking 
the details and intricacies of healthcare work. The case study presented in this 
chapter seeks to explore these areas further, applying STAMP in an 
aggregated analysis and comparing findings to those found in an interview 
study with frontline workers on what they find creates safety in their everyday 
practice. 
Reason (2008) has raised concern with taking too extreme a view with either 
a system or person perspective regarding the understanding of safety 
incidents. Reason sees a weakness in the system view in an excessive 
reliance on system measures and a disregard for the personal qualities of 
individuals and the impact on safety (Reason, 2008). The importance of 
understanding work as performed at the frontline and how practice creates 
safety has been noted elsewhere (Woods and Cook, 2002). The ideas 
collected and packaged as Safety-II also highlight the benefit of understanding 
everyday function in the workplace and the full range from normal routine 
performance, exceptionally good performance, near-misses and incidents or 
accidents (Hollnagel, 2014; Shorrock, 2014).  
The potential weakness in making safety recommendations from analysing 
incidents alone (Hollnagel, 2014) and in taking a strong system view (Reason, 
2008), makes for an interesting study in comparing findings from a STAMP 
incident analysis with findings from in-depth interviews with workers on safety 
practices. It also provides a further form of evaluating the utility of STAMP in 
healthcare. In this case study, STAMP is applied to the investigation of patient 
suicide in community-based mental health care. Patient suicide was discussed 
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by a participant in Case Study 1 as an example of the very different types of 
incidents that healthcare needs to investigate, there was interest in how 
STAMP would perform in this type of investigation. 
6.1.1 Patient suicide in community-based mental health care 
Suicide is a major public health concern with close to 800,000 deaths by 
suicide each year worldwide (World Health Organization, 2017).  In England, 
around 4,500 people end their own lives each year and an estimated 27% of 
those had contact with mental health services within the 12 months preceding 
their death (Appleby et al., 2017). Over the past 25 years mental health care 
has transitioned from an institution-based care model to a predominantly 
community-based care model (Gilburt et al., 2014). This means that patients 
with an ‘acceptable’ level of suicidal risk are managed within the community 
setting, where risk of suicide is potentially higher than within inpatient care. 
Although the multiple factors involved make comparisons between the settings 
difficult, suicide rates among patients of community-based crisis resolution 
home treatment teams were higher per episode (14.6 per 10,000 episodes) 
than in patients per inpatient hospital admission (8.8 per 10,000 hospital 
admissions) in England between 2003 and 2011 (Hunt et al., 2014).  
This case study focussed on the community-based mental health care services 
of a Mental Health Trust in England, this included community mental health 
teams (ongoing support for complex and serious mental health problems), 
crisis teams (urgent support for a mental health crisis) and psychological 
service teams (support through psychological therapy). The Mental Health 
Trust serves a population of one million and employs over 5500 members of 
staff. Suicides of people known to the Trust are subject to investigation and 
incident analysis. This study reviewed 41 of the Trust’s suicide incident reports 
(average length 26 pages) where patients had been involved with community-
based care. 
6.1.2 Aims and objectives 
This study aims to examine the application of STAMP to the aggregated 
analysis of patient suicide incidents. To meet this aim, the study has the 
following objectives: 
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• To demonstrate the application of STAMP to the analysis of a cluster 
of patient suicide incidents 
• To evaluate the validity of the analysis findings through comparison 
with interviews with frontline workers on what helps them create safety 
in practice 
• To evaluate and reflect on the STAMP application  
6.2    Methods 
The research follows a case study design (Yin, 2013) with suicide incident 
reports and interviews with staff used as data sources. The case study 
focussed on the community-based mental health care services of a Mental 
Health Trust in England, this included community mental health teams 
(ongoing support for complex and serious mental health problems), crisis 
teams (urgent support for a mental health crisis) and psychological service 
teams (support through psychological therapy).  
6.2.1 STAMP analysis 
6.2.1.1 Data collection 
First, this study reviewed 43 incident reports (mean length 26 pages) and 41 
incident reports where patients had been involved with community-based care 
were selected for STAMP analysis. Figure 23 and Figure 24 summarise the 
incidents by patient age, gender and suicide method. The suicide methods are 
consistent with national data where hanging/strangulation and self-poisoning 
by overdose are the most common methods for patient suicide in England 
(Appleby et al., 2017). Two incident reports did not provide patient age and 
gender. The investigations in the reports had been conducted by experienced 
mental health professionals using RCA as the analytical approach. 
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Figure 23 Breakdown of incidents by patient age and gender 
 
Figure 24 Breakdown of incidents by suicide method 
6.2.1.2 Incident analysis protocol 
STAMP was applied to the analysis of 41 suicide incident reports. The 
application of STAMP followed the process described by Leveson (2012) and 
used in Case studies 1 and 2. The analysis considered four main types of 
hazardous control actions (Leveson, 2012): i) control actions necessary to 
enforce safety constraint are not given; ii) the necessary control actions were 
provided too early or too late; iii) unsafe control actions were provided; iv) a 
control action stops too soon or is applied too long. 
The STAMP analysis was initially conducted by the author, the RCA reports 
were coded in qualitative data analysis software (NVivo) to identify controllers, 
control-feedback loops, control failures, feedback flaws, communication and 
coordination issues, and underlying patterns. Following the development of an 
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initial control structure and findings, the analysis was discussed with another 
HFE researcher and alterations made until an agreement was reached. The 
safety control structure was validated in an initial group session with three 
managers from the Trust (including two Consultant Psychiatrists), a further 
group session was conducted to discuss the findings and recommendations 
(control structure shown in Appendix 11 was used in this discussion). 
Information on the manager participants is provided in Table 16. 
6.2.2 Interview protocol 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 community-based mental 
health professionals: a group interview with the three managers to validate the 
system model and to get an overview of operations; two group interviews with 
six and five participants from crisis teams (eight Registered Mental Health 
Nurses, two Support Workers, one Social Worker); four individual interviews 
with Community Mental Health Team staff (two Consultant Psychiatrists and 
two Community Psychiatric Nurses); two individual interviews with 
psychological services staff (two Psychotherapists). A summary of participant 
information for the managers, community teams and psychological services is 
provided in Table 16, the crisis teams participant information is summarised in 
Table 17. 
Participants were identified by a manager at the Trust who was collaborating 
in the research, they were then invited to interview through email. The 
sampling of participants aimed to include stakeholders from the three main 
areas of crisis teams, community teams and psychological services. But as the 
nature of crisis teams increases their suicide prevention work it was felt 
necessary to include more participants from this area.  
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Table 16 Participant information for managers, community team and psychological service 
Participant Role Experience in service area 
1 Medical director/consultant psychiatrist 20+ years 
2 Service manager/consultant psychiatrist 20+ years 
3 Service manager 20+ years 
4 Consultant psychiatrist 20+ years 
5 Consultant psychiatrist 10+ years 
6 Community psychiatric nurse 10+ years (with time in crisis team) 
7 Community psychiatric nurse 10+ years 
8 Psychotherapist and clinical lead 10+ years 
9 Consultant psychotherapist 5+ years as consultant 
 
Table 17 Participant information for crisis teams 
Participant Role Experience in crisis service 
10 Registered mental health nurse 13 years 
11 Social worker 8 years 
12 Registered mental health nurse 1 year 
13 Registered mental health nurse 1 year 
14 Support worker 1 year 
15 Registered mental health nurse Under 6 months 
16 Registered mental health nurse 8 years 
17 Registered mental health nurse 3 years 
18 Registered mental health nurse 2 years 
19 Registered mental health nurse 2 years 
20 Support worker 2 years 
 
The interviews probed the decision-making process of clinicians, the 
constraints they operated within and methods they found useful to be 
successful regarding suicide prevention. This was in line with studies and 
theories on Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM), which provides approaches 
to studying critical decision making in the real world (Klein, 1999) and the ideas 
behind Safety-II (Hollnagel, 2014). 
The interviews covered the following topics/questions: How suicidal risk and 
signals of risk are detected; the process of deciding on response to patient 
status and thresholds for responses; and the methods staff find useful in 
dealing with the complexity of the work activities. All interviews were conducted 
by the author at the participant’s place of work and were between 30 to 60 
minutes in duration. The interviews were semi-structured with the use of a topic 
guide, with deviation allowed to adapt to participant responses. All interviews 
were audio-recorded, with the recordings transcribed into NVivo and coded 
into themes. Participants gave written informed consent. 
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The data analysis and coding relied on the theoretical propositions (Yin, 2013) 
of Safety-II (Hollnagel, 2014), in that workers would make adaptations in their 
practice to ensure the system can function. This guided the initial interview 
topics which were then used to organise and code the interview data, themes 
then developed within these topics. The interview data was coded by one 
researcher (the author) but the findings from the study were presented back to 
another HFE researcher, the managers involved in the group interview and 
other mental health professionals from the Mental Health Trust at the end of 
the data analysis. Discussion and comments were invited providing a form of 
member checking for qualitative validation (Creswell, 2014). 
6.2.3 Evaluation of STAMP 
Participant evaluation of the usability and utility of STAMP was not conducted 
in this case study, as explained in section 3.4 of Chapter 3. The application of 
STAMP is evaluated through the comparison of the STAMP analysis findings 
with findings from the interviews and against evaluation criteria (Katsakiori, 
Sakellaropoulos and Manatakis, 2009). The individual interviewees did provide 
comments on aspects of STAMP having been introduced to the safety control 
structure diagram, due to time constraints this was not possible in the group 
interviews. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 STAMP analysis 
The processes involved in suicide prevention were modelled as a safety 
control structure (Figure 25) and its weaknesses identified from the incident 
report analysis were represented. The model identifies the controllers that 
influence the system and the control-feedback loops that enable them to 
change and receive information on the system and patient status. Weak 
feedback can result in a controller having an incorrect understanding of the 
system state, which can impact on their ability to make decisions, an example 
of an individual controller process model is provided in Figure 26. Controls can 
be weak and ineffective in changing the system to the desired state.  
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The suicide prevention control structure could have been modelled up to 
government level as in Case Study 1, but a system boundary was drawn 
around the regional healthcare the Mental Health Trust was part of, to keep 
the analysis within the locus of control of the healthcare provider. The police 
could also be included as a separate controller, however a team from the crisis 
services works with the police and they attend incidents in a triage vehicle 
together. The suicide incident reports refer to this crisis response unit, so it has 
been modelled as such. Similarly, urgent care includes professionals from 
crisis response within their units and this is represented by the crisis response 
controller.  
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Figure 25 Suicide prevention safety control structure 
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Figure 26 Mental health professional process model 
The five main weaknesses in the control structure were identified as: 
1. Inherent weakness controlling a dynamic risk in community 
environment 
There is an inherent weakness in the control structure in patients having 
freedom in the community, this limits feedback with patients not under constant 
observation and places responsibility on the patient to adhere to treatment 
plans. There were 17 cases where patients have committed suicide without 
any change in their risk / psychiatric status being detected.  
2. Patient non-attendance/non-compliance issues 
One major theme in the incident reports that weakens both feedback on patient 
status to the clinician and the effectiveness of treatment controls is poor patient 
engagement. Eleven of the reports noted significant patient engagement 
issues. This includes non-attendance at appointments, declined medical 
advice and non-adherence to treatment.  
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3. Patient declines support/service options offered 
In four of the reports it is noted that the patient recently presented in a period 
of crisis but did not receive crisis support or inpatient treatment. In these cases, 
the patients discussed voluntary admission or further crisis support with the 
clinicians but were not suitable for forced admission under the Mental Health 
Act (legislation covering rights of people with a mental health disorder). The 
patients have then declined crisis and inpatient treatment, in one case this was 
due to the service the patient was referred to being away from the region they 
lived in.   
4. Patient new to service, recent handover or awaiting appointment 
There were patients yet to be assessed by the service they were to enter 
before the suicide incident or having had few appointments; with seven cases 
where the service had two or less appointments with the patient prior to the 
incident. 
5. Communication, coordination and process issues 
With care provided by multidisciplinary teams and changes in patient status 
resulting in changes to service provision, coordination between controllers is 
critical. There were seven cases with examples of coordination and 
communication issues, with staff sick leave, differences in electronic record 
keeping between services, administration issues in referrals and lack of 
required service expertise resulting in disrupted care. 
6.3.1.1 Recommendations from STAMP analysis 
The recommendations formed from the STAMP analysis centre around the 
inherent limitation in predicting and controlling human behaviour. The control 
structure needs to be strengthened with this weakness in mind, to that end 
recommendations for remedial action are as follows: 
- To work towards improvement in patient engagement through service 
design. This is not a quick fix and would require further research 
involving patients, to understand the issues they have in engaging with 
the service. 
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- To stop out-of-area referrals.  
- To ensure prompt follow-up of new referrals. 
- The electronic record keeping issues had been or were being improved 
prior to this study. But a recommendation can be made for better 
change management when new IT systems are introduced in an 
organisation to ensure access to patient records are available to other 
care providers. 
The above recommendations are limited by their resource-intensive nature, 
with them requiring further research or more capacity within the services (local 
inpatient space, extra appointments). 
6.3.2 Interviews 
6.3.2.1 Participant comments on STAMP 
The individual interviewees were introduced to an early draft of the STAMP 
analysis safety control structure. After a brief explanation of STAMP concepts 
in terms of control-feedback loops they were asked to comment on how the 
model fits to suicide prevention. Interesting comments were made around the 
assumption the system can control or apply safety constraints to control 
human behaviour.  
‘So, this is a kind of structure of services and availability isn't it? [referring 
to safety control structure]. I think there's a premise in there which I 
would already think is false was that it is an indication of things going 
wrong. So, it's all about risk, and risk is never obliterated when it 
comes to suicide. And it's about balance of risks and you can never 
completely get rid of risk. And it's also about in the end it comes down to 
the decision of the individual, whatever the system is doing. So, if 
someone decides to jump off a car park, they have in the end made 
that decision and there is a notion that services can take 
responsibility for that. But we can't. In the end it comes down to that 
individual. So that's one premise that actually there's a person involved 
here that's making the decision themselves. And the second premise is it's 
about balancing risks and that's both on a population level, not necessarily 
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the population as a whole but the population of our patients. And it's about 
for an individual’ – Consultant Psychiatrist 
‘And then there are all the things outside our control, so we have this 
sort of job of as part of our job of preventing people killing themselves or 
helping people not kill themselves. And yet so much of that is out of our 
control because if you want to, you would view yourself as an autonomous 
being and what's going on in your life is altering how you feel and to think 
that a professional you see every few weeks has some control over 
that, you wouldn't think that and yet that's the position that we're 
placed in. So, I can't do anything about cuts in benefits, I can do my best 
to write letters etc. but I can't do anything about the actual government 
policy, I can't do anything about the increase in relationship breakdowns in 
our society. Which hugely increases human misery, even though it also 
decreases it in another way. I can't do anything about my patient having 
been abused sexually when they were a child, I'm here doing my best to 
help people deal with what goes on in their lives as well as them having a 
mental illness. I can't do anything about lots of that stuff.’ – Consultant 
Psychiatrist   
The premise of control-feedback loops was also questioned in terms of a 
structure that can become restrictive. A system that attempts to monitor or 
feedback on patient behaviour can restrict the relationships between clinician 
and patient.  
‘Have you included things that come up from the bottom, because there are 
things that come up. What I mean is, all the policies are a response to 
the patients’ pathology. So, something happens, an adverse event, 
because I think risks are there in life, you can't prevent everything, 
but something happens and then there is a policy to make sure it 
doesn't happen again. So, I mean it feeds from human nature basically 
and then all the policies, you can see that in everything, terrorism, whatever, 
trying to control, monitor. It's the same, you need to monitor everything as 
if there's an illusion that you can monitor. I think you can to an extent 
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monitor, but there is an illusion that you can know everything if you have 
the right systems in place.’  
Question from AC – ‘Meaning it becomes too restrictive?’ 
‘Yes, that's what I mean. I don't know the answer, because obviously you 
have to react if something happens, I think there is a lot of pressure 
to react. But I think you're right, I think trying to tick all the boxes 
make sure you've done everything right is extremely restrictive. And 
just to add, I think it's a disservice to the patient because right now patients 
cannot tell us anything. They know everything needs to get reported so we 
lost that relationship. So, it's the intrusion of the policy in the consulting 
room, and I don't say that everything should be kept between patient and 
clinician, I'm not saying everything should be, but there is some common 
sense that is not there anymore.’ - Psychotherapist  
6.3.2.2 Deeper probing into working practice and decision-making 
The interviews with staff revealed a complex decision-making process with 
participants describing the input and detection of changes in patient status, 
and decision making and response to patient status. The decision-making 
elements display three main considerations and trade-offs clinicians are 
making in their judgements: i) being patient-centred in terms of clinical need, 
patient desires and patient circumstances; ii) a resource consideration in terms 
of their individual emotional, time, experience and skill resource and the 
resources available within services; iii) a legal and procedural responsibility 
with constraints from laws and regulations. Responses are then made 
accordingly, but the entire process unfolds with a level of uncertainty and 
ambiguity due to the imperfect nature of information on patient status and 
ability to predict future behaviour. The overall decision-making process 
described by the participants can be summarised into the control-feedback 
mechanisms of the STAMP safety control structure (Figure 27). 
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Figure 27 Decision making process for suicide prevention 
6.3.2.2.1 Understanding patient status – feedback and detection of risk 
With the inherent weaknesses and uncertainty in gaining an insight into patient 
status, a holistic approach is taken to risk management. Inputs that went into 
decision-making included three interlinked elements: i) knowledge built up 
about the patient over the course of their care; ii) the information disclosed by 
the patient within the working relationship; iii) understanding of patient status 
gained through clinical assessment processes.  
Within the formal assessments and ongoing monitoring of patient status there 
are judgements made on the level of suicidal thoughts and intent. Current 
patient presentation is considered alongside patient diagnosis and risk factors. 
Non-verbal communication plays a key role in these assessments. 
‘We're using our knowledge, our skills, our gut instinct as well sometimes. 
To determine someone's risk at that moment, knowing it can change’ – 
Crisis Team Support Worker 
‘The mental state obviously is important, but the mental state is contributed 
by many other personal and social circumstances as well. So, some 
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patients if they're having issues with relationships or issues with finance or 
jobs. So, when you're making your plan you need to look into those aspects 
otherwise, we may not be able to manage the risk adequately and also in 
terms of gauging to what extent the patient risk can change’ – Consultant 
Psychiatrist 
‘Gauging all the non-verbal sorts of responses, are they engaging, what are 
their responses like.’ – Crisis Team Mental Health Nurse 
Building depth to understanding a patient occurs over the course of their care. 
With a long-term clinician to patient relationship enabling an understanding 
beyond what can be gained from only assessments and patient records and 
enhancing the ability to spot patterns in patient presentation.  
‘For every new patient you do a full assessment, you get as much 
information as possible. But listening to the patient, looking from the notes 
is very different from you being involved in the patient's care all through. 
Because there are many subtle things which happen between a patient and 
the clinician which is not documented, which cannot be expressed in words.’ 
– Consultant Psychiatrist 
This is of concern to crisis services which generally have much shorter-term 
working relationships with patients and are reliant on information from other 
professionals. 
‘A lot of the time we're using secondary information. We try and gather as 
much information as we can because we don't have the luxury of building 
a relationship. Very often you're allocated your work and it'll be the first time 
you've laid eyes on the person.’ – Crisis Team Support Worker 
The strength of the relationship and rapport with the patient is perceived as 
key in assessing patient status. Within community care there is often a reliance 
on the patient coming forward and confiding with the clinician with regards to 
any periods of crisis, this requires a trusting relationship with the patient. The 
crisis services are heavily reliant on clinicians’ ability to build an almost instant 
rapport with the patient. 
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‘It’s about reading people. There’s a lot of science and psychiatry behind it 
but it’s all about engagement. If you can’t engage with your client and if you 
can’t get into where they’re at and their mental state, you don’t know what’s 
going on. And they will shut down and they will not tell you what you need 
to know.’ – Crisis Team Mental Health Nurse 
‘…and the patient coming forward is partly the patient taking some 
responsibility for their own safety. It will partly be about me building up a 
relationship with them which means that they think that they want to die, 
but instead of killing themselves they will contact the doctor. Because they 
trust the doctor, the doctor has told them that they can contact the doctor, 
there is that little bit of ambivalence in them. Which is helped by knowing 
that doctor is there and will help.’ – Consultant Psychiatrist 
6.3.2.2.2 Decision-making and trade-offs 
Along with the clinically indicated need of the patient, clinicians need to 
consider the patient’s circumstances and desires, the services and resources 
available to treat the patient, and procedural and legal obligations. All this is 
considered within a level of uncertainty and ambiguity with the difficulties in 
detecting risk, predicting human behaviour and the dynamic nature of the risk. 
The understanding of uncertainty is shown in descriptions of decision-making. 
‘…and my judgement, along with my community nursing colleague who 
knows her well too, is that she is less likely to give into those feelings of 
wanting to be dead with the support of her family round her. Both because 
that is supportive to her in building up her ambivalence against suicide and 
because it reminds her of how her family will feel if she dies. So, we have 
made a judgement that rather than lock her up in hospital. She's less likely 
to do it (commit suicide) if she's in the community. But I cannot say she 
won't do it.’ – Consultant Psychiatrist 
i) Dilemma around being patient-centred 
Mental health professionals need to consider both the clinical need identified 
for the patient and the patient’s own desires and circumstances. This creates 
a collaborative decision-making process, planning with the patient rather than 
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just for the patient. A balance is needed to maintain patients’ sense of 
responsibility for their own lives, both for the sake of the service resource and 
for the patient’s quality of life. 
‘We don't want then the patient to become more dependent on the services 
and we need to help the patient to develop more autonomy and build more 
strengths within the community in managing those situations rather than 
relying on the services.’ – Consultant Psychiatrist 
‘Sometimes intervening is not helpful to them. It might feel counter-intuitive, 
but sometimes…. basically, what will happen, if every time, he knows now 
that if he takes an overdose I will be motherly or looking after him, then he 
would keep taking the overdose. So, there will be a reinforcement.’ - 
Psychotherapist 
There is also a feeling that the fit to patient desires can go too far towards 
customer service, rather than clinical need. 
‘I think it's the customer service mentality, so this is what I need, I'm telling 
you what I need, you need to do what I need.’ - Psychotherapist  
ii) Dilemma around being resource-constrained 
Decisions on responses to changes in patient status are also affected by the 
quantity and the quality of the service and treatment options available. 
‘One is resource issue, because if people would have for example more 
psychotherapy, talking treatments, you wouldn't put them on too many 
antidepressants.’ - Psychotherapist 
‘But for one individual, you're still doing the best for that individual that you 
can with the resources you've got. And that then becomes wrong (e.g. 
suicide) but the decision for the individual given the resources you've got 
may not have been wrong.’ – Consultant Psychiatrist 
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iii) Dilemma around being procedurally and legally-obliged 
Consideration of legal and procedural obligation is also a factor that impacts 
decision-making. There is a threat of litigation if something untoward were to 
happen, with documentation and procedures in place to protect clinicians. 
‘It's more about making sure we're not open to litigation. So, clinicians, I 
think one of the things that impacts on decision making is fear.’ - 
Psychotherapist 
‘You have to consider how everything you do, every action you take, 
everything you document would look if the worst happened and somebody 
lost their life.’ – Community Psychiatric Nurse 
6.3.2.3 Recommendations from interviews - what helps things go right? 
The interviewees were also asked about what helped them to be successful 
and the results revealed a strong theme on the importance of peer-support, 
with other suggestions of the importance of using multiple sources to gather 
patient information and matching patients with clinician’s skillset. Further 
discussion centred around the more technical or clinical aspects of instilling 
hope and working with the patient to help them understand that suicide is not 
the solution to their problems. Due to the more clinical nature of these points 
they are beyond the scope of this study and will not be discussed further here.   
Both informal peer-support through conversations with colleagues and formal 
peer-support in the form of supervision and multi-disciplinary group meetings 
were perceived to be valuable. 
‘More important to all this is the corridor discussions I have with my 
colleagues, that is very powerful and that's very important. If I'm not sure 
what I need to do with this patient, how I need to manage the risk and when 
I see my colleague, when we are having coffee or if it is something which 
is very urgent, I can pick up the phone and then say look I need some 
help and advice. That kind of, I can call, I know that I have some of my 
colleagues whom I can call anytime of the day and not have to think at all 
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that I'm disturbing them. And I similarly respond in the same way.’ – 
Consultant Psychiatrist 
‘…everyone has supervision. So, I go and talk to them about what 
happened, and they help me think about aspects of the presentation 
and the risk. That I might, I might struggle with. Because we all have blind 
spots. So yeah that's important, to have supervision, to have a space 
outside of the relationship you have, the assessment, where you can 
reflect.’ – Psychotherapist 
‘…it is that experience, but you can learn from it without actually 
having the experience yourself, definitely.’ – Crisis Team Mental Health 
Nurse ‘…and that's the importance of supervision and group 
supervision and those daily discussions that we have.’ – Crisis Team 
Mental Health Nurse  
‘I think one of the things about this team is that we all come from vary 
varied backgrounds both from our experience working within our own 
disciplines but then we also are made up of different disciplines as 
well. So, there's nurses, there's mental health nurses, there's learning 
disability nurses, there's social workers, there's occupational therapists, 
there's people from psychology backgrounds, there's doctors and 
psychiatrists. But I think one thing that's being looked at, at the moment is 
how we share our knowledge, because there's a huge wealth of it, how 
we share that amongst ourselves. And I think that's something that's going 
to be implemented shortly in the form of staff delivering teaching packages. 
Because sometimes I think we take our own knowledge for granted but 
then we don't know the value of that until someone says oh that's a good 
idea, until you realise that you're coming at things from a different point of 
view.’ – Crisis Team Mental Health Nurse 
Interviewees discussed how they use multiple sources to build up information 
about the patient, including information from family, friends and other agencies 
to form a complete picture.  
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‘Sometimes what you hear from the patient, what you see in the patient, 
may not be the complete picture. So, in those instances we must go 
beyond the patient, which will be family, friends or other agencies who 
are involved in the patient care and probably his previous involvement with 
other services.’ – Consultant Psychiatrist 
Participants discussed one method of coping and adapting to the wide range 
of patient needs through carefully matching patients with a clinician’s skillset. 
‘You need to match the member of staff. Knowing your patient and 
knowing your members of staff and being able to match the two as best as 
you can.’ – Crisis Team Mental Health Nurse. ‘Yes, that's an art as well.’ – 
Crisis Team Mental Health Nurse  
‘I think also because as a team we see patients in the morning, if you've 
identified a particular member of staff and think they might be able to 
see this in more detail, then within reason you can kind of facilitate 
that to happen. I've been to see a patient and I wasn't sure if what I was 
seeing was a learning disability or autism and that's not my strength. But I 
know that my colleague has that strength and we're in the same team, so 
we were able to facilitate that she went to see them the next time. So, it's 
little things like that that's sharing our knowledge, because we are our own 
resource.’ – Crisis Team Support Worker. ‘Staff are the most important 
resource, take everything else away and we'd still make a difference.’ – 
Crisis Team Mental Health Nurse  
6.3.3 Overall evaluation of STAMP 
6.3.3.1 Descriptive requirement 
One difference between original investigation reports and STAMP analysis 
was that the original analysis has a big focus on patient history, going back 
through their clinical records to judge whether the treatment had been 
appropriate. This clinical aspect would not necessarily come up in an analysis 
focussed on control-feedback as STAMP does and would require clinical 
expertise to analyse. There is a suggestion that in this case STAMP may not 
guide the analysis to consider clinically relevant facts. 
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6.3.3.2 Revealing requirement 
As in the other cases, STAMP considers interactions among system 
components and distinguishes between events and system issues. There may 
be underlying causes of a clinical nature that relate to treatment options and 
clinical judgement that would require clinical expertise to analyse. 
6.3.3.3 Consequential requirement 
A consideration of STAMP’s recommendations is in keeping with the 
consequential requirement of accident investigation (to formulate specific 
recommendations for prevention). The recommendations made from the 
STAMP analysis tend to be system measures that require extra resource and 
are out of the control of and not directed towards individual clinicians. In 
contrast, the suggestions made by interviewees are things that they can do 
individually and within their teams, the role of the organisation would be to 
facilitate these activities as best it can. Table 18 contrasts the 
recommendations between STAMP incident analysis and interviews with 
healthcare staff.  
Table 18 Comparison of recommendations from incident analysis and interviews 
 STAMP analysis of 
incidents 
Participant consideration 
of what helps them 
Focus Uncertainty in predicting 
and controlling human 
behaviour 
Trade-offs and dilemmas in 
decision-making 
Recommendations Service design for 
patient engagement 
 
Prompt follow-up for 
new patients 
 
Stopping out-of-area 
referrals 
 
System design to allow 
communication between 
provider IT systems 
Facilitate formal and 
informal peer support 
 
Matching clinician’s skillset 
to patient 
 
Gather information on 
patient status from multiple 
sources 
 
6.3.3.4 Validation requirement 
STAMP has a focus on controls enforcing safety constraints, in this case this 
concept may put too much emphasis on a control the healthcare stakeholders 
do not have. Although at a system level the focus on enforcing constraints may 
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be more fitting, in terms of governance structures and regulation, at the level 
of the individual clinician and patient the management of risk is not simply 
about enforcing constraints. And the most restrictive or constrained practice 
such as admission to inpatient care may not be right for every patient.  
The results suggest that more consideration is required for how clinicians 
manage to overcome the uncertainties and difficulties in preventing suicide. 
Furthermore, STAMP’s process model format for a decision-maker’s mental 
model is perhaps too simplified and would benefit from consideration of the 
trade-offs decision-makers deal with. These weaknesses in STAMP are 
relevant to the validation requirement and it may be oversimplifying reality to 
the point of overlooking key considerations. This is further shown in 
considering the differences in recommendations between the STAMP analysis 
and what staff themselves put forward as helping them manage suicidal risk, 
a comparison is shown in Table 18.  
6.3.3.5 Practical requirement 
In this case study, the analysis was undertaken by the author with healthcare 
stakeholders used for further information and validation of outputs. As in the 
other cases it is felt that STAMP requires more expertise than is held in those 
currently undertaking investigations in healthcare. 
6.4 Discussion 
The study explored the application of STAMP in the analysis of community-
based patient suicide incidents. This application was evaluated by comparing 
the findings with the findings of interviews with frontline staff. As expected, 
STAMP gave a system-level understanding and produced recommendations 
based around system measures. The exploration of working practice in the 
interviews highlighted some limitations of the STAMP analysis, which are 
summarised as:  
• An oversimplification of decision-making and a need for further 
consideration of the trade-offs and dilemmas that occur in the complex 
tasks of clinical judgement.  
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• STAMP’s focus on the enforcement of safety constraints meaning a lack 
of consideration of the positive action workers take and the way they 
adapt and overcome to the difficulties in their work.  
Previous work in suicide prevention has been criticised for being overly 
focussed on risk assessment and the identification of general risk factors 
(example risk factors include use of alcohol, being 55 years of age plus and 
being separated/widowed/divorced) (Mulder, 2011). The risk assessment 
approach assumes that suicide could be reduced if risk of suicide is assessed 
more frequently and more rigorously, however, risk assessment doesn’t 
remove the uncertainty around the potential for suicide (Mulder, 2011; Franklin 
et al., 2017). Recent suicide prevention literature has proposed a more holistic 
approach (Mokkenstorm et al., 2017) and has taken influence from James 
Reason’s work on organisational accidents (Reason, 2000). This literature 
argues for the use of a multilevel system view, encompassing: a direct 
approach to suicidal behaviours; continual improvement of the quality and 
safety of care processes; and an organisational commitment to the goal of zero 
suicides (Mokkenstorm et al., 2017). This type of framework could be extended 
to include the use of control-theory based system safety approaches, such as 
STAMP, in the analysis of system hazards and suicide incidents.  
6.4.1 Limitations 
As with the other two case studies this study is limited by using investigation 
reports as the basis for the incident analysis, rather than a full investigation 
from scratch. This is discussed further in the overall discussion in the next 
chapter, along with potential future research. 
Having only one analyst to code the suicide incident reports and interview data 
provides a further limitation. Some measures were used to increase qualitative 
validity such as the validation of the STAMP model by subject matter experts, 
having a second HFE researcher give opinion on the STAMP analysis and 
further member checking of the study findings. However, there was no 
checking for reliability in terms of having other analysts code the data and 
checking agreement between findings.    
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Chapter 7  - Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis sought to answer two main questions: 1) How effective is STAMP 
in healthcare incident analysis? and 2) How do healthcare stakeholders 
perceive the usability and utility of STAMP in healthcare incident analysis? To 
answer these questions, empirical research has been conducted in the form of 
three case studies, which have been presented in the previous three chapters. 
This chapter provides a cross-case analysis of the three studies and presents 
the main themes and findings.  
7.2 Cross-case analysis 
The three case studies were linked by their application of STAMP to healthcare, 
but conditions were varied in the type of incident STAMP was used to analyse. 
The three case studies can be summarised as follows:  
• Case Study 1 applied STAMP to a large-scale organisational failure 
through the analysis of the Mid-Staffordshire public inquiry, healthcare 
stakeholders provided feedback on their thoughts on the usability and 
utility of STAMP.  
• Case Study 2 applied STAMP to a small-scale medication prescription 
error incident and the re-analysis of an RCA investigation, healthcare 
stakeholders involved in the original RCA gave feedback on their 
perceptions of the usability and utility of STAMP.  
• Case Study 3 applied STAMP to the analysis of aggregated patient 
suicide incidents in community care. This case study did not collect 
healthcare stakeholder feedback on STAMP usability and utility. Instead 
the study compared the findings of the STAMP analysis with the 
findings of interviews with mental health professionals on what they 
found helped them to perform effectively in the prevention of suicide.   
The following sub-sections present a cross-analysis of the findings from these 
case studies. 
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7.2.1 Participant perceptions of the usability of STAMP - Cases 1 
and 2 
Overall, the participants in Case Study 2 were more positive about the usability 
of STAMP than in Case Study 1. Participant responses on Case Study 1 (Mid-
Staffordshire case) were particularly negative about the ease of understanding 
with 45% giving a negative response (72% negative or neutral rating) and ease 
of application with 34% giving a negative response (78% negative or neutral 
rating).  Participants in Case Study 2, where STAMP was applied to a smaller-
scale incident within the participants’ workplace, were more positive about 
ease of understanding and ease of application, with 75% providing positive 
responses and none providing negative responses. The Mid-Staffordshire 
case is a large and complex organisational failure and the subject of several 
long reports. The complexity of the case and the short duration of time that 
participants had to explore the case and STAMP would impact their 
assessment of STAMP. Participants felt they needed additional time, further 
training and external help. Participants in both cases suggested they would 
need help and external expertise to apply STAMP in the future. 
In the current practice of healthcare incident analysis, senior frontline 
personnel undertake incident investigations alongside their clinical working 
activities. This practice creates difficulties in finding time to provide sufficient 
training in STAMP. Furthermore, comments from healthcare stakeholders 
suggested they were put off by the initial complex appearance of STAMP. It is 
perhaps not feasible for the method to fit into current practice, rather STAMP 
needs external expertise to apply effectively in healthcare. Case Study 3 
demonstrated an external application, whereby initial incident analysis reports 
were aggregated and used to analyse suicide prevention in community care. 
The input of healthcare stakeholders is still needed, to validate models and 
results, but their time is used more effectively if the analysis is done by external 
safety researchers or professionals.        
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7.2.2 Participant perceptions of the utility of STAMP – Cases 1 
and 2 
Overall, participants were positive in their ratings of the utility of STAMP. In 
Case 1 participants were particularly positive about STAMP providing a 
different perspective and its relevance to healthcare (78% gave a positive 
response). Participants in Case I were more mixed about the application of 
STAMP being useful in learning from the incident and it helping to make 
recommendations. The Mid-Staffordshire case did not lend itself to making 
recommendations, in part due to the sheer number of recommendations made 
in the original public inquiry investigation. Within Case 2, the author and 
participants were able to make additional recommendations than the initial 
investigation and in accordance with this, participants were more positive in 
their ratings on usefulness in learning and helping to make recommendations.   
The discussion around the utility of STAMP in learning from incidents and 
making recommendations, regarded factors involved in making and 
implementing remedial actions, that were outside of the accident model or 
method used. This is discussed further in section 7.4.    
7.2.3 Overall evaluation of STAMP application - Cases 1, 2 and 
3 
Within each case study STAMP was evaluated against a set of requirements 
provided by Katsakiori et al. (2009), this section attempts a cross-case 
evaluation with further consideration of the criteria for accident model 
evaluation given by Benner (1985). 
7.2.3.1 Descriptive requirement 
The descriptive requirement relates to an analysis method providing guidance 
in order to identify the set of facts relevant to an accident (Katsakiori, 
Sakellaropoulos and Manatakis, 2009) and is in accordance with Benner’s 
definitive criterion. This requirement is difficult to evaluate against in this 
research due to the use of incident reports as data, rather than performing full 
investigations with initial data collection. Something can be said for STAMP’s 
organisation of the data however, particularly in consideration of Case Study 
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1, where a large amount of information about the incident was incorporated 
into STAMP’s structure. STAMP’s concept of accidents was a good fit for the 
data provided in Case Study 2 and 3 also, although it cannot be said from this 
research that STAMP would have provoked the same information search and 
data collection as the initial investigations.  
7.2.3.2 Revealing requirement  
The revealing requirement states that an accident investigation method should 
distinguish between events and underlying causes. This distinction should 
guide an investigator to considering underlying causes (Katsakiori, 
Sakellaropoulos and Manatakis, 2009). A related criterion is Benner’s (1985) 
noncausal criteria, whereby an accident model should address full descriptions 
of accident phenomenon, showing interactions among all parties and things. 
Generally, systemic accident analysis methods are praised for their 
consideration of underlying causes and interactions between system 
components, and it is this that sets them apart from earlier linear methods  
(Hollnagel, 2004; Salmon et al., 2011). Within this research, participants 
praised STAMP for its consideration of interactions between individuals, teams 
and the organisation, particularly within Case Study 2. Throughout the case 
studies STAMP has been shown to go beyond a search for superficial cause. 
STAMP considers the enforcement of safety constraints at each level of the 
system and models the interactions between system components (controllers) 
in control-feedback loops. In both Case Study 2 and 3 STAMP revealed system 
weaknesses that had not been articulated in the original investigation reports. 
For Case Study 2, the consideration of system design moved the investigation 
towards the proposal of system measure remedial actions. For Case Study 3, 
the conceptualisation of control-feedback loops articulated weaknesses in the 
system control structure due to uncertainty regarding suicidal behaviour. This 
uncertainty may be well known to frontline clinical staff, but not necessarily 
understood by the non-clinical managers involved in designing the system and 
coroners involved in investigating suicides. It is felt that STAMP meets this 
revealing requirement.       
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7.2.3.3 Consequential requirement 
To meet this requirement, an accident investigation method needs to allow for 
specific recommendations to be generated for prevention of future accidents 
(Katsakiori, Sakellaropoulos and Manatakis, 2009). The application of STAMP 
in Case Study 2 and 3 allowed for recommendations to be made for prevention 
of medication incidents and patient suicide.   
A criticism of current practice in healthcare incident analysis is in the low quality 
of the proposed remedial actions, which are felt to be weak and ineffective 
measures focussing on training and policy (Wu, Lipshutz and Pronovost, 2008; 
Kellogg et al., 2016; Peerally et al., 2016). Case Study 2 showed an increase 
in the generation of system measure solutions following the use of STAMP 
compared with the initial RCA investigation. The proportion of influence on the 
generation of recommendations that was due to the presence of HFE 
researchers compared with use of STAMP is not known, but participants did 
agree that STAMP helped them to make additional recommendations. There 
is some limitation in evaluating based on the quality of generated 
recommendations, when their effectiveness is only truly known after they are 
implemented, and their impact measured. However there has been some 
attempt to rank the strength of proposed solutions by the NPSA as shown in 
Figure 28 (Trbovich and Shojania, 2017), with policy change and retraining 
towards the bottom for effectiveness.  
Culture change
Forcing functions/constraints
Equipment/environment (Re)-Design
Automation/computerisation
Simplification/standardisation
Checklists/cognitive aids
Warnings/labels
Rules/protocols/policies
Education/(Re)-Training
Strong actions
Moderately 
strong actions
Weak actions
System-level
Person-based
Effectiveness
Effort
Hierarchy of effectiveness
 
Figure 28 Hierarchy of effectiveness adapted from Trbovich and Shojania, 2017 
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Something that can be noted is that the stronger effectiveness actions are 
considered to take more effort and in Case Study 3 the recommendations from 
the incident analysis would be resource-intensive. Case Study 3 perhaps 
displayed a general weakness of making recommendations from incident 
analysis alone, with recommendations generated from the incident analysis 
being resource intensive but also beyond the control of those implementing 
change. When compared with what frontline workers found helped them to 
perform to their best, which showed actions that can be taken within their 
teams and organisations, and not reliant on extra money or changes beyond 
their locus of control. This reveals a need to take more considerations of 
working practice and the positive actions taken by frontline workers to prevent 
incidents, alongside the safety constraints and system measures focussed on 
by STAMP incident prevention. Despite this limitation of incident analysis 
operating in isolation, as an analysis tool it is felt that STAMP meets this 
consequential requirement. 
7.2.3.4 Validation requirement 
The validation requirement constitutes validity in the correspondence between 
the analysis findings and reality, and reliability in facilitating agreement in 
analysis results between different users (Katsakiori, Sakellaropoulos and 
Manatakis, 2009). Benner (1985) also proposes a criterion for accident models 
to be realistic, in that the models must represent reality and the observed 
nature of the accident phenomenon. In the case studies in this research, 
agreement was reached between analysts through discussion over the safety 
control structure models produced and these models were also validated with 
healthcare stakeholders along with analysis findings. So, while issues with 
reliability and validity were reduced through the process taken for the analysis, 
reliability and validity were not formally tested. Katsakiori et al. (2009) found 
few validation or reliability studies within the literature and postulated that this 
is due to the difficulties evaluating these criteria.  
Inter-rater reliability could be tested by having different analysts apply STAMP 
to an accident and their findings compared to check for agreement, but this 
would require several analysts trained in STAMP. Trained STAMP analysts 
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were not available for this research project, but formal testing of reliability in 
STAMP analyses in healthcare and other industries should be a priority for 
future research. Previous research has assessed the reliability of STAMP in 
application to the South Korea Sewol Ferry accident (Filho, Jun and Waterson, 
2017). Four applications of systemic accident analysis were compared, two 
using AcciMap and two using STAMP. In comparing the identification of 
contributory factors, the study found the reliability between the two STAMP 
applications (61% of identified factors were common between applications) to 
be higher than the two AcciMap applications (31% of identified factors were 
common between applications) (Filho, Jun and Waterson, 2017). When 
considering the recommendations made from each application, the authors of 
the study reported that the recommendations reflected the focus and 
knowledge of the analyst. In this thesis, the literature review in Chapter 2 
introduced the influence of analysis aim and analyst background on the 
outcomes of accident analysis. It may be a suboptimal approach to compare 
applications by different analysts which may have started with different aims. 
Reliability could be tested in controlled conditions where analysts set out with 
the same analysis aim, furthermore, using multiple analysts with varied 
backgrounds could also provide interesting findings pertaining to the effect of 
analyst background.    
In this research project, the validity of the STAMP safety control structure was 
in some way tested through feedback from healthcare stakeholders and their 
thoughts on how it fits to healthcare systems. Areas of contention here were 
in a need to clarify the definition for control actions in healthcare and whether 
the system model oversimplifies healthcare systems and misses some of the 
important nuances of healthcare work. These issues are discussed in more 
detail in section 7.3. The lack of formal testing of the validity of STAMP 
applications is a key limitation of this research. To test for validity in accident 
analysis there needs to be an agreement on what the reality of the accident 
situation was, this is difficult due to the nature of analysing a past event upon 
which there is incomplete knowledge. However, there is potential in setting up 
a panel of subject matter experts that can provide broad expertise on the 
accident situation, between them the panel can agree on a reality of the 
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accident situation. Multiple analysts could then undertake a STAMP analysis 
of the accident, the outcomes of these analyses can then be evaluated against 
the predetermined reality to give an understanding of the validity of STAMP 
analysis. This research project focussed on the usability, utility and feasibility 
of using STAMP in healthcare. Formal testing of the validity of STAMP 
applications is a large undertaking and an area deserving of its own focus in 
future research.    
7.2.3.5 Practical requirement 
The practical requirement relates to the need for education and training to use 
STAMP. From participant comments and ratings of STAMP usability it can be 
said that training is needed to use the method effectively. Participants, 
although having had limited exposure to STAMP, felt they needed external 
help and/or further training to apply the method in the future. Previous research 
has also highlighted that accident investigators find STAMP to be a 
complicated method to use (Underwood, Waterson and Braithwaite, 2016).   
7.2.3.6 Application field 
The application field requirement specifies that an analysis method should 
account for the specific context of the accident. This requirement is at the crux 
of this thesis, in the effectiveness of STAMP when applied to the specific 
context of healthcare incidents. STAMP was considered relevant to healthcare 
by the participants and the three case studies have demonstrated its use in 
healthcare. But the method is not tailored to healthcare and does not account 
for the language used by healthcare personnel. This application field 
requirement is discussed more in sections 7.3.4 and 7.4, and in making 
recommendations for the application of STAMP in healthcare.  
7.2.4 Summary of main themes 
More interesting than the Likert scale ratings of the usability and utility of 
STAMP were the comments made by participants’ during their exploration of 
the method. The combination of participant comments and author reflections 
on the use of STAMP are synthesised into themes on the application of 
STAMP in healthcare. Four overarching themes are discussed in the following 
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sections, these are: system versus person perspective; human controller 
decision-making; modelling the soft elements of healthcare systems in STAMP; 
STAMP language – defining terms for healthcare. 
7.3 Emerging themes on STAMP application in healthcare  
7.3.1 System versus person perspective 
A theme developed from comments of healthcare stakeholder participants in 
Case Study 1 regarded a deliberation between a system and person 
perspective. Participants in Case Study 1 and 2 liked STAMP’s system 
overview, the consideration of interactions between people, teams and the 
organisation, and the system focus shifting concentration from individual 
blame. But in the first case study there were some concerns that too far a move 
to a systems view may mean underplaying the role of the individual. This 
concern echoes the warnings of James Reason (2008) and his proposal of the 
weaknesses of taking too extreme a view from either a system or person 
perspective.  
The weakness of an extreme system view is said to be in an excessive reliance 
on system measures and a disregard for personal qualities (Reason, 2008). 
Too strong a system view could lead to learned helplessness (Reason, 2008), 
with individuals believing they are powerless to affect change in a flawed 
system. Case Study 3 tested features of the system versus person perspective 
by comparing a STAMP incident analysis with frontline worker interviews 
focussing on what helped them to perform effectively in working practice 
(regarding prevention of patient suicide). The STAMP incident analysis did not 
facilitate the identification or understanding of the importance of activities such 
as peer-support, matching clinician skillset to patients and the holistic 
approach to understanding patient status. These positive aspects of work were 
overlooked by a focus on the failure of the system to enforce safety constraints. 
However, this is not something that would be picked up in a traditional person 
perspective of incidents, where workers are seen as a potential hazard 
(Reason, 2008).  
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In an overview of safety work in safety critical industries, Vincent and Amalberti 
(2016) have classified three main approaches to safety for healthcare: ultra-
adaptive, high reliability and ultra-safe. The findings from Case Study 3 were 
comparable to the ultra-adaptive model, in which risk is embraced and risk 
management is heavily reliant on the judgement, adaptability and resilience of 
individuals. The ultra-adaptive model prioritises adaptation and recovery 
strategies, power is given to experts, with safety improvements coming 
through peer-to-peer learning, shadowing, acquiring professional experience 
and personnel having awareness regarding their own limitations (Vincent and 
Amalberti, 2016). Much focus is given to the positive actions of individuals 
rather than excessive reliance on system measures. The STAMP incident 
analysis in the case studies did not capture much in the way of positive actions, 
rather the focus is on enforcing safety constraints, however this is perhaps a 
more general limitation of incident analysis rather than just the STAMP method. 
Woods and Cook (2002) have previously recommended a more holistic 
approach to reactions to failure that include consideration of how working 
practice creates safety. The comments from participants in Case Study 1 
tended to focus on the negative aspects of individual performance. However, 
they did articulate that STAMP may overlook the important details and 
nuances of working practice in healthcare. This includes variations in 
procedures and protocols that different clinical specialisms work to and the 
deviations workers make from written protocol, in essence the difference 
between work as done versus work as imagined (Hollnagel, 2015). 
Consideration of positive actions and adaptations by workers is the thought-
line of research in resilience engineering (Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson, 
2006) and Safety-II (Hollnagel, 2014).  
It is the author’s recommendation that when using STAMP in healthcare, 
consideration is given to the positive actions and adaptations of healthcare 
workers, rather than sole focus on the controlling actions they take to enforce 
safety constraints. In-depth consideration of working practices will also help to 
ensure a consideration of Work-as-Done and avoid a STAMP analysis that 
leans too far towards Work-as-Imagined (Hollnagel, 2015; Braithwaite, Wears 
and Hollnagel, 2017). Making sure to get an understanding of how work is 
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actually carried out, rather than just how it is planned beforehand or evaluated 
after it has taken place (Hollnagel, 2015). This can be achieved by extending 
STAMP to include ideas and techniques that have been categorised into 
Safety-II, such as gaining an understanding of worker adaptations through 
interviews and observations of working practice. The difficulty comes in 
incorporating this into the STAMP safety control structure model. FRAM 
attempts to analyse adaptations and had a diagrammatic output to present the 
findings, but it lacks the structured model that STAMP has and it would not be 
easy to represent the nuances and complexities of work in a simple and 
readable model. Rather than disrupting the structure of the control structure 
model and the overview it provides, it may be better to use STAMP alongside 
another method that can provide an in-depth analysis of current practice, such 
as the approach taken to Case Study 3.      
7.3.2 Human controller decision-making 
Although it takes a system view, STAMP does analyse the behaviour of 
individuals in modelling the decision-making of human controllers. A particular 
finding of Case Study 3 was the potential for STAMP to oversimplify human 
decision-making and lack representation of the trade-offs made in decisions 
by healthcare workers.  
In considering human decision-making, STAMP takes into account the safety-
related responsibilities of controllers, the context their decisions are taken in 
and the controller’s mental model. Decision-making is presented as a process 
model (Figure 29), inadequate decisions are usually depicted as the result of 
flaws in the controller’s mental model (e.g. in Case Study 2 the nurses 
administering the medication had feedback informing them it was the correct 
dose). But with the more complex decisions involving clinical judgement, such 
as in Case Study 3, there is scope for further consideration of trade-offs. 
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Process 
model
Control actions Feedback
Controlled process
 
Figure 29 Generic process model adapted from Leveson, 2012 
Case Study 3’s focus on clinician decision-making in suicide prevention 
revealed potential trade-offs in accounting for resource constraints, patient 
clinical need and circumstances, and procedural obligations. Due to the level 
of uncertainty regarding suicidal behaviour in the community setting, a 
clinician’s mental model is always likely to be flawed. Decisions are made 
using clinical judgement with various factors weighed-up and trade-offs made, 
as illustrated in the following quotes:      
‘…and my judgement, along with my community nursing colleague who 
knows her well too, is that she is less likely to give into those feelings of 
wanting to be dead with the support of her family round her. Both because 
that is supportive to her in building up her ambivalence against suicide and 
because it reminds her of how her family will feel if she dies. So, we have 
made a judgement that rather than lock her up in hospital. She's less likely 
to do it (commit suicide) if she's in the community. But I cannot say she 
won't do it.’ – Consultant Psychiatrist 
‘…for one individual, you're still doing the best for that individual that you 
can with the resources you've got. And that then becomes wrong (e.g. 
suicide) but the decision for the individual given the resources you've got 
may not have been wrong.’ – Consultant Psychiatrist 
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Within Case Study 3 it was felt important to make explicit consideration of the 
complex decisions mental health care staff make and the contention with 
multiple trade-offs between being patient-centred, resource-constrained and 
legally-obliged. Decisions around risk management and patient care are too 
complex to be evaluated only in terms of completeness of mental model. There 
is room within a STAMP analysis to allow for further consideration of decision-
making in terms of responsibilities and context, but the role of trade-offs is not 
made explicit. 
Trade-offs in decision-making have been addressed in resilience engineering 
literature (Righi, Saurin and Wachs, 2015), where there is a focus on how to 
help people cope with complexity under pressure to achieve success (Woods 
& Hollnagel, 2006). Previous research into the work of aircraft maintenance 
technicians identified decision shaping factors of schedule pressure and 
operator effort optimisation, airworthiness, cost saving, and operator 
accountability in aircraft maintenance technicians (Nathanael, Tsagkas and 
Marmaras, 2016). These factors were suggested as potentially common to 
decision-making in other safety critical industries (Nathanael, Tsagkas and 
Marmaras, 2016) and are broadly comparable to mental health care staff 
considerations of clinician capacity and service resources, patient and clinical 
need, and regulatory and legal considerations.   
Clinician trade-offs related to compromise of risk, such as discharging a patient 
early to accommodate another patient needing care, have been the subject of 
research taking a naturalistic decision making approach (Reader, Reddy and 
Brett, 2018). A variance in decision preferences among intensive care unit 
clinicians was found, with clinicians making decisions to fit resource and 
operational constraints in a dynamic environment (Reader, Reddy and Brett, 
2018). Further to this, Patterson and Wears (2015) discuss system-level trade-
offs between adaptive capacity and efficient production in a pharmacy. Their 
case study described a situation where demands on the system had greatly 
increased, while resource allocation had remained static, a situation not unlike 
that in community mental health care. The extraordinary resilient behaviours 
and adaptive capacity of individuals had masked the system’s reduced ability 
to sustain performance under stress (Patterson and Wears, 2015). Patterson 
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and Wears (2015) warn that the system leaders may be prevented from 
recognising the individual efforts required for success and the increasing risk 
from further demands on the system. This again highlights that incident 
analysis alone might not give the full picture of safety performance in 
healthcare systems, STAMP incident analysis would benefit from explicit 
consideration of trade-offs and the positive actions of workers.   
The author highlights a need for STAMP to consider the trade-offs healthcare 
workers make in their decision-making, alongside inaccurate or incomplete 
mental models. Safety science literature has presented the need for in-depth 
consideration of working practices in the systems under investigation, during 
accident analysis or safety improvement projects (e.g. Woods and Cook, 2002; 
Hollnagel, 2014).  The area of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) (Klein, 1999, 
2008) has built up knowledge of human decision-making in work and critical 
situations, and provides techniques for studying this decision-making. In safety 
science and NDM, observations of working practice and in-depth interviews 
with workers are often used to probe decision-making in the real world. 
Alongside a STAMP analysis, the author recommends that a more in-depth 
probing into decision-making is used, one that goes beyond incomplete mental 
models and gets a richer picture of working practices. This is particularly 
important in healthcare contexts where clinical judgement plays a key role, 
such as in mental health care and can be achieved using interviews and 
observations based on the techniques of NDM.   
7.3.3 Modelling the soft elements of healthcare systems in 
STAMP 
Culture was consistently referred to by participants as an element lacking from 
the STAMP safety control structure model, particularly in Case Study 1. 
Culture is defined in the Oxford English dictionary as ‘the distinctive ideas, 
customs, social behaviour, products, or way of life of a particular nation, society, 
people, or period.’ Definitions provided for safety culture are generally in 
keeping with this definition of culture, the Health and Safety Commission have 
provided a definition (see below) that is regularly cited in safety culture 
literature (Health and Safety Executive, 2005): 
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‘The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that 
determine the commitment to; and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s health and safety management’ (Health and Safety Commission, 
1993).  
The breadth of this definition and the scope of a STAMP analysis (as 
demonstrated in Case Study 1) open a challenging debate as to whether 
STAMP has inadequacies regarding consideration of culture. STAMP is 
modelling the structure an organisation has in place to enforce safety 
constraints on behaviour, this could include monitoring and control of individual 
and group values, attitudes etc. STAMP is also considering an organisational 
hierarchy and within that the organisation’s health and safety management. So, 
there is overlap in the definition of safety culture and the analytical approach 
of STAMP.  
Leveson makes several references to safety culture in literature on STAMP 
(Leveson, 2012) and in introducing the need for an approach such as STAMP 
states that: ‘the struggle for a good safety culture will never end because it 
must continually fight against the functional pressures of the work environment. 
Improvement of the safety culture will therefore require an analytical approach 
directed toward the behaviour-shaping factors in the environment.’ (Leveson 
2012, p. 52). STAMP is later described in this text as the analytical approach 
to achieving this, including in the design of operating conditions and the safety 
management control structure. Stringfellow (2010) suggests a set of general 
factors to consider in a STAMP analysis which includes safety culture. 
Leveson (2012) suggests that the important contextual and behaviour-shaping 
factors become clear during the process of explaining why people acted the 
way they did in a STAMP analysis. So, there is consideration of safety culture 
in a STAMP analysis, but we must remember that the participants of this 
research were being introduced to STAMP for the first time and perhaps need 
more guidance towards aspects such as culture. Stringfellow (2010) has 
provided some guidance in suggesting an analysis should consider if 
organisational culture allows for honest reporting by lower level individuals, for 
example. 
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Participants made comments on STAMP while exploring a safety control 
structure, rather than a textbook and it can be said that issues with culture do 
not jump out from a control structure diagram. Indeed, one criticism of STAMP 
arising in participant feedback was that the control structure model didn’t tell 
them what went wrong, rather it showed what was in place at the time. Some 
participants discussed the model further and suggested that it didn’t capture 
the complexity in the relationships between people, teams and organisations. 
Another suggested it didn’t show the humanness (these aspects are also 
guided towards by Stringfellow (2010)). Taken together it seems the criticism 
of STAMP was directed more towards the safety control structure model and 
an inability to represent the softer elements of healthcare systems. 
Hollnagel (2006) believes fixed diagrammatic structures such as tree, graph or 
network are inadequate as a representation of the potential for complex 
accidents and this inadequacy is a consequence of the systemic view of 
accidents (Hollnagel, 2006). Graphical representations focussing on 
descriptions of links between parts are said to be unable to account for how a 
stable system may suddenly become unstable and struggle to represent 
dynamic bindings or couplings (Hollnagel, 2006). The safety control structure 
model shows fixed links representing control-feedback loops, but as the 
participants commented it does not show the strength of, or changes in, the 
relationships between teams and organisations. Participants from 
commissioning bodies were particularly descriptive of the relationships they 
had to build and maintain with provider organisations, the differences between 
the relationships with different providers and the effect this had on safety 
management. In Case Study 3, the strength of the dynamic relationships 
between a patient and the service, or patient and clinician, were also an 
important factor regarding their safety. When analysing an accident these 
factors would likely be unearthed (as Leveson (2012) points out) but it is not 
apparent to people looking at the control structure model and is not easy to 
represent in a fixed diagram structure.    
The model is beneficial in reducing the need to search through hundreds of 
pages of an accident report document to gain an understanding of an accident. 
But comments from healthcare stakeholders highlight a need for the model to 
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show the control structure weaknesses more explicitly and for the model to 
reference organisational factors such as relationships and culture.    
7.3.4 STAMP language – defining terms for healthcare 
The language of STAMP was also questioned in terms of its representation of 
healthcare systems. It was not always clear to the author what needed to be 
captured as a control in the analysis of healthcare incidents and participants 
also requested clarity in the definition of control. Furthermore, in Case Study 
3, some participants felt the term control was not representative of their 
relationships with patients, which didn’t allow for them to control patient 
behaviour as such.  
The use of the control and feedback terms comes from systems and control 
theory and Leveson has described the idea of control actions as follows: 
‘An example of a control action is the imposition of constraints upon the activity 
at one level of a hierarchy, which define the ‘laws of behaviour’ at that level. 
Those laws of behaviour yield activity meaningful at a higher level. Hierarchies 
are characterised by control processes operating at the interfaces between 
levels.’ – Leveson (2012, p. 64) 
In Case Study 3 the meaningful activity is in preventing loss of human life 
(patient suicide), towards the bottom of the hierarchy, clinicians may use 
control actions such as instilling hope in a patient, facilitating a change in a 
patient’s belief that suicide is the solution to their problems, or prescribing 
medication. So, while they may not have complete control, they are performing 
actions to constrain a patient’s suicidal behaviour. You can however 
sympathise that at the frontline of mental healthcare, the proposition that they 
could potentially be seen to fail to control suicidal behaviour, a dynamic 
process containing a high level of uncertainty, could cause friction. So, while 
not necessarily conceptually wrong, there is reason to consider the use of the 
term control for the benefit of acceptance and usability in healthcare. 
We can also see in these examples of control actions in mental healthcare that 
there could be a huge breadth of potential actions to consider in healthcare. 
This brings us to the comments on clarity of definition and the question, what 
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are controls in healthcare? There is a balance to be struck between being too 
prescriptive and in providing clarity and guidance to new users of STAMP. It is 
the author’s reflection that, to some degree, it becomes apparent when going 
through the accident analysis as to what the control actions were and what 
was important to capture within the model. But then this needs to be explained 
and articulated to healthcare stakeholders, whether they are involved in the 
analysis or in validating the model and findings.   
A previous section of this discussion deliberated on the need for a healthcare 
STAMP analysis to ensure consideration of the positive actions and 
adaptations of healthcare workers that may not be directly related to enforcing 
constraints. These actions may not necessarily occur vertically down a 
hierarchy and could be support within teams. Here cautionary advice is given 
on how the term control may be interpreted and the need to clarify what is 
meant by control within the STAMP analysis. Particularly when the healthcare 
stakeholders are not fully involved in the analysis and may not see the link 
between hazard, safety constraints and control actions. It needs to be made 
clear that the analysis is interested in the actions taken by healthcare workers 
to prevent an unwanted loss, rather than there being an assumption that they 
should have complete control of a process. 
7.4 Would STAMP make a difference to current practice? 
The literature review in Chapter 2 and exploratory descriptive study at the start 
of Case Study 1 described issues with current practice in healthcare incident 
analysis. One of the limitations of current practice was in the analytical 
approach used, RCA, but this was not felt to be the only factor reducing the 
effectiveness of incident investigation. It would be naïve to think that a change 
from RCA to STAMP alone could make drastic and sustained improvements 
to investigation quality. The healthcare literature and participant comments on 
current practice were largely in agreement with safety literature on factors 
influencing investigation outcome. 
Accident investigation can be influenced by several factors including the 
background and knowledge of the analyst (Rasmussen, 1990; Lundberg, 
Rollenhagen and Hollnagel, 2010), the accident model used (Lundberg, 
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Rollenhagen and Hollnagel, 2009), the time and resources available for the 
investigation and proposed remedial actions being constrained by practical 
considerations (Lundberg, Rollenhagen and Hollnagel, 2010). We also have 
to consider that an accident investigator is human and not immune to cognitive 
bias (see Appendix 1) or political and organisational pressures (Johnson, 2003; 
Dien, Dechy and Guillaume, 2012). Within the case studies of this thesis, 
STAMP was applied by the author, who has a background in HFE and is 
external to the NHS organisations subjected to analysis. So, when compared 
with current practice, not only was the method changed but also the influences 
on the individual analyst. A proposal of the author is that for STAMP to be 
effective in healthcare it needs to be performed by analysts with experience 
and training in the STAMP method, there is a further requirement of safety/HFE 
expertise and the input of healthcare stakeholders. In addition, there needs to 
be awareness of the factors influencing investigation outcome. 
The need for training to provide competence in using STAMP may seem like 
a barrier to adoption of the method, but there are ways to accommodate this. 
Currently local healthcare provider incident investigations are undertaken by 
busy frontline clinical workers and they may benefit from using methods with 
better usability characteristics such as AcciMap. However, healthcare also 
contains patient safety specialists and managers at provider, regional and 
national level. These managers and specialists may have the required 
motivation and safety expertise to undertake training in STAMP and to use the 
approach in the analysis of clusters of patient safety incidents. Furthermore, it 
is expected that the recruitment of HFE and safety specialists in healthcare 
should increase in the future, these specialists also have potential as STAMP 
users. This would provide healthcare with the capability of undertaking 
effective systemic accident analysis and benefit from a control-theory 
perspective of patient safety incidents.   
Within the case studies and analyses of this research, input was sought from 
healthcare stakeholders with specialist knowledge on the work domain and 
this was combined with the knowledge of HFE researchers. Work domain 
knowledge is a vital part of the analysis and when combined with HFE 
knowledge can produce good quality analysis outcomes. Collaboration is 
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necessary as neither group of analysts hold the requisite knowledge from both 
domains. But this collaboration has its challenges, such as the limited time 
healthcare stakeholders can give and communication between the two 
professional groups with their different technical terms and jargon.   
The use of STAMP as a systemic accident analysis method should also benefit 
investigation outcome in comparison to sole use of the RCA cause-effect 
model as occurs in current practice (Hollnagel, 2006; Lundberg, Rollenhagen 
and Hollnagel, 2009). STAMP contains a combination of systemic thinking with 
qualitative systems modelling and detailed analysis of human decision making. 
While RCA, although including identification of contributory factors to incidents, 
lacks a description or explanation of the relationships and interactions between 
humans and components across the system. This limits the understanding of 
how these factors shape behaviour and impact human decision-making. Within 
this thesis the use of STAMP is shown to be of benefit to the development of 
remedial actions. 
Although beneficial, this combination of method and expertise does not 
remove the organisational and political factors that can influence investigation 
outcome and implementation of remedies. These issues are beyond the scope 
of this thesis and of individual incident investigations, but it is a known problem 
that has led to calls for independent investigation bodies in healthcare (Macrae 
and Vincent, 2014) and the development of the Healthcare Safety Investigation 
Branch (HSIB) in the UK.  
7.5 Methodological considerations and limitations 
The limitations of the research have been considered throughout the research, 
with some discussion of limitations with each individual case study. As 
qualitative case study research, the research design suffers from limitations 
common to this type of study, the strategies taken to lessen limitation effects 
are discussed in the following sections. 
7.5.1 Qualitative validity 
Consideration of validity in qualitative research has been described as a test 
or check on the accuracy of the findings, if they are accurate according to the 
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researcher, participant and the readers of the research (Creswell, 2014). 
Terms used in discussion of validity of qualitative research include 
trustworthiness, authenticity and credibility (Creswell, 2014). Steps have been 
taken throughout the research to ensure validity, but of course there are trade-
offs in the decisions taken in research design that mean limitations still occur. 
Robson (2011) describes threats to validity that can occur in qualitative 
research in description, interpretation and theory. A valid description requires 
accurate and complete data, within this research this has been ensured 
through audio-recording and full transcription of participant interviews and 
comments on STAMP. While workshop 1 in Case Study 2 wasn’t audio-
recorded, the workshop wasn’t used in evaluating the application of STAMP in 
healthcare, rather it was used to provide more information for the incident 
analysis itself. Efforts have been made to convey the findings of the research 
with a rich, thick description (Creswell, 2014), including in the descriptions of 
case study context and setting, and the quotes from participants.  
Interpretation normally refers to the interpretation of results from people, such 
as the comments from the interviews and workshops with healthcare 
stakeholders. A threat to interpretation comes in imposing a framework on 
what is happening rather than this emerging from the data (Robson, 2011). No 
framework was applied to the interpretation of participant perspectives in the 
interviews and workshops. The evaluation questionnaire was fixed in terms of 
the scale-based questions, but it also included open questions and participants 
were asked for further comments and discussion. The scales are limited in 
forcing participants to agree or disagree with a statement provided by the 
researcher rather than articulate their own view, but these questions were used 
to lead into the further discussion and were never presented alone. In 
interpreting the findings, evidence is provided for each theme and within the 
case studies this is in the form of rich descriptive quotes from different 
participants, providing multiple perspectives (Creswell, 2014).  
The main threat regarding theory is in not considering alternative 
understandings of the phenomena studied (Robson, 2011; Yin, 2013). The 
literature review and case studies have considered the role of factors beyond 
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analytical approach that impact the quality and outcomes of incident 
investigation. This has enabled the viewing of the application of STAMP in 
healthcare within the context of normal practice where other factors could 
diminish the impact of the approach. Furthermore, a point has been made to 
include negative (Creswell, 2014) participant feedback on STAMP, even when 
they ran counter to the themes such as the more extreme views in Case Study 
1.      
The research could have considered alternative system accident analysis 
methods such as in previous research comparing STAMP with AcciMap 
(Salmon, Cornelissen and Trotter, 2012; Underwood and Waterson, 2014). 
This could further have benefitted the research in allowing participants to relate 
their views on STAMP to another approach, for example AcciMap is more 
usable than STAMP. However, there was felt to be difficulties in one analyst 
applying different methods, with the author being the main analyst. The first 
application by whichever method first used would likely set how the analyst 
thought about the incident, the second method then just a rejig of this analysis 
and not exploring the depth of the approach or how this method would view 
the incident independently. Order effects could potentially be avoided through 
counterbalancing and changing the order of method first used, but then the 
number of case studies would need to be increased and the research approach 
changed to include fixed design studies (Robson, 2011). This research has 
instead sought to investigate the application of one method, in depth.  
7.5.1.1 Bias and rigour 
All research involving people presents issues of bias and rigour (Robson, 
2011). There is a need to clarify the bias the researcher brought to this 
research (Creswell, 2014) and the relationship between researcher and setting, 
and between researcher and participants (Robson, 2011). 
Both Robson (2011) and Creswell (2014) discuss the potential benefit of 
spending a long time in the field, that it gives the researcher an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon under study, helping to increase the 
accuracy and validity of findings (Creswell, 2014). The researchers can 
become more accepted by participants which can help reduce initial reactivity 
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and the trusting relationship reducing the likelihood of respondents giving 
biased information (Robson, 2011). This research was not ethnographic in 
nature and the researcher dipped in and out of the case study setting, without 
spending prolonged periods of time with participants. This could potentially 
reduce the relationship between researcher and participants, most of which 
were only met on one occasion for interview or workshop. But the research 
was not designed to be ethnographic, nor to only describe the phenomenon, 
rather it was about application of a method, still there is a potential limitation 
here. Efforts were made to triangulate different data sources and use different 
approaches to examine the application of STAMP, using multiple perspectives 
and in demonstrating the application in detail and discussing its effectiveness 
with reference to established criteria. Furthermore, established relationships 
can have a negative effect, with prolonged involvement potentially increasing 
researcher bias with their role as researcher and interpretation of findings 
affected by their relationships and feelings towards the setting (Robson, 2011).  
Other approaches to increasing rigour come in triangulation through using 
more than one observer/researcher (Robson, 2011; Creswell, 2014). Further 
observers can check the accuracy of data collection and analysis. This 
research is limited by predominantly having only one researcher conduct 
interviews and workshops, and code the findings. However, this avoids 
deviation in interview and workshop procedures and drifts in the definition of 
codes from coordination and communication issues between coders. And from 
a practical standpoint this was individual research, not team research, other 
researchers were not available to undertake data collection and results 
analysis. Parts of the research did involve member checking (Robson, 2011; 
Creswell, 2014), with publications and outputs of the research involving 
healthcare stakeholders from the case study setting, giving them the 
opportunity to check the researcher’s accounts and findings for accuracy. This 
occurred in Case Study 2 and 3, but not Case Study 1. Case Study 3 was even 
presented back to healthcare professionals from the healthcare provider 
involved at an educational event. Furthermore, the research had auditors 
(Creswell, 2014) in the author’s supervisor and internal examiner throughout 
the research process. The research was also regularly presented to peers 
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(Robson, 2011) in research group meetings, a doctoral consortium, 
Loughborough Design School presentations and conferences, with feedback 
taken onboard. 
A further strategy for increased rigour came in the keeping of a record of 
activities (Robson, 2011; Yin, 2013) involved in the research, including audio-
recordings, transcriptions, details of the data analysis and a journal 
documenting notes taken during interviews. This audit trail is both electronic 
with NVivo records and paper-based with notebooks and journals. 
7.5.2 Qualitative reliability 
Qualitative reliability regards whether a researcher’s approach is consistent 
across different researchers and different projects (Creswell, 2014). Ideas of 
standardisation can be problematic for qualitative research, where methods 
are generally non-standardised and precludes formal reliability testing, Robson 
(2011) instead advises to avoid common pitfalls in data collection and analysis 
(e.g. equipment failure and transcription errors) and being able to show that 
the research has been conducted thoroughly, carefully and honestly. This 
brings us back to the documentation of research activities and audit trail, 
explained in the previous section, with the procedures of the case studies in 
this research documented with as many steps of procedures as possible (Yin, 
2013).  
There was a slip in terms of documentation of steps within workshop 1 of Case 
Study 2, where participant information was not collected. This was in part due 
to a convenience sampling of using a pre-arranged education event. However, 
participants did introduce themselves along with their role in healthcare, but 
this was not documented by the researcher as it was in the other workshops. 
When considering the role of this workshop and the overall aim of the research 
this lack of documentation of participant information is not an issue. The 
workshop was used to gather more perspectives and information about the 
patient safety incident itself, along with preparing the researcher for the use of 
STAMP in the next workshop where its application was evaluated through 
participant feedback. The participants of workshop 1 were not used in the 
healthcare stakeholder evaluation of STAMP. 
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7.5.3 Generalisability 
Both Robson (2011) and Creswell (2014) consider qualitative research to be 
most concerned with internal generalisability, in the generalisability of the 
conclusions within the setting studied, rather than external generalisation 
beyond that setting (Robson, 2011). As Creswell puts it, the intent of qualitative 
inquiry is not to generalise findings to individuals, sites or places outside of 
those under study (Creswell, 2014). 
However, Robson (2011) stresses that the lack of statistical generalisations in 
qualitative research does not preclude generalisability beyond the specific 
setting studied. This research is concerned with the application of STAMP in 
healthcare incident analysis and has investigated the effectiveness of this 
potential application with case studies applying STAMP to specific incidents in 
certain settings. So, there is a concern with external generalisability and 
analytical generalisations have been made concerning the application of 
STAMP in healthcare settings other than those studied.  
The generalisations in this research are not made to populations but rather 
theoretical propositions (Yin, 2013), in that STAMP can be applied to other 
areas of healthcare, with similar factors influencing the usability, utility and 
effectiveness of STAMP. Analytical generalisation made from the case studies 
are based on replication logic in the demonstrations of STAMP applications 
and the evaluation against criteria in the cross-case analysis. This replication 
provides insight into the use of STAMP in varied healthcare contexts and 
themes were developed across the case studies, it is reasonable to believe 
the themes would hold true across further healthcare contexts, but this is not 
known for certain. As with other research endeavours an element of doubt is 
held. There may be more issue in making generalisations solely from the 
participant evaluation of STAMP. The participants of this research were 
volunteers and most held an interest in patient safety and/or HFE that may not 
be true of a wider sample. Those without an interest in patient safety may have 
different perspectives of STAMP than those included within this research and 
this should be considered when interpreting the findings. 
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7.5.4 Incident analysis approach 
Another consideration regarding limitations is the incident analysis procedure. 
The incident analysis was done from previous reports on the incidents and not 
part of a full investigation, this is a limitation previously noted by Woodcock 
when reviewing accident analysis literature (Woodcock, 1995; Woodcock et al., 
2005). Not conducting a full investigation means the research does not see 
how STAMP would have driven and influenced data collection, there may be 
missing data that could be included, or STAMP may not have helped identify 
certain data. 
There was also a lack of testing of the reliability of STAMP, with the analysis 
undertaken by the author and agreement reached with another researcher, 
rather than having different analysts conduct an analysis and testing for 
reliability through seeing if there was agreement between analysis findings 
from the different analysts. 
7.6 Summary 
To summarise this discussion, the key findings of the research are presented 
in Table 19. 
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Table 19 Summary of key findings and recommendations for applications of STAMP in 
healthcare 
Key findings Recommendations for STAMP 
STAMP difficult to use for those 
newly introduced to the approach. 
 
There is a requirement for training 
and/or external facilitation for 
effective application. 
STAMP has utility in application to 
varied incidents and facilitates the 
generation of system measure 
recommendations. 
 
Healthcare stakeholders positive 
about the utility and future 
application of STAMP. 
STAMP has potential to be used in 
the investigation and analysis of 
patient safety incidents. 
 
STAMP may be most effective when 
used by safety specialists such as 
patient safety managers and HFE 
specialists. 
STAMP incident analysis may 
overlook the positive safety-related 
actions of healthcare workers and 
the nuances of work. 
STAMP incident analysis should be 
combined with a deep 
understanding of working practice 
and worker adaptations through 
observations and interviews. 
STAMP’s consideration of human 
controller decision-making is too 
simplistic when applied to certain 
healthcare contexts. 
STAMP analyses need to consider 
the dilemmas faced by clinical staff 
and trade-offs made when making 
complex clinical judgements and 
decisions. 
Control structure diagrams may be 
seen to make everything look okay 
and overlook cultural, relationship 
and environmental factors. 
Control structure diagrams should 
make explicit reference to system 
weaknesses/vulnerabilities and 
cultural, relationship and 
environmental factors. 
There can be difficulties defining 
control actions in healthcare and the 
term ‘control’ can be perceived as 
inappropriate by healthcare 
stakeholders. 
Care should be taken when using 
the term ‘control’, ensure healthcare 
stakeholders understand these are 
the actions taken to prevent 
unwanted loss and guide with 
context specific examples. 
The analytical approach taken to 
incident analysis does not work in 
isolation. 
A need to consider choice of analyst 
and the factors that influence 
incident investigation outcome. 
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Chapter 8  - Conclusions 
8.1 Summary of main findings 
This research set out to examine the application of STAMP in healthcare and 
develops a better understanding of how STAMP could be used in healthcare 
incident analysis. The research collected healthcare stakeholder views on the 
usability and utility of STAMP and demonstrated the application of STAMP in 
three case studies in different healthcare contexts. 
Healthcare stakeholders felt they would need external expert help and/or 
lengthy training and practice to apply STAMP effectively. Several stakeholders 
found STAMP to be a complicated method and an issue was found with the 
language and terminology used in STAMP for those without system safety and 
HFE experience. It is expected that future applications of STAMP would be 
conducted by analysts with the requisite expertise, rather than frontline 
healthcare workers with minimal training in incident investigation. However, 
healthcare stakeholders can contribute to a STAMP analysis and are needed 
for their clinical expertise and work domain knowledge. 
STAMP was effective in providing an analysis of a system, considering 
interactions between system components and generating recommendations 
for prevention of future incidents, particularly regarding system measures. 
Furthermore, healthcare stakeholders were mostly positive about its utility and 
potential future application.   
Although STAMP considers individual human controllers and decision-making, 
there is potential to overlook some of the personal qualities and positive 
actions of individuals valued highly in healthcare. This may be an issue for 
incident analysis generally and it is previously suggested that safety 
management should not rely on incident analysis alone, with a need to 
consider normal practice, near misses and full range of performance variation. 
There is a need to consider what helps healthcare professionals create safety 
and the adaptations they make to function successfully within the system. But 
at the same time healthcare should not rely too much on individual resilience, 
which may conceal system issues while healthcare systems migrate to failure 
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and healthcare needs methods such as STAMP to identify system issues and 
help propose system remedies. 
Based on the findings from the case studies the author can make 
recommendations to increase the effectiveness of STAMP applications in 
healthcare: 
• Ensure consideration of the positive action healthcare workers take to 
create safety, along with the actions they take to enforce safety 
constraints. 
• Make explicit consideration of trade-offs in decision-making when 
analysing human controllers. 
• The safety control structure diagram should represent the weaknesses 
in the structure and make explicit reference to cultural, organisational 
relationship and environmental factors.  
• Care should be taken when using the term ‘control’ with healthcare 
stakeholders, ensure they understand these are the actions taken to 
prevent unwanted loss and guide with context specific examples. 
STAMP can be applied effectively to healthcare incident analysis, but it needs 
to be undertaken by the right analysts, with the necessary data and time 
resources, and with consideration for the biases and organisational influences 
that can affect incident investigation outcomes. 
8.2 Summary of contributions 
This research has made several contributions to knowledge, although the 
research used a method developed by others and previously applied in 
healthcare, the original contributions include: 
• Demonstrated the use of STAMP in new healthcare contexts in the 
application to a large-scale hospital-based organisational incident (Mid-
Staffordshire case) and to the analysis of community-based patient 
suicide incidents. 
• Involved healthcare stakeholders in the argument for using STAMP in 
healthcare by gathering their perspectives on the usability and utility of 
STAMP. This was further enhanced with consideration of the 
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application of STAMP with reference to current practice in healthcare 
incident investigation. 
• Evaluated the application of STAMP to healthcare incident analysis 
within a research design that had greater generalisability than previous 
studies in the area, with a multiple case strategy and evaluation against 
specified criteria. 
• Made suggestions to improve STAMP, in the recommendation that 
consideration of trade-offs in decision-making is added to the human 
controller process model. 
Overall, this research filled a gap in understanding concerning the application 
of STAMP in healthcare incident analysis and how it can be integrated into 
current incident investigation practice. 
8.3 Future work 
There is the opportunity to confirm the findings through further studies applying 
STAMP in different healthcare context and the involvement of a wider group of 
healthcare stakeholders. But rather than just replication, this research can also 
build into further work.   
8.3.1 STAMP-led full investigation 
A limitation of this work was in the use of incident reports as the basis for the 
STAMP analysis. Future work could complete full STAMP-led investigations, 
allowing STAMP to guide the identification of information about the incident. 
STAMP could then be evaluated against the full range of requirements and 
criteria for accident analysis models and methods. 
8.3.2 Compare STAMP with applications of other systemic 
accident analysis methods 
Early in this research STAMP was identified as the method of choice to 
overcome some of the limitations of current healthcare incident analysis 
practice. But other systemic accident analysis techniques may offer similar or 
further benefits. FRAM wasn’t used due to the lack of method guidance and 
example applications at the time of the research, but a skilled analyst could 
apply the method and contrast with a STAMP application to the same incident. 
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Similarly, AcciMap could be contrasted with STAMP in application to 
healthcare incidents with feedback from healthcare stakeholders on usability 
and utility. There is also potential for methods to be combined to see the benefit 
of taking a multi-method approach to incident analysis. 
8.3.3 Formal testing of the validity and reliability of STAMP 
applications 
The reliability of STAMP in terms of agreement between results of an analysis 
between different investigators was not examined, nor was the validity of 
STAMP applications in comparing analysis outputs with a predetermined 
accident reality. With the availability of STAMP trained analysts, different 
investigators could apply the method to the same incident(s) and the outputs 
and findings compared. With more investigators, further factors can be 
considered in terms of analyst background, experience and knowledge, and 
how this effects analysis outcome when the same analytical approach is used. 
Testing of validity could be performed by putting together a panel of experts to 
discuss and agree upon the reality of an accident situation, STAMP analysts 
could then perform an investigation, with their outputs compared with the 
panel’s accident reality. 
8.3.4  Train healthcare stakeholders in STAMP 
If healthcare stakeholders can be made available for thorough training in 
STAMP, they could be trained and allowed to conduct investigations and 
analysis themselves. Outputs from their analysis could then be evaluated and 
they could give more comprehensive evaluation of the usability and utility of 
STAMP. Research of this type could be used in the development of healthcare 
specific training in STAMP. 
8.3.5 Incorporate trade-offs in controller decision-making in 
further applications of STAMP 
The consideration of trade-offs could be included in future applications of 
STAMP in healthcare and other industries. This consideration of trade-odds 
was only developed in the final case study of this research. Further research 
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could investigate whether certain trade-offs are present in other industries and 
other areas of healthcare. 
8.3.6 Test the use of the control structures developed in the case 
studies as part of an STPA hazard analysis 
This research project has focussed on accident analysis, but STAMP has a 
hazard analysis method in STPA. It would be interesting to perform hazard 
analyses using the control structures developed in this research to identify 
leading indicators to future incidents (Leveson, 2015). This would demonstrate 
a proactive, rather than reactive, application of STAMP in healthcare. 
8.3.7 Further case studies 
Further case studies examining the application of STAMP in healthcare could 
vary certain conditions, such as using in the context of systems with more 
technical aspects such as medical devices and software. Or taking 
consideration of other aspects of the wider system that are outside the scope 
of healthcare such as the media and legal components. The media and legal 
components were not comprehensively analysed in the case studies of this 
research, but their influence was mentioned by participants, such as in how 
patient suicide was reported in the local newspapers and the influence of 
coroner investigations. These areas could be included in the wider safety 
control structure or in the consideration of the benefit of using other methods.    
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Psychology literature pertinent to analyst bias 
There is a large body of work on psychological bias and this section does not 
attempt to cover the whole area. The aim is to provide a summary of 
background experimental research that gave rise to the thinking and terms 
used in discussing bias in accident analysis. To give an overview, the literature 
describes the role of perception when determining causality and the 
attributional errors that can occur when people make judgements on past 
events. Errors in attribution have been linked to both cognitive and motivational 
forces and are an important consideration in efforts to maximise learning from 
accidents. 
An early consideration of perception and causal attribution comes from Heider 
(1944). Heider (1958) is credited with the development of attribution theory 
which deals with how a perceiver uses information to arrive at causal 
explanations for events, including the information gathered and how it is 
combined to form a causal judgment (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). The theoretical 
beginning of attribution theory has motivated numerous experimental works on 
perception and bias in causal analysis and attributions of responsibility. Heider 
(1944) uses themes from previous experimental work to describe how a 
perceiver of an event will attribute cause by connecting a change (effect) with 
an origin (cause). The perceiver then integrates the identified cause and effect 
into one unit (causal unit), where the change gains meaning from the origin it 
is connected to (Heider, 1944). There is a tendency for a person to be identified 
as a causal origin, the interpretation of an effect then becomes dependent on 
the value judgements the perceiver places on that person: If the perceiver 
disparages the person, they will attribute failures to that person’s 
characteristics and successes to luck or unfair practice (Heider, 1944). 
Similarity and proximity also said to play a part in causal unit formation, if two 
events are similar to each other, or near each other, one is likely to be 
perceived as being the cause of the other (Heider, 1944). Studies on attribution 
theory have tended to focus on the perceived causes of other people’s 
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behaviour and has been the subject of a previous review (Kelley and Michela, 
1980). 
Attribution of responsibility and the defensive-attribution 
hypothesis 
Hollnagel (2004), using a quote from Nietzsche (1844-1900) (Nietzsche, 1990) 
describes desire for control and relief of anxiety as motivational forces behind 
the search for explanations for accidents. There is some empirical work 
examining these motivations, in the testing of the defensive-attribution 
hypothesis; a theoretical position on the role of self-protective motives in the 
attribution of responsibility for an accident. Heider (1944) has noted a tendency 
for people to be identified as causal origins of events. Building on this, Walster 
hypothesised that the greater the consequences of an accident are, the greater 
the tendency to attempt to assign responsibility to someone (Walster, 1966). 
This tendency to attribute responsibility occurs despite people having no real 
control over many of the events that happen to them (techniques to prevent 
accidents may be unknown or practically unrealistic to implement) (Walster, 
1966). Walster suggests that this is due to people finding the attribution of 
responsibility to be reassuring. Perceivers of an accident can relieve 
themselves with the thought that it couldn’t happen to them by chance. By 
attributing responsibility or blame to the victim, or another person, fear is 
alleviated from the perceiver because it was a predictable, controllable event, 
with someone responsible (Walster, 1966). The perceiver can then protect 
themselves by believing that the behaviour of the person responsible is 
controllable in some way, perhaps by punishing or isolating those responsible 
(Walster, 1966). In this sense the attribution of causality by the perceiver of an 
accident is motivated by self-defence and the feeling of protection.  
It is suggested that the motivation to assign responsibility increases with 
increases in the magnitude of event consequence. As the greater the 
consequence, the more unpleasant it is to a person to consider that event as 
able to happen to themselves (Walster, 1966). It is this hypothesis, of the 
perceiver of an accident increasing attribution of responsibility to a potential 
perpetrator with increasing magnitude of consequence, that is tested in the 
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literature. These ideas later became known as the defensive-attribution 
hypothesis (Burger, 1981). Walster tested this hypothesis in experimental 
studies, these are summarised in Table 20. Walster’s experiments have a 
similar basic protocol; an accident or major decision is described to a group of 
participants, but the participants are randomly assigned into conditions for 
magnitude of accident consequence. The conditions for consequence will 
include low to high severity but may also have variation in the person the 
accident causes damage to (e.g. have only the potential perpetrator suffering 
damage and/or a separate person that could not reasonably be considered the 
perpetrator). The participants are then asked to rate the responsibility of the 
potential perpetrator. The experiments gave mixed results. 
Walster’s first study (Walster, 1966) supported the hypothesis that the 
tendency to assign responsibility to a person (who could reasonably be 
deemed responsible) was increased with increasing severity of consequence. 
But further studies (Walster, 1967) failed to replicate these results, with one 
experiment (Experiment I in Walster, 1967) even producing the opposite result, 
with increasing magnitude of consequence lowering the assignment of 
responsibility. Walster did find evidence that the greater the consequences of 
a major decision, the greater the tendency for a perceiver to exaggerate the 
foreseeability of the outcome of an event (Walster, 1967). This finding was 
again explained with the motivating factor of self-protection. The greater the 
consequence, the more secure an individual will feel by believing it was orderly 
and predictable. Furthermore, it’s suggested that when an outcome was more 
serious, people are likely to spend more time analysing the cause-effect 
relationships, this increased time spent on thinking about the event makes it 
seem more predictable (Walster, 1967).  
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Table 20 Walster's experiments testing the defensive-attribution hypothesis 
Study Experimental 
design 
Participants Event 
stimulus 
Effect of increased 
consequence magnitude 
Walster, 
1966 
Independent 
measures 
88 students Car accident Increased responsibility 
attribution 
Walster, 
1967 
Independent 
measures 
153 students Decision to 
buy a house: 
Future value 
dependent 
on event 
Decreased responsibility 
attribution 
 
Increased rating of ability 
to anticipate outcome 
Walster, 
1967 
Independent 
measures 
213 students Decision to 
buy a house:  
Future value 
dependent 
on event 
No relationship with 
responsibility attribution 
 
Increased rating of ability 
to anticipate outcome 
 
Shaver (1970) speculated that the variations in Walster’s findings could be 
explained by a relevance factor. In other words, whether perceivers believe an 
accident could realistically happen to themselves and thus deem it a threat. 
Moreover, Shaver speculated that the relevance (similarity) of the potential 
perpetrator to the perceiver could also influence attribution of responsibility. 
Shaver undertook a series of experiments (Shaver, 1970a, 1970b) based on 
Walster’s earlier work but taking into account the similarity of a potential 
perpetrator to the participants, these experiments are summarised in Table 21. 
Shaver’s experiments (Shaver, 1970a, 1970b) failed to replicate Walster’s 
earlier finding of increased assignment of responsibility with increased 
magnitude of consequence. His findings did show an effect of similarity; when 
the perceiver was personally similar to the perpetrator, they were found to be 
more lenient regarding attributions of responsibility and judgements towards 
the perpetrator. Shaver felt these results to be a fit with the defence-attribution 
hypothesis. The perceiver could assign responsibility when personal similarity 
was low due to feeling safe in the knowledge that they are not like this person 
and so protected from the accident. However, he considers an alternate 
explanation for the findings, with the instruction for considering personal 
similarity could be interpreted as meaning to have increased empathy towards 
them. The participants could also attribute considerations of themselves, such 
as being a careful person, to the potential perpetrator. 
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Motivated by the mixed results regarding evidence for the defensive-attribution 
hypothesis, Burger (1981) examined the effect size through a meta-analysis. 
The combined results of 22 studies showed a statistically significant but weak 
tendency for more responsibility to be attributed to an accident perpetrator in 
severe rather than mild consequences. When the variables of participant and 
perpetrator personal and situational similarity were accounted for, much 
stronger support is found for the defensive-attribution hypothesis (Burger, 
1981).   
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Table 21 Shaver's experiments testing the influence of relevance on the defensive-attribution 
hypothesis 
Study Experimental 
design 
Participants Event 
stimulus 
Effect of 
increased 
consequence 
magnitude 
Effect of 
relevance 
Shaver, 
1970a 
Independent 
measures 
68 students Car accident 
 
Varied 
consequence 
magnitude 
 
Varied 
perpetrator 
age 
 
No relationship 
with 
responsibility 
attribution 
Responsibility 
attribution 
increased with 
age of 
perpetrator 
 
Same age 
perpetrator 
judged to be 
more careful 
Shaver, 
1970a 
Independent 
measures 
30 students Car accident: 
severe 
consequence 
only 
 
Varied 
perpetrator 
characteristic 
Not tested Personal 
similarity 
lessened 
attribution of 
responsibility 
and increased 
judgmental 
lenience 
Shaver, 
1970a 
2 by 2 
factorial 
40 students 
(19 male, 21 
female) 
 
 
Accident at 
work 
 
Varied 
consequence 
magnitude 
 
Male 
perpetrator 
Trend towards 
lower 
responsibility 
attribution 
 
Increased 
rating of ability 
to anticipate 
consequences 
Tendency to 
judge the 
relevant 
perpetrator as 
more similar in 
mild 
consequence 
condition, 
reverse true in 
severe 
conditions 
Shaver, 
1970b 
Independent 
measures 
54 students Car accident 
 
Varied 
consequence 
magnitude 
and insurance 
compensation 
No relationship 
with 
responsibility 
attribution 
 
Regardless of 
severity, less 
responsibility 
attributed when 
perpetrator had 
insurance 
Perpetrator 
judged to be 
more similar in 
characteristics 
to participant 
when they had 
insurance 
Shaver, 
1970b 
Independent 
measures 
46 university 
psychology 
students 
Car accident: 
severe 
consequence 
 
Compensated 
by: 
Perpetrator, 
Other, None 
Assigned 
responsibility 
lower when 
perpetrator 
insurance pays 
compensation 
Not tested 
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Hindsight bias 
The experiments of Walster (1967) and Shaver (1970b) found evidence for a 
link between accident outcome severity and perceiver ratings of foreseeability; 
with study participants giving higher ratings for the foreseeability of an event 
outcome with increased severity of consequence. Fischhoff continued these 
early empirical tests of the effect of hindsight on perceptions of predictability of 
event outcomes (Fischhoff 1975). This effect became known as the hindsight 
bias; the tendency for people with outcome knowledge to falsely believe they 
would have predicted the reported outcome of an event and to deny the 
outcome information has influenced their judgement (Hawkins and Hastie, 
1990). This effect is a potential issue for accident investigation and analysis, 
with the outcome knowledge investigators have. Analysts may overestimate 
the foreseeability of the accident outcome to the people involved at the time of 
the event (without outcome knowledge) and there is potential to be overly 
judgemental of their actions (Woods and Cook, 1999). 
Fischhoff’s initial experiments on hindsight bias are summarised in Table 22, 
the experiments present participants with descriptions of historical events and 
a series of possible outcomes. Participants are randomised into groups, with 
some given knowledge of the outcome of the event and others not (conditions 
with different outcomes labelled as true and another condition without an 
outcome labelled as true). Participants are then asked to rate the likelihood of 
each event outcome, or in some experiments asked to guess the judgments of 
outcome ignorant participants regarding outcome likelihood. Participants 
consistently rated the likelihood of possible outcomes as higher when they had 
knowledge of the outcome, even when asked to ignore this knowledge. 
Fischhoff also found that participants’ ratings of the importance of each 
evidence item, given in the descriptions of events, were influenced by outcome 
knowledge. Furthermore, when guessing how outcome ignorant people would 
rate the likelihood, participants with outcome knowledge attributed higher 
probabilities in their estimates.  
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Table 22 Fischhoff’s early studies on hindsight bias 
Study Experimental 
design 
Participants Event 
stimulus 
Outcome 
measure 
Effect of 
hindsight 
Fischhoff, 
1975 
Independent 
measures 
367 
students 
 
 
Historical 
and 
clinical 
events 
Rating of 
likelihood of 
possible 
outcomes 
Reporting an 
outcome 
consistently 
increased its 
perceived 
likelihood 
Fischhoff, 
1975 
Independent 
measures 
80 students 
 
 
Historical 
and 
clinical 
events 
 
Rating of 
likelihood of 
possible 
outcomes 
(participants 
asked to 
ignore 
outcome 
knowledge) 
Reporting an 
outcome 
consistently 
increased its 
perceived 
likelihood 
 
 
Fischhoff, 
1975 
Independent 
measures 
94 students Historical 
and 
clinical 
events  
Guess the 
judgements of 
other outcome 
ignorant 
students on 
likelihood of 
outcomes 
Participants 
with outcome 
knowledge 
attributed 
higher 
probabilities to 
outcome 
likelihood 
given by 
outcome 
ignorant others 
 
Since Walster and Fischhoff’s experiments, there have been numerous works 
investigating hindsight bias. This empirical research on hindsight bias has 
been the subject of a previous review (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990). Hawkins 
and Hastie’s review (1990) splits studies on hindsight bias into two groups: 
studies using event outcome judgement tasks (as in Fischhoff 1975) and 
studies using almanac question judgement tasks.  
The almanac question judgement tasks look for a knew-it-all-along effect using 
general knowledge questions. The basic protocol sees one group of 
participants answer a set of questions, they are then told the correct answer 
and attempt to remember their own responses. Another group of participants 
answer the questions and then attempt to remember their responses without 
being given the correct answers. A further group of participants sees the 
questions with the answers and are then asked to respond as they would have 
had they not been told the answers (Fischhoff, 1977). People tend to 
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overestimate both how much they knew and would have known (Fischhoff, 
1977). 
Hawkins and Hastie (1990) accept there is a hindsight effect and through 
reviewing previous research, produce a taxonomy of five explanatory 
mechanisms for hindsight bias: 
i. Creeping determinism (a term introduced by Fischhoff 1975), a process 
in which outcome information is integrated into a person’s knowledge 
about the events preceding the outcome (creeps into their mental 
representation of events) 
ii. Outcome knowledge affects the selection of evidence to make a 
judgment 
iii. Outcome knowledge affects the evaluation of evidence 
iv. Outcome knowledge affects the manner in which evidence is integrated 
v. Outcome knowledge affects the response generation process 
They conclude that creeping determinism is the most common mechanism 
underlying observed hindsight effects. But that the other mechanisms are 
plausible and it is likely that, in certain situations, a combination of the 
mechanisms produce the hindsight effect (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990). 
Since the review, two meta-analyses have been conducted (Christensen-
Szalanski and Willham, 1991; Guilbault et al., 2004) that provide support for 
an effect of hindsight bias. A 1991 meta-analysis including 122 studies on 
hindsight bias found only a small effect size of hindsight bias in probability 
assessment, the authors found the effect to be moderated by participants’ 
familiarity with the task (Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991). A more 
recent meta-analysis including 95 studies also found that hindsight bias does 
exist, with the effect size considered to be in the small to medium range 
(Guilbault et al., 2004). There were larger hindsight effect sizes in studies using 
general knowledge questions than in studies using real-world events (Guilbault 
et al., 2004).  
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Outcome bias 
As with hindsight bias, outcome bias concerns the effect of outcome 
knowledge on judgements of past events. Outcome bias is markedly different 
however, in that it is the phenomenon of knowledge of a negative outcome 
affecting a perceiver’s judgement of a decision maker’s actions at the time of 
an event.  
Baron and Hershey (1988) conducted one of the initial studies on outcome 
bias. The basic protocol of outcome bias studies can be described as: 
Participants are given descriptions of decisions made by others under 
conditions of uncertainty. The descriptions are given with an outcome of a 
decision, some positive outcomes, some negative. Participants are asked to 
evaluate the decision, including the quality of thinking and competence of the 
decision maker. Studies on outcome bias are summarised in Table 23, the 
experiments consistently show an outcome bias, with participants favourably 
evaluating past decisions when told of a good outcome, in comparison to 
evaluations with a worse outcome. 
For accident investigation the implication is that the decisions and actions 
leading up to a negative outcome will be judged more harshly than those with 
a successful outcome. However, sometimes good processes can lead to 
unsuccessful outcomes, it is then premature to make changes to an 
organisation based purely on an unsuccessful outcome (Henriksen and Kaplan, 
2003). 
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Table 23 Experiments on outcome bias 
Study Experimental 
design 
Participants Event 
stimulus 
Main findings 
Baron 
and 
Hershey, 
1988 
Repeated 
measures 
(counterbalanced) 
20 students Medical 
decisions 
Outcome bias 
found: Good 
outcome meant 
higher rating of 
decisions 
Baron 
and 
Hershey, 
1988 
Repeated 
measures 
(counterbalanced) 
41 students Medical 
decisions 
Outcome bias 
found:  
Good outcome 
meant higher rating 
of decisions 
Baron 
and 
Hershey, 
1988 
Repeated 
measures 
(counterbalanced) 
17 Monetary 
gambles 
Outcome bias for 
amount of money 
won: 
Better outcome 
meant higher rating 
of decision 
 
Decisions given 
higher ratings if 
decision not taken 
had lesser outcome 
Baron 
and 
Hershey, 
1988 
Repeated 
measures 
(counterbalanced) 
29 Medical 
decisions 
Outcome bias 
found: Good 
outcome meant 
higher ratings of 
decisions and future 
competence of 
decision maker 
Baron 
and 
Hershey, 
1988 
Independent 
measures 
111 psychology 
students 
Monetary 
gambles 
Outcome bias 
found: 
Good outcome 
meant higher rating 
of decisions 
 
Participants did not 
appear to think they 
were using outcome 
as basis for decision 
Lipshitz, 
1989 
2 by 2 factorial 178 male military 
officer students 
Military 
decisions 
Outcome bias 
found: Successful 
outcome meant 
decisions more 
justified, follow 
superior process 
and decision maker 
seen more 
favourably 
Caplan et 
al., 1991 
Independent 
measures 
112 
anaesthesiologists 
Medical 
decisions 
Outcome bias 
found: 
A worse outcome 
decreased ratings of 
appropriate care 
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Confirmation bias 
Within safety literature, Johnson (2003) describes confirmation bias as an 
attempt by investigators to ensure that any causal analysis fits their initial ideas 
about an accident (Johnson, 2003). This description seems to refer to a 
conscious and deliberate act of case building, but confirmation bias could also 
occur without the awareness of the investigator (Nickerson, 1998). In general, 
the term confirmation bias is used to refer to a less explicit and less conscious, 
one-sided case-building process (Nickerson, 1998). Confirmation bias 
includes selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence, and restriction of 
attention to a favoured hypothesis (Nickerson, 1998).  
A review of experimental studies on confirmation bias finds support for the 
phenomenon, stating that evidence is extensive and strong (Nickerson, 1998). 
Nickerson’s review has grouped studies and experimental works on the 
different phenomena concerning cognitive bias, although with the review being 
narrative in nature, it does not provide much detail on the experiments 
themselves. An effort is made here to describe the phenomena of concern to 
accident analysis and provide a summary of the experimental works 
evidencing them.        
One concern to accident investigation is the potential for an analyst to make 
efforts to confirm an initial hypothesis regarding an accident explanation and 
not to consider any alternative hypothesis. Laboratory-based studies have 
investigated the focus on confirmatory strategies, these are summarised in 
Table 24. The general protocol for studies in this area asks participants to form 
an initial hypothesis regarding a basic research question, then gives options to 
the participant to seek evidence to confirm or disconfirm their hypothesis or 
test alternative hypotheses. The studies have shown participants tend to use 
a confirmatory strategy, rarely testing alternative hypotheses (Mynatt, Doherty 
and Tweney, 1977, 1978; Doherty et al., 1979) and often keep or return to their 
initial hypothesis even when it has been disproven (Mynatt, Doherty and 
Tweney, 1978). 
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Table 24 Studies investigating tendency to focus on initial hypothesis and seek confirmatory 
evidence 
Study Experimental 
design 
Participants Event stimulus Main findings 
Mynatt et 
al., 1977 
Independent 
measures 
45 students Formulated 
hypotheses about 
motion of particles in 
a simulation 
 
3 groups instructed 
to either confirm, 
disconfirm or test 
Participants tended 
to choose 
confirmatory testing 
of their initial 
hypothesis 
 
Rarely tested 
alternative 
hypotheses 
Mynatt et 
al., 1978 
Independent 
measures 
16 students Discover laws of 
particle motion in an 
artificial universe 
(simulated 
environment) 
 
One group of 
participants 
instructed in strong 
inference (SI) 
Participants tended 
to use confirmatory 
strategies  
 
Permanently 
abandoned falsified 
hypotheses only 
30% of the time  
Doherty 
et al., 
1979 
Independent 
measures 
121 Archaeology 
research: 
Participants formed 
hypothesis on origin 
of a pot 
Participants tended 
to seek evidence to 
confirm their initial 
hypothesis 
 
People may also give preferential treatment to evidence supporting existing 
beliefs. Relevant to this is Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957, 1964), which describes the state of discomfort people feel 
when a mental conflict occurs from a situation involving conflicting attitudes, 
beliefs or behaviours. This is a potential motivator for people that have 
committed to an attitude, belief or decision, to then gather supportive 
information and neglect unsupportive information to avoid this unpleasant state 
of conflict (Hart et al., 2009).  
Hart et al. (2009) performed a meta-analysis to assess whether exposure to 
information is guided by motivations to defend their pre-existing beliefs or by 
an accuracy motivation, whereby information is processed in an objective, 
open-minded way. They included 91 studies that measured information 
selection based on pre-existing beliefs, attitudes or behaviour. The included 
study protocols are like those in Table 24, usually laboratory-based, 
participants make a decision or report an attitude, they are then given the 
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opportunity to receive information. Participants choose whether to receive 
information that agrees with their prior belief or disagrees with their prior belief. 
The meta-analysis provides evidence of confirmation bias, finding biases in 
the selection of information, with people nearly two times as likely to select 
information that is congenial rather than uncongenial to their pre-exiting beliefs 
(Hart et al., 2009). Their findings showed confirmation bias to be positively 
correlated with factors of information quality, commitment and close-
mindedness. Whereas the bias was negatively correlated with participants’ 
confidence in their pre-existing belief (Hart et al., 2009).  
Summary 
In summary, there is evidence of several biases that could affect the objectivity 
of an accident investigation. Accident investigators need to be wary of the 
following potential effects:  
- Severe accident consequences increasing attribution of responsibility 
to those involved 
- Personal similarity affecting the judgement of those involved  
- A tendency to overestimate foreseeability of an outcome to those 
involved 
- The issues with judging decisions and actions on outcome alone 
- A tendency to seek information to confirm prior beliefs without 
considering alternative hypotheses   
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Appendix 2: Loughborough University sponsor approval 
letter 
  
226 
 
Appendix 3: Health Research Authority approval letter 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire for participant STAMP evaluation 
Method Evaluation Questionnaire 
If you don’t mind could we have a contact details and email address in case of 
any follow-up? 
What is your job role? 
How many years’ experience do you have working in healthcare? 
How much experience do you have of patient safety investigations? 
Which accident analysis methods have you previously used? 
For the following Likert scale questions please put a cross in the circle of the 
response that best characterises how you feel about the statement. 
Approach utility 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
The approach has given 
me a different perspective 
on the incident/system 
     
The approach is useful in 
learning from the incident   
   
The approach is relevant to 
healthcare 
     
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree 
nor 
 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
The approach can help in 
identifying weaknesses in 
the safety control structure  
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The approach can help to 
make recommendations to 
strengthen the safety 
control structure 
     
 
How did the use of the approach impact your view and understanding of the 
incident? 
Are there aspects of healthcare accidents that this approach does not seem to 
cover? 
How well do you feel the approach covers human decisions and control actions 
in healthcare? 
Approach usability 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
It was easy to understand 
the approach 
     
The approach was easy to 
apply      
The approach was 
presented clearly      
The templates provided 
were useful      
 
Did you have any difficulty in identifying the system and hazards involved in 
the accident? 
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How useful and understandable did you find the control structure element of 
the approach? 
Is there something that could make your use of the approach easier? 
Future application 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
The approach would be 
useful in the analysis of 
future incidents 
     
Healthcare would benefit 
from the use of this 
approach 
     
We would need expert help 
to apply the approach      
 
Do you feel the approach is something you could learn to use? If so, what kind 
of support would you need? 
General 
What did you like about the approach? 
What didn’t you like about the approach?  
Do you have any additional comments? 
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Appendix 5: Case Study 1 initial control structure for Mid-Staffs incidents 
Operation
Health and Safety 
Executive
Health Protection 
Agency
Incident: appalling care between 2005-2008 in parts of the main hospital serving Stafford
Patient
Complaints
Assessment
Observation
Diagnosis
Medication
Intervention
Personal care and hygiene
General cleanliness and hygiene
Care plans
Discharge arrangement
Fluid and nutritional intake
Symptoms
Clinical indicators
Medical history
Background information
Complaints
Medical records
Buzzer
Resources
Workforce review
Standards & Policies
Disciplinary procedures
Clinical audit
Targets
Appraisal and professional development
Care pathways
Risk assessment
Standards
Policies
Procedures
Budget allocation
Targets
Standards
Policies
Budget allocation
Political pressure
Targets
Government
Department of 
Health
Information on 
national trends
NHS England
National Patient 
Safety Agency
National reporting 
and learning 
system
monitor
Healthcare 
CommissionMonitor
Annual health check
Investigation
Peer service review
Trust Board
Clinical Directors Divisional 
Management
Strategic Health 
Authority
Primary Care Trust
Consultant
Staff Nurse
Junior Doctor
Healthcare 
Assistant
General Medical 
Council
Nursing and 
Midwifery Council
Deanery/
universities
Royal College of 
Nursing
Medical records
Patient status
Diagnosis
Risk assessment
Diagnostic questions
Patient transfer
Prescriptions
Handover to other teams
Family, friends, 
carers
Incident reporting
Reports
Resource needs
Safety concerns
Patient complaints
Whistle-blowing
Incident 
reporting
Observations
Reporting breaches of 
standards – system 
and professional
Professional standards
Training
 Professional registration
Hazard: conditions or events that can lead to an accident
= poor care?
Funding
Standards
Policies
Procedures
Audit/inspection
Targets
Self-assessment reports
Serious untoward 
incident reports
Reports
Budget
Policy Budget needs
Health and safety 
at work
Surveillance of 
hospital infection
Ward reconfiguration
Risk assessment for changes 
(not done)
Academy of 
Medical Royal 
Colleges
NICE
Design
Patient
Complaints
Intervention
Care plans
Discharge arrangement
Symptoms
Clinical indicators
Medical history
Background information
Complaints
Resources
Workforce review
Standards
Policies
Waiting time targets
Appraisal and professional development
Record packs and documentation
Standards
Policies
Procedures
Budget allocation
Standards
Policies
Budget allocation
Political pressure
Government
Department of 
Health
Information on 
national trends
NHS England
National Patient 
Safety Agency
National reporting 
and learning 
system
monitorHealthcare 
CommissionMonitor
Annual health check
Investigation
Peer service review
Trust Board
Trust Management Clinical 
Management
Strategic Health 
Authority
Primary Care Trust
Doctor
Nurse
TraineeHealthcare Assistant
General Medical 
Council
Nursing and 
Midwifery Council
Deanery/
universities
Royal College of 
Nursing
Medical records
Patient status
Diagnosis
Risk assessment
Local MPs Community Health Council
Family and friends
Patient and Public 
Involvement 
Forum
Incident reporting
Resource needs
Safety concerns
Patient complaints
Incident 
reporting
Observations
Reporting breaches of 
standards – system 
and professional
Professional standards
Training
Registration
Funding
Standards
Policies
Procedures
Audit
Targets
Self-assessment reports
Reports
Budget
Policy Budget needs
Royal College of 
Surgeons
NICE
Reports
- including performance on national 
targets (e.g. waiting times)
Supervision
Supervision
Complaints
Requests
Information 
on patient
Porter/cleaner
Senior Nurse
Information on 
diagnosis and 
care plan 
Hygiene 
precautions
Complaints
Medic from 
another trust
Request second 
opinion Request second 
opinion
Specialist
Local MPs Community Health Council
Patient and Public 
Involvement 
Forum
Patient advice and 
liaison service
Opinion
Patient GP
Instruction
Referral
Targets
Inspection
Advanced Nurse 
Practitioner
Whistle-blowing
Summary of patient complaints
Mid-Staffs Analysis
 
Figure 30 Initial model of Mid-Staffordshire control structure 
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Appendix 6 Case Study 1 presentation slide handouts 
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Appendix 7: Case Study 1 slides from workshop presentation 
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Workshop newspaper summary handout 
 
255 
 
 
256 
 
 
257 
 
 
258 
 
 
  
259 
 
Appendix 8: STAMP analysis of Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust 
failings 
STAMP analysis: Hospital physical processes 
Safety requirements and constraints violated:
• Provide facilities and equipment to treat patients
• Enable monitoring of patient condition
Failures and inadequate controls:
• Inadequate defibrillators for each resuscitation trolley in A&E
• Inadequate layout of assessment unit, limiting patient observation
• Inadequate number of beds in specialist and critical care units
• Lack of facility for non-invasive ventilation on respiratory ward
• Inadequate function of cardiac monitors (missing or not working)
• Inadequate equipment for traction or specialist hoists
Physical hospital safety controls
 
 
Figure 31 Analysis of Mid-Staffs hospital physical level 
STAMP analysis: Hospital clinician and support staff system level 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure high standards of hygiene and 
cleanliness are maintained
• Undertake duties to support care
Context:
• Porters having to act as security rather 
than specialist security staff
• Not enough porters with number 
decreased as part of staff cuts
• View from A&E reception desk limited. 
Patients could not be seen from reception
• Staff morale low, long serving staff seeing 
out their time 
• Insufficient nursing and senior clinical 
staff in A&E 
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate control actions: Cleaners not 
maintaining high standards of cleanliness
• Inadequate control actions: Hand gels not 
refilled in some areas
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Cases 
of patients absconding
• Inadequate assignment of control authority: 
Receptionists in A&E relied upon to assess 
patients and raise concerns to nursing staff, 
despite lacking clinical training
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Coordination and communication issues 
among staff
• A&E waiting area view obscured
 
Figure 32 Analysis of auxiliary staff level 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure high standards of care are maintained
• Report incidents and concerns
Context:
• Working in busy, chaotic and understaffed wards
• Receiving inadequate training and development
• A lack of senior staff in some areas
• Equipment lacking in some areas of the hospital
• Working with patients with a high dependency 
level
• Staff were reluctant to speak out against the 
poor standards of care in fear of wrath of some 
senior nurses
• Staff expected to falsify records in order to avoid 
breaching waiting time target
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate execution of control actions, with cases 
of inadequate care provision: 
• Inadequate patient hygiene practices
• Inadequate prevention of patient falls, issues with 
observation, recording and risk assessment
• Inadequate patient handling practices
• Inadequate pressure area care
• Failure to monitor and maintain drip bags
• Failure to ensure nutritional requirements met
• Minimal patient observation and examination
• Communication and coordination issues: Inadequate 
record keeping and lack of clear registration of 
patient transfer between wards. Lack of appropriate 
nutrition and hydration charts
• Communication issues: Reports of issues with 
attitudes of staff towards patients and families 
impacting on patients raising concerns
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Reporting of incidents did not seem to result in 
action, which deterred future reporting
• Layout of hospital made it difficult to observe 
patients in some areas
• Trust staff isolated from other trusts and 
developments in care for continuous learning
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure high standards of care, hygiene and 
cleanliness are maintained
• Organise and supervise wards and junior staff
• Ensure reporting and investigation of incidents
Context:
• Trust lacked senior nurses e.g. only 3 matrons 
across whole trust up to 2008 when number was 
increased to 12
• A&E chronically understaffed in terms of 
consultants and nurses
• Reported low staff morale following strain of 
trust financial difficulties, cuts and difficulties in 
delivering acceptable standards of care
• High sickness rates among staff
• Some community support services not 
satisfactory for discharge
• Pressure to discharge patients to accommodate 
patient intake from A&E
• Large variation in standards of care between 
wards
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Cases of 
poor standards of care
• Inadequate feedback: Pressurised junior staff to alter 
records on discharge times to meet targets
• Inadequate communication channels/learning 
processes: Forceful management styles, particularly 
in A&E, stopped junior staff from raising concerns
• Inadequate execution of control action with 
ineffective management of discharge processes: 
Premature discharge, protracted discharge 
processes, failure to communicate arrangements to 
patients, failure to ensure adequate support
• Inadequate safety management processes: Cases of 
alleged staff misconduct not being addressed with 
governance proceedings
• Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes: Staff appraisal and professional 
development afforded low priority
• Inadequate feedback: Incident report forms 
sometimes found to be inaccurate and misleading
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Focussed on meeting targets, which was seen as 
a priority across trust
• Disengagement between management and 
clinicians
• Reporting of incidents did not seem to result in 
action
• Trust staff isolated from other trusts and 
developments in care for continuous learning 
and understanding of status of trust
Supervision CommunicationIncident reporting
 
Figure 33 Analysis of nursing care 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Check prescription sheets and deal with non-
compliance to guidelines
Context:
• Hospital did not have a pharmacist 
dedicated to each ward
• Pharmacists did not have enough time to 
be involved in wardsUnsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate feedback: Did not always provide 
feedback on prescribing to doctors
 
Figure 34 Analysis of hospital pharmacists 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure best standards of care are achieved
• Report concerns about patient safety
Context:
• Under pressure from senior nurses to 
discharge patients to meet targets in A&E
• A lack of supervision and insufficient 
support and advice given to junior doctors 
in A&E
• A lack of consultants in some areas meant 
junior doctors having to cover on quiet 
nights
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate execution of control action: 
Examples of issues with diagnosis and 
inappropriate discharge
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure best standards of care are achieved
• Provide efficient high quality service
• Supervise junior doctors
• Report concerns about patient safety
Context:
• There was a lack of emergency medicine 
consultants and middle grade staff in 
A&E, making it difficult to treat critically ill 
patients, supervise junior doctors and 
provide efficient high quality service
• Issues with low numbers of nurses and 
reduction in experience were reported to 
heads and director. But needs for more 
staffing gave in to financial pressures
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: 
Sometimes deviated from guidelines on which 
antibiotics to use (the guidelines are there to 
prevent risk of C difficile)
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Junior 
doctors received insufficient support and 
advice
• Inadequate execution of control action: 
Examples of delayed diagnosis, misdiagnosis 
and inappropriate discharge
• Coordination issues: Some diagnostic 
questions not followed up due to constant 
changes in staff
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Reporting concerns about an individual 
clinician seen as an exceptional event
• Issues with what and where to report 
when whole areas of the hospital not 
functioning properly
• Lots of policies e.g. on antibiotics, which 
were not easily accessible
Supervision CommunicationIncident reporting
 
Figure 35 Analysis of consultants and junior doctors 
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STAMP analysis: Trust leadership and clinical governance 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure quality and safety of patient care
• Ensure learning and improvement following 
investigation of incidents and complaints
• Manage systems for the management of risk to 
patient safety and wellbeing. Ensure reporting of 
serious incidents to SHA and NPSA
Context:
• Responsibil ity for most of risk management and 
governance system devolved to divisions in 2007
• Trust cost improvement plan in action with 
board setting savings plan and divisions 
responsible for implementation
• Cost improvement plans were identified as a risk 
to patient safety and wellbeing
• High staff turnover and sickness, difficulty 
recruiting 
• Changes in staff skill mix resulted in a lack of 
senior nurses and increase in support staff
• Disconnect between clinical staff and 
management with clinicians feeling their 
concerns were ignored
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Failed to 
maintain high standards of care
• Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes: Complaints and incident investigations 
undertaken by frontline staff. Staff lacked training 
and time for investigation resulting in varied quality
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Surgical 
division described as dysfunctional in RCS review
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Problems in 
medical and surgical divisions often listed on risk 
register but not resolved
• Inadequate allocation of resources: A&E had issues 
with low staffing levels, lack of leadership, lack of 
equipment and lack of high quality training
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Clinicians felt concerns were not listened to by 
trust leadership and the trust focused on 
financial strategy
• A closed culture among clinicians with reluctance 
to adopt national guidance such as from NICE 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Improve patient care and outcomes through 
systematic review, evaluation and implementation of 
change
• Ensure high standards of care, hygiene and 
cleanliness are maintained
Context:
• Continual change in clinical leadership at board 
level – clinical governance predominantly 
overseen by director of nursing
• Clinical governance lead did not feel adequately 
trained or experienced for role
• No lead for clinical audit for a year prior to April 
2007
• Clinical audit lead had other research and 
development commitments and a substantial 
workload
• Director of infection control role regularly 
changed between personnel
• Improvements in infection control in 2008 noted 
by DH and HCC
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes: 
• Clinical audit weak and disjointed. Lacked planning 
and not linked to other governance
• A lack of follow-up after audits to ensure changes 
and improvements were made
• Inadequate robustness in review of patient deaths
• Did not participate in the audits of specialist medical 
and surgical societies
• Coordination and communication issues: Disconnect 
between divisions, departments within divisions and 
the central audit team
• Inadequate enforcement of safety constraints: 
Hygiene and cleanliness standards not maintained
• Inadequate interactions with external bodies: Did not 
report 2005-2006 increase of C.difficile to HPA, SHA 
and trust board
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Filtering of information on complaints and 
incidents did not give adequate information for 
board to judge standards
• Reassured that high mortality rates were due to 
poor coding
• Inadequate use of data to drive and generate 
audit
Policy/guidance Audit
 
Figure 36 Analysis of Trust clinical governance 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure quality and safety of patient care
• Ensure learning and improvement following 
investigation of complaints
• Ensure trust has systems for the 
management of risk to patient safety and 
wellbeing
• Ensure reporting of serious incidents to SHA 
and NPSA
Context:
• Applying for foundation trust status with 
focus on financial and corporate governance
• Non-executives lacked NHS experience
• Considerable change in board membership 
since 2005
• Pressure to meet targets, with significant 
savings needed
• High staff turnover and sickness, with 
difficulty recruiting
Unsafe decisions and resulting control actions:
• Did not act on issues at trust prior to external 
investigation
• Inadequate allocation of resources: Low 
numbers of senior nurses and consultants
• Unidentified hazards: Lacked consideration of 
risks of staffing levels
• Focussed on financial and corporate 
governance over standards of care
• Inadequate risk assessment for clinical floor 
reconfiguration and staffing mix
• Target driven and focussed on delivery of 
A&E waiting time target
Mental model flaws:
• Non-executives reliant on information given 
by executives ,aware of some issues but 
unaware of concerns with standards of care 
until HCC investigation in 2008
• Non-executives thought issues were being 
rectified by executives and disconnected 
from operational activity
• Did not have full understanding of 
organisational status due to filtering of 
internal information on complaints and 
incidents
Safety-related responsibilities:
• 2003 to 2006 medical director gave medical 
advice to trust board and connection 
between board and consultants, no other 
specific roles
• Director of nursing responsible for strategic 
response to clinical risk management
• Create culture for effective hygiene and 
infection control
• Clinical governance, effectiveness and audit
Context:
• Continued change in clinical leadership
• The 2 medical directors during period were 
reluctant to take up position 
• Medical director a part-time role with holder 
continuing as clinician 
• Medical director post empty for much of 
2006
• Lack of training for roles, some had relevant 
previous experience
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Failed to comply with recognised standards 
of clinical audit
• Chief nurse introduced an online reporting 
system which had poor usability
• Inadequate risk assessment for proposed 
changes, such as clinical floor layout and 
staffing mix
• Failed to ensure adequate nursing staff on 
wards
Mental model flaws:
• Medical director did not feel they had a 
leadership role, did not often perform 
walkarounds of wards
• Medical director aware of some problems but 
not concerns requiring urgent action
• Chief nurse focussed on strategic concerns
• Director of nursing believed the review 
committee followed up on action plans from 
complaints
Communication
Coordination
Coordination issues between 
director of nursing/chief nurse and 
chief operational officer:
• Responsibil ity for risk 
assessment of nurse staffing
• Operating officer felt 
managerial responsibility for 
nursing staff but not clinical 
standards
And with director of nursing and 
complaints review committee 
(including non-executives):
• Not aware who followed up on 
action plans from complaint 
investigation
Inadequate assignment of responsibilities to 
controllers:
• Medical director at times lacked specific 
responsibility
• Director of nursing and chief operating 
officer had overlaps between roles
Inadequate assignment of controller 
hierarchy:
• Devolved responsibilities to divisional 
management including trust wide issues 
such as staffing
Inadequate allocation of resources:
• Reduction in beds and staff
• Nursing shortages on wards
• Issue with skill mix and lack of senior 
nurses 
Inadequate communication channels provided 
for the organisation
• Filtered information on complaints and 
incidents did not give adequate 
information for board to judge standards
• Ignored clinician concerns, including on 
risks of clinical floor reconfiguration and 
low nurse staffing 
• Generally poor clinical engagement
Inadequate interactions with 
external bodies:
• Meetings on governance held 
privately and closed to public 
scrutiny 
• Disputed negative reports
• Did not share all serious 
untoward incident reports 
with SHA and NPSA
• Did not report 2005-2006 
increases in c.difficile to HPA 
and SHA
• Did not share RCS report on 
dysfunctions in surgical 
division with Monitor during 
review
Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes regarding incidents and complaints:
• Action plans for complaints not followed 
up
• Legal team inquest reports not shared 
with other trust governance to be 
considered as part of risk management
• Staff incident reporting system difficult to 
use 
• No regular auditing of antibiotic practice 
until 2007
• Ineffective clinical audit and lack of 
follow-up to ensure improvements made
Control action not given or not followed:
• Wards did not meet hygiene or 
environmental cleanliness standards
 
Figure 37 Analysis of Trust Board 
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STAMP analysis: Regional healthcare governance 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Commission high quality services and hold 
providers to account for provision of safe and 
high quality services
• Monitor provider performance and improve 
quality of commissioned services
Context:
• Available action against provider non-
compliance with obligations was limited
• One action in response to non-compliance 
was financial penalties. However, the 
hospital trust had financial difficulties and 
PCT did not want to take actions that 
would further destabilise the hospital 
trust
• No real option to commission alternative 
provider with local need for a service
• The PCT was subject to reorganisation 
during this time period. So had to devote 
time to restructuring and lost corporate 
memory and experience
• There was a lack of guidance available to 
the PCT on how to set-up and monitor 
provider performance 
• The PCT lacked relevant clinical expertise 
in comparison to providers who could use 
their knowledge to rebut concerns about 
performance 
• Improvements in 2008/09 with use of 
local quality data, Department of Health 
operating framework, requirements for 
providers to comply with NICE guidance 
and monitoring through  annual patient 
questionnaire
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate feedback from monitoring of 
trust’s quality and safety performance: The 
PCT lacked locally agreed performance 
measures and relied on trust’s self-declaration 
of issues and monitoring by other 
organisations
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints 
through unidentified hazards: Failed to 
identify hazards relating to trust’s 2005 staff 
reduction proposals
• Inadequate allocation of resources: The trust 
was short staffed in terms of nurses and 
consultants
• Ineffective control actions to enforce safety 
constraints and remedy trust performance 
issues: The design of available control actions, 
such as financial penalties, did not enforce 
constraints on trust’s safety and quality 
related performance
• Inadequate execution of control actions (late 
control action): Actions to enforce safety 
constraints were late and applied after PCT 
was made aware of issues by HCC review, and 
concerns raised in meetings with campaigners 
(cure the NHS group) and local GPs
• Inadequate coordination with controllers and 
decision makers: PCT not made fully aware of 
issues following external peer reviews of 
trust’s care for critically ill and injured 
children. If aware PCT could ensure remedial 
action and follow-up
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Lacked an understanding of the issues at 
the trust due to limited data gathering 
and reliance on trust’s self-declaration
• Became more aware of status of trust and 
performance issues after HCC 
investigation and meeting with 
campaigners
• Focus on financial performance over 
quality and safety. Fault in system design 
with lack of clarity on safety responsibility
• Limited patient and public involvement
 
Figure 38 Analysis of Primary Care Trust (PCT) regulator 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure the delivery of safe, quality services through 
effective clinical governance arrangements in PCTs 
and NHS Trusts
• Keep in place arrangements for monitoring and 
improving the quality of care provided
Context:
• SHA a small organisations with 1.5 members of staff 
for each organisation for which it was responsible
• Confusion over extent to which SHAs were expected 
to address safety concerns. SHA not given capacity 
to performance manage providers
• SHA going through a period of extensive 
reorganisation, reduction in size and management 
of financial issues in a difficult financial climate
• The SHA relinquished responsibility for the trust 
when it gained foundation status in February 2008, 
Monitor assumed ongoing responsibility. SHA still 
had a role performance managing PCT 
commissioning the trust
• Priorities for the newly organised SHA handed down 
from Department of Health focussed on finance and 
restructuring of the NHS as a whole. It was assumed 
that provider organisations were capable of 
delivering safety and quality without detailed 
performance management
• Following the reorganisation the intention was for 
the SHAs to delegate function as provider 
performance managers to PCTs
• There was no nationally determined safety metrics 
or quality measures in 2006
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate organisational change process: SHA did 
not have capacity to continue to performance 
manage trust. PCTs not equipped to take over trust 
performance management as expected by SHA
• Inadequate organisational change process: 
Ineffective handover on reorganisation and lack of 
systematic approach to retaining organisational 
memory
• Inadequate identification of hazards: PCT and trust 
pressured to achieve financial and waiting time 
targets without due regard for impact on patient 
care
• Inadequate feedback and monitoring of safety 
performance: SHA feedback from PCT and trust 
focussed on meeting targets rather than safety. SHA 
safety monitoring relied upon trust self-assessment 
or serious concerns being brought to their attention
• Inadequate feedback on safety performance (2006 
to 2007): SHA identified need for safety metrics 
including on medication errors and avoidable 
deaths. After discussion with PCTs and trust, metrics 
instead focussed on access to treatment and indirect 
measures of safety
• Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes: SHA did not ensure incident reports 
received from the trust were scrutinised, or that 
investigations were completed with the 
development of action plans and key lessons 
recorded
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints, SHA did not 
take action or ensure action taken: PCT reports to 
SHA (2008), external review reports and SHA risk 
assessment (2007) raised concerns about safety of 
care in the trust. Issues raised included hospital 
related infection, hygiene standards, high mortality 
rates, low staffing and standards of care. This 
information did not raise due concern regarding 
issues at trust. SHA took action on hospital related 
infection and challenged trusts in area on mortality 
rates, reassured by PCT and trust actions on other 
issues
• Time lag in execution of control action: Issues with 
trust nurse staffing levels raised to SHA by trust 
director of nursing in 2007. Supported director of 
nursing but propositions not presented to the trust 
board until a year later
• Inadequate organisational change process: On trust 
gaining foundation status, SHA did not alert Monitor 
to issues with mortality rates
• Inadequate interactions with external bodies: SHA 
were defensive toward HCC investigation
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• There was no comprehensive handover following 
reorganisation and some organisational memory 
was lost
• The information the SHA received did not give them 
concerns about the quality of care the trust 
provided or make it stand out from other trusts. 
Although external reviews of the trust had raised 
concerns
• Did not receive reports of all serious untoward 
incidents relating to the trust
• Monitoring of provider performance was limited to 
compliance with national targets. This did not 
distinguish trust adversely from other trusts in the 
region
• Believed that provider trust boards would be 
monitoring quality and safety of care
• On reorganisation, information from handover had 
focussed the SHA on issues at organisations other 
than the trust
• Reassured by the monitoring of trust and actions 
undertaken by PCT. The PCT reports to SHA tended 
to balance negative aspects with good potentially 
presenting a more favourable view of trust status 
• SHA aware of reported high mortality rates at trust 
since 2007. Coding used in analysis made 
significance of rates questionable and this was SHA 
focus
• SHA lacked collation of information or dashboard to 
give full picture of issues
 
Figure 39 Analysis of Strategic Health Authority (SHA) as regulator 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Reduce episodes of healthcare associated 
infections by providing advice and support to 
NHS organisations
• Provide national surveillance of hospital 
associated infections
Context:
• Had concerns about trust’s management 
of hospital acquired infections in 2006, 
2008 and 2009
• The trust had an outbreak of C.difficile in 
2008 and a repetition in 2009
• A support organisation rather than a 
regulator, it could only provide 
information and advice
• Gave advice to trust and raised concerns 
following outbreaks, but some advice not 
taken and did not have the power to 
enforce constraints
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Design does not enforce constraints: The 
organisation was designed to provide 
feedback to providers and regulators and did 
not have available control actions to enforce 
constraints
• Inadequate coordination among controllers 
and decision makers: Concerns were shared 
with the trust and PCT but not escalated to 
SHA prior to 2009. Concerns were not shared 
with Monitor or HCC
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Some unclear guidance and lack of 
understanding on when to share 
information with different regulators 
 
Figure 40 Analysis of Health Protection Agency (HPA) 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Report concerns about patient safety
Context:
• When formally asked for their views in 
April 2008, a majority of GPs expressed 
concern about the quality of care received 
by their patients
• Complaints included poor nursing care, 
low levels of nurse staffing and 
inadequate out of hours cover in A&E
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints/
feedback: Did not express concerns about the 
trust until the HCC investigation had begun
• Coordination and communication issues: A 
large proportion of local GPs were not actively 
involved in the consortia that could collect 
local views and deliver concerns to the PCT
• Coordination and communication issues: The 
local consortia and PCT discussions did not 
regularly discuss issues of healthcare quality
• Coordination and communication issues: GPs 
may have been unclear as to the 
communication channels through to the PCT    
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Dealt with  issues concerning individual 
patients directly with trust consultants
• Dealt with concerns relating to individual 
patients on a case-by-case basis 
• Did not connect their role in the 
commissioning process with information 
from their patients
 
Figure 41 Analysis of local GPs' role in reporting safety concerns 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Report patient and public concerns
• Patient and Public Involvement Forum (PPIF) 
had the power to inspect the trust
• Local Involvement Networks (LINks) intended 
to obtain and analyse information from a wide 
range of sources 
Context:
• PPIF and LINk relied on untrained 
volunteers and received little support or 
guidance
• PPIF was a small group of 8 to 10 people 
meeting monthly. 
• Two members of PPIF resigned over 
dissatisfaction with PPIF leadership. Both 
gave stories to local press
• PPIFs were replaced with Local 
Involvement Networks (LINks) in 2008
• LINk struggled to recruit members due to 
a lack of interest
• From the set-up of local LINk in 2008 it 
was preoccupied with its own governance 
issues
• LINk members reluctant to conduct 
inspections without indemnity insurance
• LINk did not address issues at trust before 
the publication of HCC inspection report
• DH had inadequate organisational change 
process for shift from PPIF to LINks
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate feedback: Routes through which 
patients and the public can communicate 
issues about health services and hold them to 
account were largely ineffective    
• Inadequate feedback: PPIF did inspect the 
hospital on several occasions. Despite issues 
being raised by a member regarding 
cleanliness and hygiene practices, final reports 
to the trust emphasised the positives. PPIF felt 
trust was showing improvements
• Inadequate feedback: PPIF comments on HCC 
annual health check did not express the 
strong criticisms from some members and 
balanced comments with positive remarks
• Coordination and communication issues: The 
trust blocked the flow of information to the 
PPIF. PPIF leadership lacked the training and 
experience to challenge the trust effectively
• Inadequate feedback provided in system 
design: PPIF had l imited engagement with 
patients and the public. PPIF not equipped to 
fulfil this role
• Inadequate feedback: LINk did not undertake 
any visits to inspect the hospital
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• PPIF not kept fully informed about trust 
status. Information given to them was 
controlled by trust
• PPIF acted as representatives of the public 
but had little engagement with patients 
and the public
• LINk did not take information and 
evidence from the CURE the NHS group
 
Figure 42 Analysis of patient and public involvement groups 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• The local council authority OSC had the power 
to review and scrutinise the planning and 
operation of local health services
• Make reports and recommendations for 
improvement to local NHS bodies
Context:
• A small committee with l imited resources 
that did not have a role in performance 
management of NHS bodies
• Committee concentrated on ensuring 
health services address the needs of local 
communities
• Received information about the hospital 
predominantly from the Trust itself, but 
also PPIF, PCT, media and the public
• Focus on scrutiny of the Trust increased 
when CURE the NHS and the start of HCC 
investigation increased concern
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Prior 
to concerns being raised by CURE the NHS and 
the HCC investigation, the committee lacked 
critical scrutiny of the hospital. 
• Inadequate feedback: Relied on information 
from the Trust. Lacked critical scrutiny of Trust 
plans in relation to staffing changes and issues 
with cleanliness raised by patients’ forum. 
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Dependant on information from the Trust
 
Figure 43 Analysis of local authority overview committee 
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STAMP analysis: National governance 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Drive improvement in quality of care
• Publish data relating to the provision of healthcare by 
each NHS body
• Conduct visits and inspections of NHS bodies 
• Annually review each NHS organisation under 
jurisdiction. Assess provision of healthcare, if  significant 
failings found, report and make recommendations
• Review NHS complaints that had not been resolved 
locally
• Ensure robust intervention in tackling poor performance
Context:
• HCC started as an organisation in 2004
• Board of directors hired and fired by secretary of 
state
• Monitor developed as a second regulator to regulate 
Foundation Trusts
• HCC and Monitor developed on the back of 
recommendations from the Bristol Inquiry 
(Professor Kennedy). The inquiry had recommended 
for one organisational regulator, not two, to ensure 
clarity of roles and responsibilities
• Department of Health set standards with input from 
HCC during its development
• Aimed to bring together data about NHS and analyse 
systematically to produce a richer picture
• The act of regulating the PCT commissioning 
function was not well understood
• HCC assessment was against national targets and 
core standards and produced a score in two parts: 
quality of service and use of resources
• Function of complaints handling was a heavier 
workload than expected and took up a large 
proportion of HCC time
• Other organisations pressuring HCC to stop 
investigation
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Design of control action does not enforce constraints: 
HCC had no direct enforcement powers. Limited to 
making recommendations to Secretary of State and 
Monitor
• Inadequate feedback provided in system design: The 
standards set out by the DH which were used in HCC 
reviews were not felt to be effective as an assessment of 
quality (too specific in some areas, too broad in others 
e.g. does the organisation have systems in place rather 
than criteria to see if those systems are effective)
• Inadequate feedback: Overreliance on trust self-
declaration, although this was cross-checked against 
other information. HCC had developed techniques to 
reduce the need for routine visits
• Inadequate feedback: core standards assessment did 
not mean a physical inspection of premises, patients, 
staff or service, it could be confined to an inspection of 
paperwork. 
• Inadequate feedback, inadequate sensor operation: HCC 
risk-based core standards assessment of trust in July 
2007 failed to detect any non-compliance 
(documentation assessed, not physical inspection) 
• Late control actions: Complaint handling workload was 
so high it delayed completion of investigations and 
limited ability of HCC to use regulatory functions in 
response to complaints and limited follow-up to confirm 
action plans had been implemented
• Late control actions: Did not launch formal investigation 
until 2008 (based on concerns about mortality statistics, 
reports from campaigners and visits to trust). Lengthy 
investigation then oversaw gradual improvements
• Inadequate interactions with external bodies: Monitor 
and Deanery not notified of intention to investigate 
trust and concerns relevant to them. Deanery unaware 
of serious training issues until 2009
• Inadequate control actions: HCC did not follow-up on 
issues raised about trust from complaints and external 
reviews in 2006
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Unaware of West Midlands peer review of trust’s 
children’s services
• Reassured by trust’s actions having received 
negative reports in 2006 and 2007
• The checks of paperwork and self-declaration did 
not give full picture of trust status on several issues, 
including hygiene standards
• HCC patient and staff survey findings produced in 
2007 put trust in bottom 20% of trusts in the 
country. HCC put more value in assessment of 
documents and policies
• Until 2008 HCC did not have a means of 
systematically feeding local information from local 
assessors throughout organisation
• Higher levels of HCC not aware of trust’s application 
for foundation status. Although regional inspectors 
were aware. Monitor did not communicate with HCC 
about application and so were unaware of HCC 
forthcoming inspection when granting trust 
foundation status
• Mortality rate alerts received from 2007 and HCC 
began to monitor proactively and review alerts. In 
the beginning HCC satisfied by trust’s responses. 
Alerts received from various trusts often with 
innocent explanation for outliers 
 
Figure 44 Analysis of Healthcare Commission (HCC) 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Authorise, monitor and regulate NHS 
foundation trusts
• Powers to intervene in a foundation trust 
when there was significant non-compliance 
with statutory requirements
• Monitor not given specified role in regulation 
of quality of care
Context:
• Established in 2004 as an independent 
regulator of foundation trusts, Monitor 
had limited clinical managerial experience 
and expertise
• Authorised trust foundation status and 
took on responsibility for trust with that 
status authorised in 2008
• Policy and DH encouraged Monitor not to 
be a performance manager and not to 
micromanage and undermine 
responsibility of foundation trust boards
• Served formal intervention notice to trust 
in March 2009
• At time of HCC trust report publication, 
Monitor was engaged in intervention at 
another trust, with limited capacity to 
deal with multiple interventions
• Following HCC investigation and changes 
at trust, Monitor commissioned an 
external review into its own performance 
by KPMG 
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints with 
unidentified hazards: Lacked effective 
consideration of potential effects of cost 
saving and staff cuts on patient safety
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints with 
ineffective and delayed controls: Failed to act 
on concerns at trust to which it was aware 
and responded with undue delay (waited for 
HCC to finish investigation)
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints with 
control action not provided in system design: 
Following inquiry Monitor was given power to 
notify Secretary of State that foundation trust 
is failing to justify deauthorisation of 
foundation status. And power to start process 
of deauthorisation after giving notice to 
foundation trust of failure to meet specified 
requirements (repealed in 2012). Did not have 
these actions at time of Mid-Staffs failings 
• Inadequate coordination among controllers, 
due in part to system design: HCC inspected 
and reported quality at trust but had to have 
Monitor intervene for foundation trust. 
Monitor ended up waiting for HCC 
investigation to finish before taking action and 
a change in trust leadership
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Did not know about concerns raised 
during build-up to HCC investigation prior 
to authorising trust foundation status
• Took the view that it would be 
inappropriate to take action on trust 
before the HCC investigation was finished
• Frustrated about HCC investigation 
duration and felt there was enough to act 
on without further analysis but did not 
feel it could act prior to investigation 
conclusions. Wanted HCC to make a 
recommendation to Monitor
 
Figure 45 Analysis of Monitor 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure proper standards in the practice of 
clinicians and clinically qualified leaders
• Provide guidance to clinicians and training 
establishments on maintaining and improving 
performance with reference to patient safety
• Investigate concerns on information related to 
fitness to practice of clinicians. Deal firmly and 
fairly with clinicians whose fitness to practice 
comes into doubt – sanctions include: 
warnings, conditions on registration, 
suspension, removal from register
• Publish standards of conduct, performance 
and ethics for nurses (NMC), doctors (GMC) 
and other registered clinical professions 
(HCPC)
Context:
• Act on complaints or information received 
that raises concern about professional 
conduct and required the information to 
include named individuals
• Professional regulators seen as place to 
report after concerns had been raised to 
local organisations
• Professional regulators seen as places to 
report individual clinicians rather than 
whole system failure
• GMC received information or complaints 
about 32 doctors working at the trust 
during period under review by inquiry
• Royal College of Surgeons undertook a 
review of trust surgical services in 2007 
and 2009, expressed several concerns and 
gave recommendations to the trust
• Regulator for individual practitioners and 
not the system as a whole
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate feedback: At the time of failings 
the GMC, NMC and HCPC lacked proactive 
monitoring of issues and were reliant on 
information being provided to them
• Inadequate feedback: GMC did not 
consolidate information from one trust and 
systematically identify trends
• Inadequate coordination and communication 
among controllers: GMC did not receive any 
information about HCC investigation from the 
trust or postgraduate deanery (GMC was 
given some information by HCC in 2008, but 
perhaps not all relevant information)
• Inadequate coordination and communication 
among controllers: NMC not fully informed 
about HCC investigation until 2 weeks before 
publication of report
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• There was a lack of referrals to 
professional regulators by professionals 
when they had concerns
• The trust did not have a proper policy to 
refer clinicians to professional regulators
• Lack of feedback on issues at trust limited 
professional regulators’ awareness
• Royal College of Surgeons critical review 
of trust not shared with GMC
• NMC only made aware of 3 cases 
concerning quality of care of nursing at 
trust during period reviewed by inquiry
• HCPC had not received any information 
regarding issues at the trust
 
Figure 46 Analysis of regulators of clinical profession 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Implement and operate the national system 
for learning from error and adverse events
• Share information with NHS regulatory and 
oversight bodies
• National Reporting and Learning System 
(NRLS) to identify risks at a national level
• Send patient safety alerts, solutions to 
address repeatedly encountered medical 
problems, as national guidance
Context:
• Not a regulatory body. Had no regulatory 
powers and not responsible for 
monitoring performance of individual 
organisations
• NRLS fully implemented in 2005
• Healthcare staff could report incidents 
through their local organisation, directly 
to NPSA website or through a specialist 
group
• Patients and public could report safety 
incidents through a local organisation or 
through NPSA website
• NRLS reporting was voluntary
• NPSA sent 6 cause for concern letters to 
trust between November 2008 and June 
2010 (not exceptional compared to other 
trusts)
• NPSA not designed to review its data as a 
regulatory organisation would. 
• NPSA felt that concerns about individual 
trusts, local learning and local change was 
remit of SHA, PCT and HCC 
• NPSA began sharing increasing amounts 
of information with SHA from 2007
• NPSA set-up and operating during a 
period of healthcare reorganisations, 
therefore relatively low priority given to 
reporting system
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate feedback: Poor standards of 
nursing care probably under-reported in 
voluntary incident reporting system
• Inadequate feedback: Patient incidents 
possibly under-reported
• Inadequate assignment of goals, control 
authority and responsibilities in system 
design: NPSA the only organisation external to 
the trust that routinely received reports of 
issues, such as staffing shortages, from trust’s 
own reporting system. However, NPSA not 
equipped or designed to analyse individual 
reports, nor share them with other bodies 
which monitored and regulated the trust’s 
performance (they only received reports on 
serious untoward incidents)
• Inadequate coordination and communication 
among controllers: NPSA did not inform HCC, 
SHA or PCT about letters of concern sent to 
trust. NPSA did not routinely communicate 
with regulators and only did so once after HCC 
investigation due to heightened alert
• Ineffective control action, action does not 
enforce safety constraints: Trust’s compliance 
with NPSA patient safety alerts by deadline 
given was 67% 2004 to 2008, and 76% 2008 to 
2009 (only sl ightly below average for peers)
• Inadequate coordination and communication 
amongst multiple controllers: NPSA did not 
follow-up on failure of trusts to implement 
safety alerts, believing it was the role of SHAs 
and PCTs. SHA did not receive safety alerts 
and did not monitor trust compliance
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Trust A&E had a low rate of incident 
reporting in 2006-2008 (indicative of lack 
of learning culture)
• NPSA did not receive information on 
mortality rates
• Trust responded to letters of concern to a 
reasonable standard
• NPSA inquiry line only received one email  
(from a senior staff nurse) of potential 
interest to inquiry. This was not acted 
upon by NPSA as out of their normal 
practice
 
Figure 47 Analysis of National Patient Safety Agency 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• NHSLA Collects information about nature and 
number of claims made against trust. Sets risk 
management standards for all NHS 
organisations and assess organisations against 
those standards
• NCAS advised trust on appropriate actions 
when concerned about practice of a doctor, 
dentist or pharmacist
Context:
• NHSLA is not a regulator and is concerned 
with management of claims made against 
NHS
• Mid-Staffs Trust used its NHSLA rating in 
support of its self declarations to HCC
• Trust reported a cluster of cases to NCAS 
in 2007 and 2009 following Royal College 
of Surgeons peer review
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Coordination and communication flaws: 
NHSLA assessment of trust in 2007 found no 
cause for concern. The ratings given by NHSLA 
were used by the trust in support of its self 
declarations to regulators. Ratings wrongly 
thought by some to verify the presence of 
good quality care
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• NHSLA rejected claims that standards 
assessment could be used to indicate 
satisfactory standards of care. Potential 
for others to incorrectly interpret 
meaning of rating
• Trust did not share Royal College of 
Surgeons report with NCAS
 
Figure 48 Analysis of NHS litigation authority 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• GMC had duties relating to the oversight of 
approved practice setting establishments for 
undergraduate training and foundation year 1
• PMETB had responsibilities for foundation 
year 2 and onwards 
• Foundation school Deans oversaw quality and 
performance in the training provided
Context:
• GMC/PMETB inhibited by lack of choice of 
realistic intervention options
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Unidentified hazards: Lacked consideration of 
risk of placing trainees in a trust incompliant 
with minimum safety and quality standards
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Trust 
had declared non-compliance with 
development and training standards (2005 
and 2007). Trust stil l passed GMC assessment
• Coordination issue: GMC assessment relied on 
HCC assessments and trust self-declaration. 
GMC had no powers of audit or inspection
• Ineffective feedback: Monitoring of training 
lacked gathering of information on trust 
compliance with safety standards
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Training regulators may have had too 
narrow a view of their role regarding 
oversight of medical training and had 
inadequate thought regarding wider 
patient safety implications
• GMC did not look at or was not aware of 
information on trust’s high mortality rates 
and the increasing concerns of HCC
• HCC, SHA and trust failed to ensure that 
PMETB and GMC were aware of serious 
concerns with trust A&E in 2008
 
Figure 49 Analysis of medical training boards 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Enact a general duty on every employer to 
ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the 
health, safety and welfare of all its employers
• This duty is also owed to people who are put 
at risk by the activities of persons at work
Context:
• Does not investigate matters of clinical 
judgement or quality of care
• HSE deals with the major non-clinical risks 
to patients such as trips and falls
• Investigations relating to non-employees 
were restricted by national guidance
• Hospitals only a very small proportion of 
HSE’s work
• Conducted both proactive and reactive 
inspections
• Trust inspected in 2007 as a result of a 
national directive and further inspections 
occurred following reporting of injuries, 
diseases and dangerous occurrences 
regulations (RIDDOR)
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Communication and coordination issues with 
other regulators: Some lack of sharing of 
information between HSE and other 
regulators such as HCC. System design lacked 
a repository for sharing knowledge
• Inadequate coordination among controllers: A 
lack of clarity on which organisational body 
regulates what. With some overlap in 
responsibilities between HSE and healthcare 
regulators. A lack of awareness of each other’s 
limitations regarding control actions (HSE only 
regulator with powers of prosecution)
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Limited information sharing from HCC
• HCC did not inform HSE formally of 
investigation until January 2009
• No complaints made to HSE by any 
patient group
 
Figure 50 Analysis of Health and Safety Executive 
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Safety-related responsibilities:
• Allocate overall healthcare system resources 
and lead the direction of the NHS
• Responsibil ity for stewardship of the 
healthcare regulatory system
• 2005 objective to enhance the quality and 
safety of services for patients
Context:
• Tendency for system to reflect the 
political ambitions of the government of 
the time
• Frequent reorganisation of NHS structure
• Distinction between DH and NHS is 
blurred and NHS often not treated as 
separate from government
• Increasing pressures on resources
• NHS run at an operational level by SHAs, 
PCTs and provider trusts. DH does not 
manage individual hospitals, with a push 
for decentralisation and local 
management
• Objectives for both higher quality services 
and value for money
• The report ‘An Organisation with a 
Memory’, Sir Liam Donaldson published in 
2000 had drawn attention to need for 
clinical governance and system safety 
principles. But there had been a challenge 
in ensuring the acceptance and 
implementation of these principles by 
front-line professionals
• System focussed on finance over quality 
of care
• The regulatory model was developmental
• Constant reorganisation of NHS had 
undesirable consequences
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints, 
design of regulatory system does not enforce 
constraints: 
• Inadequate coordination between 
regulatory agencies
• Inadequate feedback with lack of 
inclusion of patient and family voices in 
regulatory system
• Inadequate feedback with flaws in 
quality assessment and interpretation in 
regulatory system
• Inadequate organisational change process for 
reassignment of roles in reorganisation of SHA 
and PCT. PCT not capable of monitoring 
quality as required by DH 
• Unidentified hazards: DH required NHS to 
reduce costs without impacting on services. 
DH did not have means to identify the 
potential impact on patient safety
• Unidentified hazards: Reorganisations of NHS 
took place without comprehensive impact or 
risk assessment
• Inadequate allocation of resources: Deficits 
caused redundancies and ward closures 
throughout country, potential impact on 
patient safety unaccounted for
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints, 
unsafe control actions given: Government 
policy gave the impression that priorities such 
as hitting targets for waiting lists and 
achieving financial balance, were more 
important than patient safety
• Inadequate feedback: System relating to 
complaints sent to DH was inadequate. 
Complaints were not processed by DH
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Trust performance indicators did not 
show a problem at the trust
• Assumed that providers would maintain 
standards while reducing costs
• DH received 119 letters of complaint 
about the trust in period reviewed, but 
conducted no analysis of them. DH passed 
the letters on to the trust
• Patient safety not always at forefront of 
DH thinking and in turn NHS manager 
thinking. Operated with incomplete 
models of work as imagined, rather than 
work as done
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Appendix 9 Case Study 2 initial control structure 
Patient
Prescribing doctor
Safety responsibility
- check nurse recommendation
- prescribe medicine
Context in which decisions are made
On call cover for ward
Inadequate control actions
Mental model flaws
Hospital management
Safety requirements and constraints
- ensure good information transfer at various interfaces
Inadequate control actions
Diabetes specialist nurse
Safety responsibility
- review patient
- recommend medication
Context in which decisions are made
Inadequate control actions
Mental model flaws
Patient receiving correct meds, checks 
by others
Ward nurse *2
Safety responsibility
- administer medicine
- monitor patient condition
Context in which decisions are made
- Short staffed
- <12 months experience in UK
- Medication takes 2-3 days to reach 
peak plasma effect
Inadequate control actions
Did not refer to DSN document only 
prescription
Did not question dosage
Mental model flaws
Assume correct prescription from 
previous checks
Pharmacy
Safety responsibility
- check prescription
- dispense medication
Context in which decisions are made
Inadequate control actions
Mental model flaws
Assumed correct prescription from 
previous checks
Advanced nurse practitioner
Safety responsibility
- Clerk patient and check paperwork
Context in which decisions are made
Inadequate control actions
- Checks made after first administration 
of medication
Mental model flaws
Ward nurse
Safety responsibility
- monitor patient condition
- administer medication
Context in which decisions are made
Medication takes 2-3 days to reach 
peak plasma effect (lagged feedback)
Inadequate control actions
Did not question dosage
Mental model flaws
Assumed correct prescription
Audits
Reports
Procedures
Forms
Clinical status
Physiological status inc. blood sugar
Medication
Inc. insulin
Prescription
TTO
Ward based doctor?
Safety responsibility
Medical notes
Recommendation
- pink form
- DSN sheet
Prescription
Medication
Inc. insulin
Medication
Inc. insulin
Clinical status
Physiological status 
inc. blood sugar
Clinical status
Physiological 
status inc. blood 
sugar
Clinical management
Safety requirements and constraints
- ensure good information transfer at various interfaces
Inadequate control actions
Ward based nurse
Safety responsibility
Discharge manager
Safety responsibility
Ensure that information is transferred
Context in which decisions are made
Inadequate control actions
Mental model flaws
Discharge summary
TTO
Prescription
Procedures
Forms
Audits
Reports
Discharge letter
TTO
Prescription
Procedures
Forms
Audits
ReportsDSN mentor
Safety responsibility
Support DSN
Inadequate control actions
Supervision
Verbal 
handover
 
Figure 52 Initial Case Study 2 control structure used in discussion with healthcare stakeholders
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Appendix 10: Case Study 2 workshop presentation slides 
Along with the slides shown in Appendix 6, the following slides were used in 
Case Study 2. 
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Appendix 11: Suicide prevention control structure used in discussion 
IAPT
CAMHS
CMHT
Older people
Adult
Older people
CAMHS
CRHT
Triage car
MHP with police
MHP in emergency 
care
Deliberate self 
harm teamDrug and alcohol 
service
MHP – Criminal 
Justice Team
Laws – Mental Health Act
Resources
Organisational Disasters
Status reports/national trends
Guidelines
Policy – number of patients per medic 
- inclusion/exclusion criteria for services
Audit/assessment
Status reports
Resources
Policy
Serious Incident Reports
CQC Inspection
Medication
Treatment
Voluntary inpatient admission
Involuntary inpatient admission
Crisis house services
Plan of care
Discharge planning
Assessment
Risk assessment
Contact by patient
Observation
Informal assessment
Policy
Risk assessment tools
Training
Status reports
Clinical audits
Incident reporting system
Status updates
Incident Reports
Resources
Policy Status updates
Assertive Outreach
Psychotherapy 
Service
Referral
Coordination of treatment
Information about patient
Contact 
with 
patient
Assessments
Medication
2. Patient non-
attendance/non-
compliance issues 
(11 cases)
4. Patient new to service 
or awaiting appointment 
(7 cases)
3. Patient declines 
support/service options 
offered    (4 cases)
1. Inherent weakness 
controlling a dynamic 
risk in a community 
environment (17 cases)
Investigations
5. Communication, 
coordination and 
process issues      
(7 cases)
CAMHS – Children and Adolescent Mental Health 
Services
CMHT – Community Mental Health Team
CQC – Care Quality Commission
CRHT – Crisis Resolution and Home Treatment
IAPT – Improving Access to Psychological Services
MHP – Mental Health Professional
NHS – National Health Service
NICE – The National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence
Support
 
Figure 53 Initial suicide prevention control structure
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